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Abstract 
Political party organisations respond to the challenges of their environments.  Different 
organisational structures have different capabilities and capacities and, therefore, some 
organisations are better suited to some environments.  What happened to party 
organisations when New Zealand changed from a first-past-the-post to a mixed member 
proportional electoral system?  Did all parties have the same capacities to meet the 
challenges raised by this new environment? 
 
This paper addresses these questions by examining the organisational responses of the 
New Zealand National Party to the introduction of the mixed member proportional 
electoral system after 1993.  The National Party was constructed to operate in a first-
past-the-post electoral system and it did so successfully, winning twelve of the nineteen 
elections it contested.  In response to the challenges of the first-past-the-post 
environment, National decentralised both candidate selection and campaign structure.  
National’s decentralised organisation proved to be a liability for National under the new 
mixed member proportional environment however.  Mixed member proportional 
demanded the construction of a nationwide list and a coherent campaign for the 
nationwide party vote.  With its existing organisational structure, National was unable 
to meet either of these demands and suffered the electoral repercussions of that failure.  
After four consecutive elections in which National lost vote share, the National Party 
centralised its organisation in 2003. 
 
This paper analyses the centralisation of the National Party organisation – and the 
reasons for it – by examining the Party’s efforts to reform candidate selection and 
management of campaigns.  The two organisational structures which National used for 
 i
selecting candidates and managing campaigns under mixed member proportional 
produced different results.  The candidate pools for 1996, 1999 and 2002 failed to 
provide nationwide appeal and produced incentive for electorate candidates to ignore 
the party vote element.  Further, the campaign structure for these three elections 
allowed electorate committees significant control and the ability to undermine the 
nationwide party vote campaign.  In the 2005 election, however, candidate selection 
and campaign management showed significant changes.  The candidate selection 
process provided incentives for electorate candidates to seek both electorate and party 
votes, although it arguably still failed to produce a nationally appealing party list.  The 
management of the campaign was also significantly different.  It demonstrated the 
benefit of central campaign control in a mixed member proportional electoral system.  
The 2003 centralisation gave National elites significant control and allowed National to 
almost double its 2002 result in the 2005 election.  This thesis demonstrates that a 
mixed member proportional electoral system gave National strong incentives to 
centralise its party organisation. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The New Zealand National Party was formed in 1936 to bring the centre-Right into one 
political entity to fight the New Zealand Labour Party under first-past-the-post electoral 
rules.  In that aim, it was successful.  National has spent more time in government than 
any other political party in New Zealand.  However, the environment in which National 
was shaped was dramatically changed with the introduction of a new electoral system – 
mixed member proportional – at the 1996 election.   
 
In the 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002 elections National suffered a significant vote share 
decline from each previous result and ended up barely above twenty percent in 2002.  
National undertook an internal review of its organisation in 2002-3 and found its 
organisation wanting.  The Party centralised its organisational structure substantially in 
2003.  In 2005 National was able to raise its vote share dramatically – indeed it was the 
largest leap in support National had ever received. 
 
The story of electoral reform in New Zealand is told elsewhere.1  Previously New 
Zealand used a simple plurality electoral formula in multiple single-member seats – or 
what is commonly referred to as first-past-the-post (FPP).  FPP tends to create two-
party systems and one-party governments.  After the electoral reform, New Zealand 
used mixed member proportional (MMP).  MMP is a two-tiered electoral system: the 
upper tier is a nationwide tally of votes which proportionally determines the overall 
                                                 
1 David Denemark, "Choosing MMP in New Zealand: Explaining the 1993 Electoral Reform," in 
Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of 
Both Worlds?,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie, New 
Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation: Accident? Design? Evolution? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1998); Jack Nagel, "New Zealand: Reform by (Nearly) Immaculate Design," in Josep M. Colomer (ed.), 
Handbook of Electoral System Choice,  (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004). 
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share of seats in the House of Representatives; while in the lower tier multiple districts 
elect a single representative using plurality rules.  For parties which receive five percent 
of the upper tier vote (or the party vote as it is common known) or one electorate seat, 
list seats are allocated to ensure proportionality so that the upper tier over-rides that of 
the lower tier.  Hence MMP produces an almost proportional result and is thus likely to 
produce a multi-party system and coalition governments. 
 
National’s decline and subsequent rise are, at least partially, organisational stories.  
Party organisation is both a mixture of formal rules and informal cultural norms.  The 
formal rules are contained in a constitutional document, whereas the informal rules are 
expected actions and behaviours for various actors.  The opportunities and challenges 
provided by an organisational structure act as a filter on party behaviour.  An 
organisational rule or culture may create veto players who prevent certain behaviours 
and agenda setting players who push for certain behaviours and outcomes.  A political 
party’s organisational structure should be designed to help win elections; if not, they 
may face a vote share decline.  Party behaviour sends signals to voters and influences 
their decision on who to elect.   
 
The New Zealand National Party provides a useful case study of these phenomena.  
Under one electoral system, which required one form of campaigning and candidate, 
National succeeded.  National brought that same organisational structure into a new 
environment, with a different form of campaigning and candidate required, which saw 
National falter.  National changed its organisational structure by bringing power into 
the centre in two key areas.  The new centralised organisation worked well in the new 
environment.  National’s experience affirms the theory that there is a relationship 
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between the environment and political party organisation capability to attract votes.  
Some structures are more suited to some environments than others. 
 
This thesis is primarily not the story of how the re-organisation was implemented or 
who implemented it or a list of rule changes, although there are stories to be told there.  
Rather, this thesis looks at why the changes were needed and what impact the changes 
had.  To do so, this thesis looks at what impact party organisation has on party 
behaviour in two key areas – candidate selection and campaigning.  These two areas are 
both key elements that parties play within a democracy and are two of the most 
important elements and clash points within political parties.  Furthermore, they provide 
external evidence as to whether party behaviour changed.  Candidate selection 
determines the public face of the party and is one of the most significant battlegrounds 
for control within a party.  Campaigning needs to target certain voters depending on the 
electoral environment and different elements within a party may seek different groups 
of voters, hence who controls the campaign is internally important. 
 
Knowledge Gained 
Significant academic knowledge can be gained from researching the National Party.  It 
is hard to discern the influence of one environmental factor across parties in multiple 
countries.  No political party operates in two countries.  Comparative studies of the 
impact of one institution on party organisation come up against other differences 
between countries and parties.  However, the National Party provides a clear and 
unique opportunity to study the impact of the electoral system change on party 
organisation.  The differences to New Zealand during this period are minimal when 
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compared to the differences between the archetypical home of the two electoral systems 
– the United Kingdom (FPP) and Germany (MMP). 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the effectiveness of political party organisation is 
environmentally-contingent brings into question the assumption that party organisations 
have evolved according to universal trends.  The study of parties needs to move beyond 
that of labelling political parties as being ‘elite’, ‘mass’, ‘catch-all’ or ‘cartel’, and 
instead understand the individual complexity of each party and why parties take certain 
forms in certain environments. 
 
The case study of the New Zealand National Party provides insights about political 
parties more generally.  Pressure for electoral reform has grown in other modern 
democracies.  Political parties which formed their organisation in one electoral 
environment may find themselves confronted by challenges in a new electoral 
environment which their organisation is ill-suited.  What happened to National may 
give cause for despair, in that significant decline may occur as a result of electoral 
system change, or hope, as it is possible to change and revitalise organisational 
structure.  Other parties may learn from what happened to National and be better 
prepared to face the challenges of electoral reform. 
 
Layout of Thesis 
This thesis is structured to seek out the insights from National’s experience.  First of all, 
a theoretical framework is built.  Some previous work has been undertaken on the 
influence of the electoral system on political party organisation – most notably in 
candidate selection methods and campaigning – and these are expanded on.  Specific 
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organisational structures may be ‘appropriate’ for different environments and 
organisational ideals are looked at for three electoral systems – FPP, party-list 
proportional representation and their hybrid, MMP.  It is argued that political parties 
operating in an MMP environment require a more centralised organisation than political 
parties operating in a FPP environment.  The challenges to analysing whether 
centralisation is due to electoral reform are also identified. 
 
Chapter Three analyses National’s political, ideological and organisational history.  The 
history demonstrates the advantages of a decentralised structure within an FPP 
environment.  Decentralisation permitted potentially conflicting interests to remain 
within a single organisation.  Furthermore, decentralisation allowed National’s 
campaigning to focus on winning the plurality of votes in electorates.  National became 
the ‘natural party of government’ in part due to its decentralised organisation. 
 
The decline that National entered into from 1993 to 2002 is then explored in Chapter 
Four.  The introduction of MMP raised a challenge for National – the need to campaign 
to maximise votes in a single nationwide electorate.  National’s organisation was 
unsuited to doing so and was the primary cause of National’s decline – especially as 
other potential factors are ruled out.  The Party elites understood that organisation was 
the primary cause of decline and tried to change it.  The attempted centralisation of 
1997 failed but hinted at many of the reforms undertaken in the 2003 centralisation, 
which was indeed a success as demonstrated by candidate selection and campaign 
structure. 
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MMP requires a different form of candidate than FPP which needs to focus on the 
nationwide electorate.  Decentralised candidate selection methods meant that the 1996, 
1999 and 2002 candidate pools were unsatisfactory and hindered the Party from 
campaigning successfully under the new electoral rules.  The 2003 review centralised 
candidate selection even though formally it became more decentralised.  These changes 
are then analysed in National’s candidate selection operation for the 2005 election.  
Ultimately institutional inertia prevented the complete centralisation of candidate 
selection and thus left ‘unfinished business’. 
 
One of the major problems of the old organisation was that National was not 
campaigning properly for a nationwide campaign as the new electoral system required.  
The decentralised organisation allowed electorates too much control to run their own 
campaign at the cost of a central campaign strategy.  The changes to National resulted 
in greater central flexibility and control over the campaign.  The 2005 election 
campaign is analysed to see how the centralisation enabled the party to run a better 
nationwide campaign.  The new organisation enabled National to reverse the decline it 
had been in for the previous four elections. 
 
Finally, the conclusion analyses whether the theorised relationship between electoral 
system and party organisation is correct.  While National provides one single case 
study, it does point to a casual relationship which needs to be explored further through 
a large-scale comparative project.  There is also speculation on long-term structural 
issues and challenges that National may need to deal with. 
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Chapter Two: The Impact of Electoral Reform on Party 
Organisation 
Two different areas of study within political science – electoral systems and political 
parties – overlap in a number of different ways.  The study of both areas is well 
established, but the study of the area of overlap contains several holes.  They are of 
course understandable – for an academic to study the overlap would require 
comprehensive understanding of two different areas which may not both be of interest 
to a researcher.  Broadly, there are four main areas of research that overlap between 
electoral systems and political parties.  The most obvious, and best researched, is the 
campaign period and elections – in which political parties operate within a set electoral 
system environment and compete for policy, office and/or votes.  Secondly, the impact 
of the electoral system on the party system is also well documented and indeed has well 
established ‘laws’.  The next area of study is the impact political parties have on the 
electoral system; although studies are not common, the research on this subject is 
expanding.  The final area of study is the impact electoral systems have on how 
political parties organise themselves.  This area is most in need of more academic 
attention and is the focus of this thesis. 
 
The experience of the New Zealand National Party provides a unique case study for the 
impact of electoral systems on party organisation.  New Zealand changed its electoral 
system in a referendum in 1993, and the new system was first used in 1996.  
Previously, New Zealand used first-past-the-post (FPP), afterwards New Zealand used 
mixed member proportional (MMP).  As MMP is a two-tiered system and a hybrid of 
different electoral systems – predominately party-list proportional representation 
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(PLPR) but with some elements from FPP – it presents unique party organisation 
challenges and hence provides a perfect example of the impact of electoral systems. 
 
Two areas highlight the key aspects of the impact of different electoral systems on 
party organisational rules.  Candidate selection mechanisms strongly influence who 
becomes a legislator and hence shape the public face of the party.  Campaign structure 
is the other key aspect as it impacts on how the party contests elections, what voters it 
targets and where it targets resources.  While analysing party organisation could simply 
focus upon governance, these two roles are vital to parties and provide external clues as 
to whether a re-organisation is purely administrative or has significant impact upon 
party behaviour and hence the politics of the polity.  There are challenges to analysing 
the impact electoral reform has had on party organisation (such as international trends 
in party organisation and oligarchic tendencies) as these may provide alternative 
explanations for centralisations within parties. 
 
Richard Katz argued that, when considering party organisation ideals, the question to 
be asked is: 
If rational candidates were designing a party with no aim 
in mind other than maximising their own chances of 
election and reelection, what would it be like?1   
A similar approach will be taken here, but will also consider the party-as-a-whole.  
While political party goals often extend to being more than just seeking election and re-
election, ideal party structures do exist as Weberian ideal types.  However, what is ideal 
in one environment may not be in another. 
                                                 
1 Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1980), 17. 
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 The Impact of Electoral Systems on Party Organisation 
Different environments have different impacts upon political party organisation.  Each 
polity has different laws and rules, peoples, political cultures and histories – all of these 
impact upon the citizenry and the political elites.  Party organisation is not independent 
of these impacts, but is shaped by the legal framework, by the party leaders and 
members, and the voters whom they seek out.  Hence environmental features are 
significant determinates of how a party organises itself. 
 
In a 1981 study Robert Harmel found that a country’s physical size, sectionalism, the 
strength of the legislature, federalism and decentralisation all have an impact upon the 
degree of centralisation within a political party; Harmel found no evidence that social 
heterogeneity or presidentialism affected party centralisation.2  A year later, Harmel 
and Kenneth Janda found that modernity, restrictions on suffrage, age of democracy, 
party competition and the electoral system all impact upon the degree of party 
complexity.3  However, neither of these works provides a suitable framework for the 
analysis of the impact of electoral reform within New Zealand on party organisation 
because they are too general and do not address the details of the formal and informal 
rules of political party organisation. 
 
There are some other academic works dealing with the impact of the electoral system 
on party organisation.  Japan’s electoral reform affected the nature of factionalism and 
                                                 
2 Robert Harmel, "Environment and Party Decentralization: A Cross-National Analysis," Comparative 
Political Studies 14, no. 1 (1981). 
3 Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, Parties and their Environments: Limits to Reform? (New York: 
Longman, 1982), 49. 
 9
campaign practices within the Liberal Democratic Party.4  Ma and Choy looked at 
Hong Kong’s electoral reform, from FPP to PLPR, and noted that “under [PL]PR the 
campaign did become more party-centred, more capital-intensive and media-intensive, 
with less emphasis on personalities, local issues and constituency services, and fewer 
negative campaigns.”5  Katz dealt with the impact of ballot structure (categorical versus 
ordinal) and district magnitude on parties.6  Yet none of these works provides a suitable 
framework for analysing changes to party organisation in New Zealand due to the 
different nature of the electoral systems being dealt with. Instead, a different framework 
will be established, primarily focusing on candidate selection and campaigning.   
 
Not all organisations are equally suited to mastering the challenges that environments 
throw at them.  Some organisational structures are more suited to dealing with 
challenges created by some environments than others.  MMP requires both a national 
candidate selection process and a national campaign for the party vote.  Hence MMP is 
likely to need a more centralised party organisation than FPP. 
 
Candidate Selection 
Michael Gallagher notes that the electoral system does not necessarily affect the degree 
of centralisation within the candidate selection process.  Instead the “electoral system 
                                                 
4 Ellis S. Krauss and Robert Pekkanen, "Explaining Party Adaptation to Electoral Reform: The Discreet 
Charm of the LDP?," Journal of Japan Studies 30, no. 1 (2004); Ray Christensen, "The Effect of 
Electoral Reforms on Campaign Practices in Japan: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles," Asian Survey 
38, no. 10 (1998). 
5 Ngok Ma and Chi-keung Choy, "The Impact of Electoral Rule Change on Party Campaign Strategy: 
Hong Kong as a Case Study," Party Politics 9, no. 3 (2003). 
6 Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. 
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strongly affects the mechanics of the selection process in every country.”7  As Hazan 
and Voerman note: 
Electoral systems at the national level and candidate 
selection methods at the party level are connected, maybe 
not causally but they do influence each other.  More 
precisely, the electoral system constrains and conditions 
the parties’ menu of choices concerning candidate 
selection.8   
While the relationship is complicated, electoral systems do influence candidate 
selection processes to some degree. 
 
Different electoral systems require different numbers of candidates per electoral district 
and the electoral units are on different scales.  These two factors are independent of 
each other in different systems, for instance a presidential election requires one 
candidate for an entire country; whereas bloc voting, single transferable voting and 
single non-transferable voting all require multiple candidates in small geographic 
districts.  Further, electoral systems in which there is only one candidate per district 
allow for a simpler selection process than one in which there are many candidates per 
district. 
 
Under a FPP electoral system selecting a candidate can be a straight-forward affair.  
Each electorate only requires one candidate to be selected.  However, the selectorate 
may be composed of in many ways.  Some parties may place the selection decision in 
                                                 
7 Emphasis in original.  Michael Gallagher, "Conclusion," in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh 
(eds.), Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics,  (London: Sage, 
1988), 260. 
8 Reuven Y. Hazan and Gerrit Voerman, "Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection," Acta Politica 41, 
no. 2 (2006). 
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the hands of the local party members, other parties may allow the head office to decide 
and some parties may place the decision in between the two extremes.  The process is 
likely to be relatively simple as just one candidate is selected.  As the candidate only 
needs to win a plurality in a small geographic electorate, there is little need for 
considering diversity.  Hence, a decentralised selectorate will be able to select an 
‘appropriate’ candidate. 
 
PLPR selection methods tend to be more complex.  In order to select multiple 
candidates for a party list an internal electoral system (a ‘selectoral system’) needs to be 
developed.  Outright voting may not be appropriate as “[PL]PR systems carry with 
them a need for a balanced ticket with, perhaps, a greater emphasis on aspirants’ 
objective personal characteristics such as gender, age and group affiliation.”9  Hence, 
the selectorate may discuss and appoint rather than vote and elect.  Furthermore, in list 
systems a high ranking is seen as a positive and infighting is likely to be more 
substantial than in ‘in/out’ systems.  As PLPR tends to have large district magnitudes 
(in some instances, nationwide), representation on the selectorate may need to be 
formalised in order to keep the party balanced. 
 
Under MMP complexity rises when compared to both FPP and PLPR due to the two-
tiered nature of the system.  FPP enabled all selections to be done at a local level if the 
party so decided.  PLPR requires a nationwide or regional list selection and hence a 
nationwide or regional selectorate.  However, MMP within New Zealand requires one 
nationwide list which needs to be determined at a nationwide level and an electorate 
selection process.   
                                                 
9 Gallagher, "Conclusion," 260. 
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 Different district magnitudes require different forms of candidates.  Single-member 
constituency candidates often reflect the prevailing social characteristic and identity of 
the region and selectorate – hence white males tend to dominate.10  However, a list of 
candidates needs to reflect all social characteristics and identities to some degree.  
Linking the list and electorate candidate through dual candidacy may make the 
candidate pool inappropriate for one tier of the electoral system and negatively affect 
the party’s ability to win either electorate or party votes. 
 
Yet linking the candidate pools through dual candidacy may have a positive impact on 
campaigning.  If a party uses a system in which there is no direct relationship between 
the two tiers then the different pools of candidates are likely to campaign independently 
for separate votes.  Electorate-only candidates may run a personalistic campaign, 
largely ignoring the party vote element, whereas list-only candidates may run a party 
vote-only campaign.  The most beneficial campaign for both the party and the 
electorate candidate is to run a ‘two-ticks’ campaign if they are complementary in what 
voters they seek. 
 
Ultimately it is the party vote that matters most under MMP for maximising 
parliamentary representation.  Hence, it is the nationwide candidate pool that is most 
important, not the local candidate.  Parties are what matter, not individual candidates.  
                                                 
10 Males have still tended to dominate as candidates even though women make up fifty percent of the 
population.  See: Richard E. Matland, "Enhancing Women’s Political Participation: Legislative 
Recruitment and Electoral Systems," in Julie Ballington and Azza Karam (eds.), Women in Parliament: 
Beyond Numbers,  (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005), 
94-97; Nadezhda Shvedova, "Obstacles to Women’s Participation in Parliament," in Julie Ballington and 
Azza Karam (eds.), Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers,  (Stockholm: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005), 35-38. 
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Voters are more likely to determine their party vote on the overall composition of the 
list, rather than who their local candidate is.  Parties should place more control, over 
both tiers of candidate selection, with a central selectorate rather than depending on the 
choices of local selectorates.  The campaign benefits of linking the two candidate pools 
out-weigh those of separating the two pools.  While identity electorate candidates may 
be less suited to winning electorate votes, overall they will contribute more to the 
nationwide vote tally through their nationwide appeal. 
 
In the lead up to the change to MMP parties will need to adopt a new list candidate 
selection method.  Introducing candidate selection rules for a new electoral system “is 
not only a major organizational undertaking for the political parties, it undoubtedly 
involves political consequences”.11  Parties need to create a new method of selecting 
candidates which may lead to the party having to address divisions within the party 
which were previously settled (or at least ignored).  The easiest way for parties to 
address the changes in moving from FPP to MMP is to introduce a list selection process 
and leave the electorate selection process alone.  Each pool would be separate to ensure 
that they are appropriate for the vote they are trying to gain.  In a decentralised party it 
would be expected that the list selectorate would have strong regional representation.  
However, having significant regional representation may lead to infighting and no 
consideration of diversity on the list. 
 
The ideal-type candidate selection for MMP and what a party finds easiest to put in 
place are likely to be at a disjunction.  An MMP candidate selection method should 
provide parties with candidates that appeal to voters across the nation through a 
                                                 
11 Hazan and Voerman, "Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection." 
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centralised selection process.  However, placing a centralised structure to ensure 
nationwide appeal is going to be hard for parties which have previously been operating 
in a decentralising environment.  If a party is able to do so then their candidate pool 
will help attract voters; if not, it may contribute to a vote share decline. 
 
Campaign Structure 
Different electoral systems require different forms of campaigns and these different 
campaigns then entail different structures for party campaigns.  FPP largely requires a 
decentralised campaign, whereas PLPR requires a more centralised campaign.  With the 
change to MMP, a hybrid system, two levels of campaign emerge but ultimately MMP 
is more in tune with PLPR than FPP as it requires a party vote campaign first and 
foremost.  
 
Under FPP, the nationwide campaign is not necessarily significant.  While there is 
centralising pressure for parties to act cohesively at the parliamentary and policy levels, 
the pressure on campaigning is to decentralise the party.  A FPP campaign requires 
parties to focus upon the “seats deemed most marginal, thereby rendering those few 
constituencies a strategic fulcrum and electoral centrepoint while relegating all safe 
seats to electoral obscurity.”12  The campaign would be best suited to focus on the 
issues and concerns of marginal electorate swing voters and not those of all electors.  
Pork-barrel politicking is likely to occur as parties try to win votes in a small number of 
                                                 
12 David Denemark, "Thinking Ahead to Mixed-Member Proportional: Party Strategies and Election 
Campaigning under New Zealand's New Electoral Law," Party Politics 2, no. 3 (1996). 
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small geographic districts.13  With the median swing voter so important, parties 
compete for the centre-ground in order to win elections.14
 
In order to campaign under FPP a party structure should be set up to focus resources on 
a few small geographical areas.  Decisions on message targeting and campaign 
literature may be left to an extent to each constituency to ensure that resources are 
properly utilised to secure pluralities where possible.  The geographic lines which 
dictate whether a voter matters or not create the lines as to where party resources are to 
be focused.  Resources should be redistributed from ‘safe’ to ‘marginal’ electorates.  
Hence a degree of campaign decentralisation is to be expected within a FPP 
environment. 
 
PLPR, in contrast, gives equal weighting to all voters.  Parties need to be able to 
maximise their vote share throughout the country.  There are fewer wasted votes.  A 
vote in a marginal area is worth just as much as one in a safe area or an opposition 
stronghold.  The focus on the campaign is nationwide.  Pork-barrel politics is likely to 
be very low.15  Parties do not face electoral pressure to move towards the centre-
ground, but rather to be ideologically distinct.16  Campaigning through television 
becomes more effective.  Under PLPR, geographical targeting similar to – but also 
different from – FPP is important as voters of similar socio-economic groupings (and 
thus political groupings) tend to live in close proximity (in the same suburbs, cities and 
so forth).  These are likely to be groups of core supporters which PLPR parties target 
                                                 
13 Thomas D. Lancaster, "Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics," International Political Science 
Review/Revue Internationale de Science Politique 7, no. 1 (1986). 
14 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1985 [1957]), 117-
118. 
15 Lancaster, "Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics." 
16 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 126-127. 
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for ‘get-out-the-vote’ campaigns.  Parties will divert resources from marginal areas to 
focus on these groups.17
 
Nationwide campaigning lends itself to a different form of party organisation.  Central 
control becomes more important.  The leader becomes more central to the campaign; 
this does not imply presidentialisation of the leader but rather that the leader 
“campaigns on behalf of the party and is therefore associated with its standpoints and 
ideology.”18   As there are no clear boundaries between areas and as there may be no 
candidate with strong links to certain communities, a strong central authority is needed 
to ensure that all areas are sufficiently covered.  The central authority is the only 
internal organisation in a position to use nationwide television.19  Candidates can only 
benefit from the nationwide vote increasing, and are thus likely to accept central 
campaign control.20  Hence, a party operating in a PLPR electoral system is likely to 
have centralised campaign control. 
 
The two-tiered MMP electoral system produces a two-tiered electoral campaign.  On 
the lower tier, candidates fight in small units for a simple plurality of the electorate 
vote.  Yet, in the upper tier, parties fight nationwide for as many party votes as they can 
muster.  The nature and focus of the campaigns will differ, as Katz theorises: 
Parties competing in small districts will tend to be 
personalistically oriented or patronage oriented, whereas 
                                                 
17 Denemark, "Thinking Ahead to Mixed-Member Proportional." 
18 David M. Farrell, "Campaign Strategies and Tactics," in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and 
Pippa Norris (eds.), Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective,  (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, 1996), 165. 
19 Farrell, "Campaign Strategies and Tactics," 173. 
20 Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems, 32. 
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parties competing in larger districts will tend to be issue 
oriented.21
In this view, electorate campaigns will remain personalistic, whereas the nationwide 
campaign will focus on issues and leaders.  There is an incentive for electorate 
candidates to cultivate a personal vote at the electorate level.22  The campaign becomes 
more complex.  Ultimately, it is the party vote aspect which determines the overall 
share of seats within the legislature.  Hence the nationwide aspects of the PLPR 
campaign should outweigh the constituency level campaigns of FPP.   Yet the 
electorate candidate may not agree. 
 
Mixed electoral systems may produce complex, and sometimes contradictory, 
campaign structures in which there is intra-party conflict for control of resources and 
messages.  As Katz notes: 
To the extent that intraparty competition determines a 
candidate’s electoral fortunes, candidates will tend to 
maintain separate campaign organizations.23
While MMP does not have direct intra-party competition (unlike the single-transferable 
vote which Katz dealt with), it is implicit due to the two-tiered nature of the electoral 
system.  Katz’s hypothesis can be modified for mixed electoral rules: to the extent that 
constituency candidates can secure their own election in their constituencies, candidates 
will focus more on the constituency vote and hence have separate campaign 
organisations.  The electorates may use their resources to fight for a plurality of the 
electorate vote through personalistic campaigns undermining the party’s party vote 
                                                 
21 Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems, 33. 
22 John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank 
Ordering of Electoral Formulas," Electoral Studies 14, no. 4 (1995). 
23 Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems, 34. 
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campaign.  Consequently, the nationwide campaign may find itself battling against 
forces within its own party. 
 
However, party campaign organisational structure under mixed electoral laws should be 
nationwide.  While there will be pressure from constituency candidates to have their 
own campaign organisation, ultimately they are not working towards the good of the 
party-as-a-whole.  The main aim of the party is to maximise the party vote in order to 
maximise the number of legislators.  This may lead to the need for a very strong central 
campaign organisation which cannot only provide a nationwide focus but can also 
ensure that constituency candidates run a party vote campaign and place the needs of 
the nationwide party above and beyond their own election. 
 
Paradoxically, while mixed electoral systems are viewed as being in between the 
‘extremes’ of FPP and PLPR,24 they create pressure for party organisation to be at the 
extreme end of centralisation.  The countervailing tensions to decentralise (from the 
electorate candidates) and to centralise (from the view of the party-as-a-whole) need to 
be brought under control.  Only a strongly centralised campaign organisation can 
ensure the entire party works as a whole towards one goal of maximising the number of 
legislators through maximising the party vote.  Indeed, parties may feel that ‘spill-over’ 
or ‘contamination’ is enough to ensure that constituency candidates are elected. 
 
As with candidate selection, the introduction of a strong central agency to run a 
nationwide campaign is likely to face difficulties.  The organisation structure of FPP is 
                                                 
24 Matthew Soberg Shugart, ""Extreme" Electoral Systems and the Appeal of the Mixed-Member 
Alternative," in Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), Mixed-Member Electoral 
Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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likely to have created institutional inertia against moving campaign control towards the 
centre.  Again the structure a party finds easiest to implement and the MMP ideal type 
are likely to be at a disjunction potentially leading to poor party signals to voters and 
thus failing to attract votes. 
 
Under MMP there are stronger incentives for both candidate selection and campaign 
organisation to be centralised than under FPP.  With these two elements needing a 
stronger central authority, the governance structure of the party needs to give 
significant power to the central.  Thus it is likely that the entire party organisation will 
become centralised rather than leaving some party functions decentralised.  However 
institutional inertia will need to be overcome in order to enact the necessary changes. 
 
Challenges for Analysis 
There are several challenges in determining whether centralisation after electoral 
reform is due to the intricate workings of the new system or is a part of a different 
trend.  There are a number of trends which result in the centralisation of a political 
party.  The wider trends each have their own impetus for reform as well as other factors 
that should be present.  However, if none of these factors are present then the 
centralisation can be ascribed to the change to MMP rather than electoral reform being 
used as an excuse by party elite reformers.  Ultimately there is a need for multiple case 
studies in order to control other variables. 
 
 20
Centralisation as a Response to Decline 
Any party which undergoes significant vote share decline is likely to engage in self-
reflection.  There are many factors that lead to party decline – reduced trust, leadership 
crisis, poor policy, social and economic change, the rise of other competitive parties 
and so forth.  While these factors may have led to the decline “parties in defeat tend to 
blame weak organization rather than weakness in policy”,25 thus centralising party 
organisation when it was not the cause of the vote share decline.  There have been 
numerous recent examples within Western Europe in which political parties have faced 
a decline or defeat and consequently had to adapt in order to survive.26   
 
Parties’ responses to decline include centralising party organisation, opening up 
leadership and candidate selection to the wider party membership, and decreasing the 
separation between the party and the leadership.27  Failure to adapt has been common 
and has led to substantial problems and the rise of alternative political parties.28  Parties 
have had to adapt to changing environments and have tended to do so by increasing 
leadership flexibility instead of reverting back to the ideological roots of the party.  
 
It can be difficult to determine whether a party is reforming itself due to decline or due 
to electoral reform, as post-electoral reform parties that have inappropriate structures 
are likely to decline in the new electoral environment.  Hence, the key to analysing 
whether centralisation is due to the impact of the electoral system on party organisation 
                                                 
25 R. S. Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 170. 
26 Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Fritz Plasser (eds.), Political Parties and Electoral Change: 
Party Responses to Electoral Markets (London: Sage Publications, 2004). 
27 Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Fritz Plasser, "Conclusion: Political Parties in Changing Electoral 
Markets," in Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Fritz Plasser (eds.), Political Parties in Changing 
Electoral Markets,  (London: Sage, 2004), 265. 
28 Mair, Müller, and Plasser, "Conclusion," 268-272. 
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is to analyse what caused the party to decline.  If there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that other factors apart from electoral reform are responsible for the decline then it is 
possible that the organisation was ‘appropriate’ for the new environment.  Further 
evidence can be found after the centralisation – if other factors are responsible for the 
decline then a re-organisation may be unable to deal with them and hence the party will 
continue to suffer poor results.  However, if there is no evidence that other factors are 
responsible for decline, and after the re-organisation the party recovers votes, then it is 
likely that the party organisation needed to be changed due to the electoral reform. 
 
Centralisation as a Response to Internal Instability 
Internally, political parties are not unified – there are many internal divisions.  
Occasionally, the balance of power changes within parties, leading to the new 
controllers to attempt to change the organisational structure to benefit themselves.29  
Parties in a turbulent electoral environment may have significant internal politicking 
and thus some elites may try to take over the party.  A stable electoral arena means “we 
can expect greater cohesion and stability in the parties’ dominant coalitions”, whereas 
in a turbulent arena “the dominant coalition is likely to have… serious internal 
tensions”.30  Changing an electoral system is likely to cause voter fluidity and thus 
internal tensions may rise within the existing parties ultimately leading some elites to 
attempt to takeover the party. 
 
                                                 
29 Robert Harmel, Uk Heo, Alexander C. Tan, and Kenneth Janda, "Performance, Leadership, Factions 
and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis," West European Politics 18, no. 1 (1995). 
30 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization & Power, trans. Marc Silver (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 208. 
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In this view, a party centralisation process is the victory from a battle for some elites to 
gain greater control over the party.  It can be predicted that those elites would seek out 
reforms which would strengthen their control over as many aspects of the party as 
possible.  Furthermore, there would be attempts to institutionalise their control by 
limiting the ability of other elites in moving into the new central authority.  Hence, 
there would be expectations for the post-centralised party organisation to have no 
regional representation on the central executive or selectorate and to have an internal 
electoral system for the executive which strongly favours incumbents. 
 
Several factors must be present for this theory to be accepted.  First of all, there must be 
a clear group of elites pushing these reforms.  Secondly, there must be clear evidence of 
significant internal disputes between different elite groups.  The dispute should not just 
be evident before the attempted centralisation, but would be significant in the party 
conference in voting on organisational reform.  Furthermore, the rule changes should 
strongly benefit the central elites and institutionalise their position.  Without these 
factors it is unlikely that the reform was solely part of internal instability and infighting 
for control. 
 
Centralisation as a Movement towards the Cartel Model 
Party organisation has seemingly gone through various different models.  Parties were 
first formed as ‘elite’ parties within the legislature environment.  ‘Mass’ parties arose in 
response, with large membership bases and organisational structures.  As parties lost 
membership and voter loyalty, they took on the ‘catch-all’ model.  More recently 
parties have taken on another form – the ‘cartel’ model.  Katz and Mair note that in the 
cartel party model: 
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[Members] affiliate directly with the central party, 
obviating the need for local organizations, and hence also 
for local organizers.  Indeed, it becomes possible to 
imagine a party that manages all of its business from a 
single central headquarters.31
Any party following the cartel model is significantly centralised and professionalised. 
 
The cartel model also requires a centralised structure.  Other features of the cartel 
model would likely be pushed as well, and the absence of these would indicate that 
perhaps cartelisation is not the primary cause of the re-organisation.  Cartel parties tend 
to also blur the lines between supporter and member – often supporters are allowed to 
participate in party activities.  Delegate rules change from the delegate to the trustee 
model to break the power of regional or sector elites.  Moreover, cartel parties often 
appropriate state resources, working in collusion with other parties to do so.32  Again, 
the absence of these other rule changes would indicate that centralisation is not due to 
cartelisation. 
 
These three alternative explanations to centralisation all require certain events, 
structures and rule changes.  While all three are generalised, it would be expected that a 
party undergoing centralisation as a result of any of these three developments would 
exhibit at least signs of attempted further change along specific lines.  Hence to 
establish that a party’s re-organisation is a result of electoral reform there needs to be 
significant evidence that electoral reform is not simply being used as an excuse by the 
organisation reformers. 
                                                 
31 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party," Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995). 
32 Katz and Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy." 
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 Parties Undergoing Electoral Reform 
Political parties after electoral reform can expect to undergo some significant changes 
internally.  The ideal typology is unlikely to be met in any situation as there are 
numerous other factors involved.  Political party organisation is ‘conservative’ – it does 
not change without reason and motivation.33  Parties are likely to suffer from a ‘FPP 
hangover’ and attempt to retain their FPP organisational structure in the new electoral 
environment.  Institutional inertia may freeze organisation as some elites seek to retain 
their power.  In theory, a party which is unlike its ideal type should find significant 
difficulty in selecting appropriate candidates and running an appropriate campaign.  
Hence, under a new electoral system, ceteris paribus, parties which react quickly in 
adopting a new model (or even had it in place already) are likely to fare better than 
those who retain most, if not all, of their previous organisational structure. 
 
Thus, hypotheses can be proposed for political parties making the transition from FPP 
to MMP, as happened in New Zealand: 
Hypothesis 1: In competitive environments, political 
parties require an organisation which is suited to the 
environment in which they operate in. 
Hypothesis 2: MMP requires a more centralised 
organisation than FPP. 
 Hypothesis 2.1: A Shift from FPP to MMP is 
likely to produce a centralisation of candidate selection 
and campaigning.  
                                                 
33 Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," Journal 
of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994). 
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The National Party provides an excellent case study for testing these hypotheses as it is 
a party dedicated to winning elections above all else and its organisational structure was 
set up to do so under FPP.  Hence, pressure to reform organisation to win elections is 
likely to be stronger in National than in Labour, which has been more accepting of 
electoral defeat and being in opposition. 
 
National faced new challenges in the MMP environment.  For the first time National 
had to create a nationwide list which appealed throughout the country, rather than to a 
small electorate.  National also had to figure out how to maximise the party vote 
through the country, rather than focusing on receiving the plurality in small electorates.  
These challenges required new activities and new organisational capabilities, which the 
decentralised organisation struggled to meet. 
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Chapter Three: The New Zealand National Party 
The New Zealand National Party was formed in 1936 and soon became the most 
successful political party in New Zealand.  National has been able to form government 
more often than any other party and dominated the government benches from 1949 to 
1984.  The Party has always had two distinct ideological branches running through both 
the caucus and the organisation.  Consequently, the Party organisation has had to be 
flexible enough to sustain two different strands of thought in one political entity while 
still realising the goal of winning office.  National achieved this by decentralising its 
organisation to five divisions and to the electorates.  The distinct environment in which 
National formed allowed it to become a success. 
 
History 
From the Party’s formation in 1936 until the change to the mixed member proportional 
(MMP) electoral system, National had an average vote share of 44 percent.  National 
won twelve of the nineteen first-past-the-post (FPP) elections it contested.  However, 
according to proportional tenure criteria National ‘should’ have won only 44 percent 
(or 8.4 elections) of the FPP elections it contested.1  While National has been highly 
successful in terms of winning office and votes, it has been unable to create policy in 
line with its ideological backgrounds, having to be largely content with managing 
Labour’s welfare state. 
 
                                                 
1 For proportional tenure, see: Peter J. Taylor, "The Case for Proportional Tenure: A Defense of the 
British Electoral System," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing An Electoral System: 
Issues and Alternatives,  (New York: Praeger, 1984); Peter J. Taylor and Arend Lijphart, "Proportional 
Tenure vs Proportional Representation: Introducing a New Debate," European Journal of Political 
Research 13, no. 4 (1985). 
 27
Formation 
The New Zealand National Party was formed at a conference in Wellington over 13/14 
May 1936.  However, calls for the National Party to form predate the conference.  
Previous attempts to establish one political entity on the Right failed on several 
occasions.  The success in keeping one party has been rewarded substantially at the 
ballot box.  The formation period highlights many of the problems constantly faced 
throughout the history of the National Party. 
 
The Liberal and Reform parties, formed by urban liberals and rural conservatives 
respectively, dominated New Zealand politics in the early 20th century.  The New 
Zealand Labour Party was established in 1916 and took eight seats in the 1919 election.  
Labour won seventeen seats in 1922, and interest rose in fusing Liberal and Reform 
together.  Reform Leader, and Prime Minister, Bill Massey argued: 
[T]he results of the election show the necessity for a 
reconstruction of parties.  The three party system cannot 
possibly be satisfactory in any case, and it is simply folly 
for the Liberals and Reformers to go fighting each other 
when so far as policy is concerned there is little or 
nothing between them.2
Massey understood Duverger’s Law before Maurice Duverger.  A conference was held 
in 1925, but failed to merge the parties as new Reform Leader Gordon Coates believed 
the Liberals would soon fade away altogether.3
 
                                                 
2 Quoted in: Alan Robinson, "The Rise of the New Zealand National Party, 1936-1949" (MA, University 
of New Zealand (Victoria), 1957), 4. 
3 Barry Gustafson, The First 50 Years: A History of the New Zealand National Party (Auckland: Reed 
Methuen, 1986), 2-3. 
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United (a new name for the Liberals) and Reform competed together as a coalition in 
the 1931 elections, and won.  For the 1935 election United and Reform decided to co-
fight Labour as the National Political Federation.  With the two parties co-fighting 
another election together, United members called for a permanent fusing of the parties.  
However, Reformers rejected the calls.  At the 1935 election Labour defeated the 
Federation – who not only had to deal with the Great Depression and an electorate tired 
of their old candidates, but also with Labour’s far superior organisation.4  The 
Federation was left with just 17 Members of Parliament (MPs). 
 
In 1936 a seriously demoralised and divided grouping merged.  The Dominion 
Executive of the National Political Federation recommended fusing the parties along 
with other anti-Labour forces such as the Democratic Party.  Subcommittees were 
formed to draft a constitution and the conference was called for 13 and 14 May 1936 in 
Wellington.  After a protracted debate over the new party’s name, ‘The New Zealand 
National Party’ was formally adopted, and Reform and United disbanded.  The 
doctrines of the party were discussed with eight objectives adopted, only three of them 
on policy issues – two conservative and one liberal.5  From the start, National tried to 
downplay the internal ideological divide within the organisation. 
 
Soon the Party began to get active.  Large recruitment drives throughout the country 
saw membership increase rapidly.  For instance, the Auckland Division’s membership 
went from 4,388 in January 1938 to 20,958 by mid-August.6  The 1938 election was 
fought on an anti-Labour platform and National gained six new MPs.  The 1943 
                                                 
4 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 4, 6-7. 
5 For the objectives, see: Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 9-10. 
6 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 25. 
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election saw National gain a further eight seats, but lost the election due to the soldiers’ 
vote favouring Labour.7  The 1946 election was again almost National’s first victory; 
however the four Māori seats,8 and thus the election, went to Labour. 
 
The Natural Party of Government, 1949-1984 
National’s first victory was not until 1949.  New National Party Prime Minister Sidney 
Holland dismantled many of the remaining rationing and controls from World War II, 
only to reinstate some of them due to high inflation and two balance of payments crises 
in 1952 and 1954.  The National Government took a tough stance against the waterfront 
workers in the largest industrial dispute in New Zealand.  New Zealand entered into a 
formal military alliance with the United States indicating a swing away from the 
traditional reliance on Britain.  Nearing the 1957 election the country’s economy 
deteriorated and Holland was unwell, having to be replaced as Prime Minister by Keith 
Holyoake.  The 1957 election was won by Labour by a margin of just two seats. 
 
National aggressively attacked the Second Labour Government, successfully labelling 
the 1958 budget as the ‘Black Budget’ and undermining the public’s faith in Labour.  
The 1960 election resulted in a 12 seat victory for National.  Compulsory unionism was 
abolished, compulsory military training reintroduced, troops were sent to Vietnam and 
the policy of assimilating Māori into Pākehā society began.  The government rode the 
wave of economic prosperity.  In 1972, Holyoake stood down as Prime Minister for 
John Marshall.  However, the electorate felt that it was ‘time for a change’ and elected 
Labour, led by the charismatic Norman Kirk. 
                                                 
7 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 50. 
8 The spelling “Māori” will be used, except in quotations. 
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 Labour suffered from two events outside of its control – the oil shock in 1973 which 
sent the world’s economy into crisis, and the untimely death of Norman Kirk in 1974.  
National, now led by Robert Muldoon, successfully won the 1975 election against Bill 
Rowling.  Muldoon was naturally a populist and held onto the security blanket that was 
the welfare system.  With economic problems developing, Muldoon implemented 
significant controls on the New Zealand economy such as heavy borrowing and 
freezing wages and prices.  National only survived the 1978 and 1981 elections due to 
the distortions of FPP – in both elections Labour won more votes although National 
won more seats.  Internal discontent with Muldoon became apparent, with a ‘Colonel’s 
Coup’ being launched in 1980 against Muldoon, but falling over at the last moment. 
 
While National was highly successful in winning office, it came at the expense of 
implementing policy in line with National’s intellectual tradition.  National had to be 
content with largely managing Labour’s welfare system, rather than dismantling it,9 
and the level of inter-party policy consensus was extremely high.10  Not only were 
voters not attracted to proposals to radically reform the New Zealand economy, 
National also struggled to formulate policy which pleased all of its interests and 
factions, and thus became content with accepting the status quo rather than risk 
infighting and desertions.11  The Party clearly favoured office, votes and internal 
stability over policy innovation and implementation. 
 
                                                 
9 Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand, 285; Anthony Wood, "National," in Raymond Miller (ed.), 
New Zealand Government and Politics,  (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003), 251; Richard 
Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, third (updated by Peter Aimer) ed. (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 2004), 239.   
10 Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand, 275. 
11 Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand, 276. 
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Liberalisation and Realignment, 1984-1993 
The bipartisan Keynesian policy consensus was destroyed, not by National, but by 
Labour.  In 1984, the Fourth Labour Government was elected and embarked upon a 
radical liberalisation of the economy.12  National became split between those tied to the 
post-war consensus (especially the farming community) who wanted to use the 
discontent that ‘Rogernomics’ was creating in order to win office, and those who 
wished to re-assert National as the party of the Right and take a more pronounced neo-
liberal line.13  Furthermore, social/moral issues were becoming more prominent within 
New Zealand.  During the Fourth Labour Government the conservative and liberal 
factions within National became clearer and were “increasingly visible and solid, and 
their existence was apparent in both the party organisation and caucus.”14   
 
The 1980s was a period of soul-searching for National.  Labour was seemingly more 
aligned with business than was National.  But some of the Labour policies were causing 
great harm to the other key support group for National – farmers.  The quick leadership 
transitions from Robert Muldoon to Jim McLay and then to Jim Bolger were part of the 
infighting within the caucus for control over the direction of the National Party.15  The 
1987 and 1990 elections, which National expected to win almost as of right,16 were 
                                                 
12 For an understanding as to why, and how, Labour undertook a radical liberalisation project, see: Roger 
Douglas, "How We Did It," in Margaret Clark (ed.), For the Record: Lange and the Fourth Labour 
Government,  (Wellington: Dunmore Press, 2005). 
13 Bryce Edwards, "Political Parties in New Zealand: A Study of Ideological and Organisational 
Transformation" (PhD, University of Canterbury, 2003), 134-135. 
14 Edwards, "Political Parties in New Zealand", 135. 
15 Ruth Richardson, Making a Difference (Christchurch: Shoal Bay Press, 1995), 39; Edwards, "Political 
Parties in New Zealand", 134-135. 
16 See: Richardson, Making a Difference, 38. 
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fought with a “deliberately ambiguous [platform] in order to satisfy the left and right 
internal camps.”17
 
At the 1990 election National won over two-thirds of the seats.  While Prime Minister 
Jim Bolger was moderate and conservative, Minister of Finance Ruth Richardson 
implemented significant neo-liberal reforms.  The large, unwieldy caucus began to 
split.  Gilbert Myles and Hamish MacIntyre left to form the (conservative) Liberal 
Party.  Winston Peters, Minister of Māori Affairs, was sacked from Cabinet, eventually 
forming his own political party after the National Executive refused to allow Peters to 
seek re-nomination for National.18  Cam Campion also left National after he was not re-
selected in Wanganui. 
  
In the 1993 election National came within a whisker of electoral defeat and recorded its 
lowest ever vote share, although not substantially lower than the 1984 election.  Labour 
declined further, sitting just 0.4 percent lower than National in the overall vote.  Public 
distrust for the main parties was high.19  Bolger removed Ruth Richardson from the 
Finance portfolio and attempted to stop the vote share decline.  National reverted to 
being a conservative/status quo party, reversing some previous policy decisions 
although still implementing tax cuts.20
 
                                                 
17 Edwards, "Political Parties in New Zealand", 136..   
18 Raymond Miller, "New Zealand First," in Raymond Miller (ed.), New Zealand Government and 
Politics,  (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003), 261-262; Martin Hames, Winston First: The 
Unauthorised Account of Winston Peters' Career (Auckland: Random House, 1995), 182-185. 
19 Tim Bale and Nigel S. Roberts, "Plus ça change...? Anti-Party Sentiment and Electoral System 
Change: A New Zealand Case Study," Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 40, no. 2 (2002). 
20 Edwards, "Political Parties in New Zealand", 175; Wood, "National," 253. 
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Figure 3.1 National Party Vote Share under FPP, 1938-199321
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The 1993 election was conjointly held with a referendum on electoral reform, and the 
voters decided to change to MMP.  MPs who were unhappy at the policy direction of 
the Party, or who risked losing their electorate seats (the number of electorates being 
reduced from 99 to 65), or both, could still have a reasonable chance of returning after 
the next election by forming their own political party.  MPs left both major parties: 
National lost six of its 50 MPs, and Labour lost four of its 45 (during the previous term 
National had lost four MPs).22  The ten MPs that left National between 1990 and 1996 
formed a variety of parties – all were conservative in nature indicating internal 
displeasure at the liberal agenda that had been implemented in the 1990-1993 period. 
 
                                                 
21 Electoral Commission, "General elections 1890-1993 - seats won by party," Elections New Zealand, 
http://www.elections.org.nz/elections/FPP_seats_won.html, 2005 (accessed: 10 December 2007). 
22 For the 1993-1996 fragmentation, see: Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel 
S. Roberts, New Zealand Under MMP: A New Politics? (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), 
49-60. 
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Ideological Factionalism 
The history of the National Party shows that the ideological makeup of National was 
diverse, flexible, but reasonably stable.  National was formed for strategic electoral 
reasons and while easily classifiable as a centre-Right party, further classification of the 
National Party in a single ideological paradigm proves difficult.  The two main 
identifiable strands of thought within National are conservativism and liberalism, 
although there are also smaller libertarian and populist tendencies within National.23  
However, the Party “generally presents itself as a hybrid party of the 
liberal/conservative type.”24  The divergent ideological bases for National have existed 
throughout its history.   
 
The two strands found within National are ideologically at a disjunction.  Part of the 
Party seeks to promote a free market society, while another part seeks to conserve a 
traditional order.  Both strands stand in opposition to socialism and can be unified in 
seeking a property ownership society.  However, ideology has never served as a strong 
platform for National.  Indeed, “the National Party cannot … secure electoral support 
for ‘freedom’ as such, without linking the concept to some concrete issue or proposal 
which is of interest to electors.”25  A pragmatic approach to politics had to be taken, 
which again served to limit the differing tendencies into accepting a compromise 
position. 
 
                                                 
23 Colin James, "National," in Raymond Miller (ed.), New Zealand Government and Politics,  (Auckland: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 369; Colin James, "Ruth Amid the Alien Corn" (paper presented at the 
Bolger Years: The Seventh Parliamentary Conference, Wellington, 27-28 April 2007). 
24 Raymond Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2005), 155. 
25 Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand, 285. 
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As already shown, the formation of the National Party highlights the factionalism found 
throughout the history of National.  Reform and United were ideologically distinct from 
each other.  United, originally the Liberal Party, predominately represented liberal 
business and urban interests whereas Reform mainly represented the conservative 
countryside.  Following on from the United/Reform split, and continuing through the 
20th century, the main split within the National Party has been an urban liberal/rural 
conservative divide.  The ideological split within National has manifested itself in 
numerous manners. 
 
From 1972 through to the MMP era the leadership switched between a liberal leader 
and a conservative leader (see Table 3.1).26  As the leadership rotated between factions, 
it indicated that the leadership was more than a random selection.  One possible 
explanation for this phenomenon is that the factions, at some point, made an agreement 
to ‘switch’ leaders.  However, no evidence of this exists, and given the high turnover of 
MPs in the New Zealand Parliament,27 such a deal would have become public 
knowledge.  Instead, the ‘factional rotation policy’ arose out of the natural 
dissatisfaction that the ‘out’ faction had towards the ‘in’ faction – the ‘out’ faction 
became the driver for leadership change and built support from non-aligned MPs, 
especially if the leader was ‘failing’. 
 
                                                 
26 This point is alluded to early on in: Keith Jackson, "Political Leadership and Succession in the New 
Zealand National Party," Political Science 27, no. 1 & 2 (1975). 
27 See: Elizabeth McLeay, "Representation, Selection, Election: The 2002 Parliament," in Jonathan 
Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), New Zealand 
Votes: The General Election of 2002,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), 305-307; Elizabeth 
McLeay, "New Zealand: Parliamentary Careers and Electoral Reform," in Jens Borchet and Jürgen Zeiss 
(eds.), The Political Class in Advanced Democracies: A Comparative Handbook,  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 279. 
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Table 3.1 The Factional/Ideological position of National’s Leaders28
Leader Faction/Ideology 
Adam Hamilton, 1936-1940 Conservative 
Sidney Holland, 1940-1957 (PM 1949-1957) Conservative 
Keith Holyoake, 1957-1972 (PM 1957, 1960-1972) Conservative 
John Marshall, 1972-1974 (PM 1972) Liberal 
Robert Muldoon, 1974-1984 (PM 1975-1984) Populist (Conservative) 
Jim McLay, 1984-1986 Liberal 
Jim Bolger, 1986-1997 (PM 1990-1997) Conservative 
Jenny Shipley, 1997-2001 (PM 1997-1999) Liberal 
Bill English, 2001-2003 Conservative 
Don Brash, 2003-2006 
Liberal/Populist 
(Conservative)29
John Key, 2006-incumbent Liberal 
 
Furthermore, the leader and deputy leader have usually represented different factions.  
Indeed, only three deputy leaders were of the same faction as the leader, and all were 
conservative-conservative matches (see Table 3.2).  Again there is a clear suggestion 
that it is not a random distribution, but rather a systemic result that helped to ensure 
caucus stability.  By ensuring that the dissatisfied faction (that which just lost the 
leadership) had control over the deputy leader, that faction could be assured that their 
policy positions were accounted for in decisions by the top.  Furthermore, having a 
‘running mate’ of a different faction widened the appeal of the leadership duo, not just 
                                                 
28 More recent leaders are included so as to provide more data.  George Forbes was temporarily leader 
from May to October 1936, and was never considered a formal leader.  See: Gustafson, The First 50 
Years, 14-17. 
29 Brash is an economic libertarian, yet he promoted largely populist conservative messages.  On the face 
of it, Brash is an outlier for the ‘factional rotation policy’, but, given his political expediency with his 
own views, Brash’s leadership is the exception that proves the rule.  For the disjunction between Brash’s 
personal beliefs and his policy see: James, "National," 371. 
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in caucus but also to the electorate, and was thus more likely to be successful in 
leadership challenges and elections. 
 
Table 3.2 The Factional/Ideological position of Leader and Deputy Leader30
Leader Faction Deputy Leader Faction 
Sidney Holland Conservative Keith Holyoake 1947-1957 Conservative 
Keith Holyoake Conservative John Marshall 1957-1972 Liberal 
John Marshall Liberal Robert Muldoon 1972-1974 Populist (Conservative) 
Brian Talboys 1974-1981 Liberal 
Duncan MacIntyre 1981-1984 Conservative31Robert Muldoon Populist  (Conservative) Jim McLay 1984 Liberal 
Jim McLay Liberal Jim Bolger 1984-1986 Conservative 
George Gair 1986-1987 Liberal Jim Bolger Conservative Don McKinnon 1987-1997 Liberal 
Wyatt Creech 1997-2001 Conservative Jenny Shipley Liberal Bill English 2001 Conservative 
Bill English Conservative Roger Sowry 2001-2003 Conservative 
Nick Smith 2004 Conservative Don Brash Liberal/Populist (Conservative)32 Gerry Brownlee 2004-2006 Conservative 
John Key Liberal Bill English 2006-incumbent Conservative 
 
The ideological differences, while most obviously seen within the caucus, are spread 
throughout the Party’s organisation.  The organisation was split into five divisions in 
order to accommodate for the ideological differences and to help National win 
elections.  The divisions each roughly corresponded to a factional body.  Auckland and 
Wellington were liberal cities, while the rural areas were largely conservative.  In 
splitting the factions away from each other through regional divisions, National has 
been able to decentralise the party to regional level and limit factional fighting. 
 
                                                 
30 Again more recent leaders and deputy leaders are included to provide more data.  The position of 
Deputy Leader was not instituted until 1947.  Italics indicate where the leader and deputy leader 
represent the same faction/ideology. 
31 MacIntyre became Deputy Leader after the failed liberal ‘Colonel’s Coup’, and the appointment of a 
conservative suggests a strong backlash against the liberal faction. 
32 The appointment of both deputy leaders for Brash occurred before Brash struck a populist, 
conservative policy stance and he was still seen as a liberal leader. 
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Organisation 
While the National Party organisation changed over the years, most of the basic 
structure set up in 1936 still existed until the 2003 review.  The original conference 
took many of the original ideas from the two merging parties, as well as copying the 
mass membership model found in Labour’s organisation.  At the formation conference 
chairman Colonel Claude Weston noted that, in order to be successful, National: 
[R]ealised the vital necessity of continuity... a political 
organisation to be of the maximum assistance to its 
members must not be allowed to hibernate, only to wake 
up on the eve of an election.  Like our friends of the 
Labour Party… we must work day and night; year in and 
year out.33
Much of the blame for the electoral defeat of the National Political Federation in 1935 
was put on poor organisation, and the new National Party sought a strong organisation 
in order to counteract the perceived perfection of Labour’s organisational structure.34
 
Party Executive 
Initially the National Party had two governing bodies.  The Dominion Council formally 
held considerable power, but the actual decisions were made by the Dominion 
Executive.  Given the lack of power within the Dominion Council it was eventually 
scrapped in the 1985 re-organisation.  Instead a new National Executive was formed.  
However, the central authority has never been strong within National. 
 
                                                 
33 Quoted in: Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 10. 
34 Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand, 170. 
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The Dominion Council was a large body with varying membership.  In 1969 it 
consisted of 164 or 165 members – the President (elected by the Annual Conference), 
five male divisional vice presidents, two women vice presidents (one from each island), 
the Māori Vice President, the Dominion Treasurer (appointed by the Council), the 
Leader, five other MPs, 140 divisional representatives, two Young National 
representatives, six co-opted members, and, potentially, a past president.  The large 
Council was designed to ensure that the Party elites were “closely in touch with the 
problems and needs of the Party throughout the country”.35  Due to size of the Council 
and that it only met twice a year meant that the Dominion Executive became “a 
committee of the Council which, though technically subordinate, does in practise 
exercise virtually all the functions of Council.”36  The Dominion Executive consisted of 
just 19 councillors – the President, the Leader, the five male divisional vice presidents, 
the Dominion Treasurer, two MPs (usually including the Deputy Leader), a woman and 
a further eight councillors (usually including the divisional vice-chairs).  Both the 
Council’s and the Executive’s membership changed over the years.  In the 1984/5 
review, the decision was made to disestablish the two separate bodies, and instead to 
have a National Executive.37
 
The National Executive was a body of twenty-six members.  The Party President, 
nominated by one of the five Divisional Conferences and elected at the Annual 
Conference, was the formal chair of the Executive.  Vice presidents arose from two 
different means – five vice presidents represented the division from which they were 
the Division Chairperson, while two were nominated by the Māori and women’s 
                                                 
35 New Zealand National Party, "The National Party Handbook,"  (Wellington: 1969), 79. 
36 New Zealand National Party, "The National Party Handbook," 80. 
37 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 185. 
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sections and then elected by the Annual Conference.  The five deputy divisional chairs 
attended as did five other divisional council representatives.  The caucus was 
represented by the Leader, Deputy Leader and two other caucus representatives.  
Finally, the Executive appointed a National Treasurer.  While larger and more 
decentralised than the Dominion Executive, the National Executive was a more 
accurate representation of where power lay at the nationwide level (see Appendix One). 
 
Even though the central body was at the formal top of the organisation, “the central 
governance was regarded by most of the Party as subsidiary to the divisional 
structures”.38  Control of finances and membership were by the divisions, not the 
central executive.  Given the relationship between the factions and the divisions, there 
was no desire to organise a strong collective body which would have had to deal with 
bridging the tensions between the rural conservatives and the urban liberals. 
 
Regional Divisions 
The regional divisions had been allocated sufficient resources and influence that “it can 
be argued that the National Party is not a centralised single party but a confederation of 
five regional parties.”39  The five regional divisions even had the ability to decide upon 
their own internal structure.  However, the 1985 review made the divisional structures 
reflect that of the national structure, but also increased the powers each division had.40
 
                                                 
38 Subject B, Interview with Gregory R. Stephens, 14 June 2007. 
39 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 205. 
40 Philip J. Clark, "The Impact of MMP on Political Party Electorate Organisations: A Case Study of 
National In Banks Peninsula" (MA, University of Canterbury, 1998), 68, 120. 
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The five divisions had responsibility for much of the operation of the Party.  The 
divisions had the responsibility for compiling membership data and collecting funds for 
the central body.  Furthermore, the divisions were strongly represented in the central 
administrative board with each division having an ex officio vice president and a 
varying number of other representatives.  The divisions were so powerful that they 
were able to prevent any significant central control over the Party.   
 
Each division had its own unique characteristics.  With the divisions corresponding to 
the factions within the Party, a degree of decentralisation is to be expected.  If there was 
central control, then some divisions may have struggled to effectively campaign in their 
area and could have seen National lose more elections as voters sought out other 
political parties.  The electoral pressure for National to form also created pressure for 
National to decentralise its operations in order to win elections.   
 
Auckland and Wellington were the notably liberal divisions, although Auckland more 
so than Wellington.  Auckland, which rejected the need to have professional staff, was 
“the major industrial and financial centre of the country… [and thus was] more socially 
and morally libertarian, and with a tendency to see things very much from an Auckland 
rather than a national perspective.”41  Wellington, which had over one-third of all 
National members, included both urban and rural areas.  The Wellington Division was 
dominated by Wellington City electorate members, many of whom became 
disillusioned under Muldoon and instead joined the liberal New Zealand Party in the 
1984 election.42
                                                 
41 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 229. 
42 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 216-224, 229-237. 
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 The conservative faction enjoyed divisional support from Waikato, Canterbury-
Westland and Otago-Southland.  Waikato was the strongest division in percentage of 
seats held and the main urban area, Hamilton, developed as a farming support town and 
thus retained a rural conservative outlook. Canterbury-Westland, arguably the most 
conservative division, was highly influential within the Party, although National slowly 
lost influence in Christchurch as it became less reliant and linked to the rural areas.  
Otago-Southland was the smallest division with three distinct and largely autonomous 
areas separating off the ‘lost cause’ of Dunedin.  However, the farming community 
largely dominated all three Divisions, ensuring that they were predominately 
conservative in outlook.43
 
The divisions each had significant control over the campaigning within their area.  By 
decentralising campaigning to divisional level, the Party ensured that message targeting 
was appropriate for each region.  The rural conservative divisions were able to provide 
conservative messaging, whereas the urban liberal divisions could produce liberal 
messaging.  There was even substantial decentralisation within divisions to the 
electorate-level.  Decentralisation helped National win FPP elections. 
 
Social Divisions 
While National has predominately focused upon geographical units of party 
organisation, three non-geographic divisions, based on social identity, have existed – 
the Māori Advisory Committee, the Junior Nationals (later Young Nationals) and the 
                                                 
43 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 207-209, 209-216, 224-229. 
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Women’s Section.  All three faced numerous battles for relevancy, official recognition 
and respect within the Party. 
 
During the formation of National considerable debate was held over the role of Māori 
in the organisation and it was decided that a Māori Vice President be instituted, 
although it was unfilled until 1945.44  The Ratana-Labour alliance saw all four Māori 
seats elect Labour MPs in the post-war era.45  In 1946 the Dominion Māori Affairs 
Advisory Council formed, later changing its name to the Māori Advisory Committee.  
In 1974 the chairman of the Māori Advisory Committee became an ex officio 
Dominion Councillor – increasing Māori representation on the Dominion Council to 
two.  The Māori Advisory Committee attacked the second National government’s 1971 
Race Relations Bill as imposing inaccurate racist perceptions – raising the question of 
whether Māori were relevant to the Party and vice versa.  On numerous occasions, the 
Māori Advisory Committee, as well as Divisional and Dominion Conferences, have 
discussed the abolition of the Māori seats, although always coming to the decision that 
the fate of the Māori seats lay in the hands of Māori themselves, with the Māori groups 
acting as veto players.46
 
The Junior Nationals emerged out of the old Junior Reform League and quickly became 
active throughout the country.  In 1957 it was decided by the division chairmen to 
organise the Juniors in divisions rather than electorates and encourage the formation of 
Junior advisory committees.  Ten years later, the Juniors changed their name to the 
Young Nationals, created a national structure (with an annual conference and a national 
                                                 
44 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 12-13, 293. 
45 The first post-war break of Labour’s Māori seat dominance was in 1993 by New Zealand First in 
Northern Maori. 
46 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 241-255. 
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executive) and took on a more political role.  The 1968 National Party Dominion 
Conference gave the right for two Young Nationals to be members of the Dominion 
Council.  The Young Nationals were largely liberal, especially on social/moral issues.47
 
National Party women began to not only organise themselves early, but also demand 
official recognition.  At the 1938 Dominion Council meeting it was decided that each 
division should have at least one voting woman amongst its councillors.  In 1940, token 
representation was given to National women, with two women vice presidencies (one 
from each island) being established, but were not on the Dominion Executive.  It was 
not until 1974, when the Party merged the vice presidencies into one, that the Woman 
Vice President became a member of the Dominion Executive, and thus formally on par 
with the divisional vice presidents and the Māori section’s vice president.  Even then, 
the Woman Vice President had no formal support behind her such as the Māori 
Advisory Committee – it was not until the 1984/5 review that five divisional women’s 
committees were formally established.  The Women’s Section was initially a 
conservative rural organisation, but during the 1970s and 1980s became more 
associated with liberal feminist views – although the Section’s membership was by no 
means unified in their views.48
 
Membership 
The National Party had a large membership, requiring substantial organisation.  While 
no formal membership numbers were released, numerous estimates have been made.  
                                                 
47 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 255-266. 
48 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 266-287. 
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The highest estimated figure is 300,000 in the 1940s and 1950s;49 by the mid-1990s 
most estimates were lower than 50,000.  Reportedly, at the 1949 election half of all 
National votes in the Saint Kilda electorate were cast by National members.50  No 
matter which estimates are correct, the trend has been that National has significantly 
lost party members since the 1950s and 1960s (see Appendix Three).  The decline in 
membership was not specific to National within New Zealand,51 or New Zealand 
within the world.52  A belief existed within the Party that every member attracted three 
more National votes – hence declining membership numbers were of real concern to the 
Party.53
 
National membership figures are not as clear as the estimates put forward.  Membership 
in National has been very open: in the 1950s minimum subscription rates were only two 
shillings and sixpence, alongside a loose definition of ‘member’ with little expectation 
on members to do more than vote and donate.54  Entire families were often signed up at 
one time and “it is quite possible for many members of the National Party to be 
unaware of the fact of their membership.”55  The National Party was not only a political 
organisation, but a social grouping with numerous National Clubs set up throughout the 
country.56  In many rural areas the National Party provided one of the few 
entertainment facilities around.  Consequently, even though National has often been 
                                                 
49 Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 73. 
50 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 208. 
51 Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 14. 
52 Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen, "Party Membership Decline in Twenty European Democracies, 
1980-2000," Party Politics 7, no. 1 (2001). 
53 Clark, "The Impact of MMP on Political Party Electorate Organisations", 115. 
54 Anthony Wood, "The National Party," in Hyam Gold (ed.), New Zealand Politics in Perspective,  
(Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992), 290, 298. 
55 Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand, 205. 
56 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 237-240. 
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thought of as one of the most successful political parties in terms of membership,57 
there is little doubt that the figures have been inflated.   
 
While party membership figures dropped significantly, theoretically those most likely 
to leave are not activists, but passive or social members.58  Consequently, the operation 
of the Party did not need to adjust due to falling membership figures – the Party’s 
membership levels never fell below the critical point for its organisational operation.  
The Party has not felt the need to introduce new democratic measures to retain 
members, as some other political parties throughout the world have.59  While declining 
membership has been a significant vote share worry for National, it has not become an 
organisational problem.  
 
Caucus Separation 
Traditionally, the National caucus has been free of control from the extra-parliamentary 
party.  The Party wanted to ensure that neither section ended up controlling the other 
and to remove the liberal/conservative divide from the membership.  E.E. Hammond, 
the major architect of the initial Constitution and Rules, stated that: 
The Organisation knows how to select its candidates 
without dictation from Parliamentarians.  When the 
selected candidates win we say ‘Goodbye’ to them at the 
gates of Parliament.  The Organisation has done its work 
                                                 
57 Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 73-74; Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 82-83. 
58 Susan E. Scarrow, "Parties without Members?: Party Organization in a Changing Electoral 
Environment," in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), Parties without Partisans,  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 95; Susan E. Scarrow and Burcu Gezgor, "Trends in Party Membership 
and Membership Participation: Smaller Parties, Different Types of Members?" (paper presented at the 
Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 20-23 April 2006). 
59 See: Jonathan Hopkin, "Bringing the Members back in? Democratizing Candidate Selection in Britain 
and Spain," Party Politics 7, no. 3 (2001). 
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in giving the necessary assistance; it is then up to the 
Members to do their part as legislators, while we continue 
in our endeavour to add to their numbers.60
The extra-parliamentary party was given responsibility for funds, membership, 
campaigning and the selection of candidates.  The caucus was given full control over 
parliamentary affairs, and shared policymaking and publicity with the extra-
parliamentary organisation.61  While there was formal separation, each section has, at 
some point, tried to gain more control over the Party as a whole. 
 
The National Party sent their representatives to Parliament as trustees rather than 
delegates of the Party.  The diverse nature of ideological views within National meant 
forcing MPs into one position was likely to result in significant internal conflict.  
National MPs were not bound to follow either the decision of the caucus or of the 
organisation, although they did have to sign that they will be “loyal to its organisation 
and chosen leader.”62  Indeed, MPs were considered to be responsible to the nation 
rather than the Party.  Yet caucus unity has been high with few dissentions on the 
floor.63  The extra-parliamentary party formally had no more sway over the caucus than 
any other interest group.64
 
In truth, the division between the two sectors of the Party was never clear.  MPs had 
considerable sway over the extra-parliamentary party – they had resources such as 
                                                 
60 Quoted in: Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 12. 
61 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 10. 
62 New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules of the New Zealand National Party,"  
(Wellington: 1986), 46.  Labour has long made candidates pledge that “I will vote on all questions in 
accordance with the decisions of the Caucus of the Parliamentary Labour Party”, see: New Zealand 
Labour Party, "New Zealand Labour Party Constitution and Rules,"  (Wellington: 2003), 18. 
63 Indeed, crossing the floor has been incredibly low in New Zealand, see: Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew 
Palmer, Bridled Power: New Zealand's Constitution and Government, fourth ed. (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 147. 
64 New Zealand National Party, "The National Party Handbook," 89. 
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professional policy advisors available to them, as well as the weight of office behind 
them.  Furthermore MPs attended Annual Conferences and had the right to speak and 
vote on remits and elections.  The Leader was selected by the caucus but then had to be 
formally approved by the extra-parliamentary Executive.  The Leader, Deputy Leader 
and at least one other caucus representative each held a seat on the Dominion Council 
and the Dominion Executive, and later the National Executive.  Since 1994, the Party 
President has regularly attended caucus meetings to inform caucus of the feeling and 
happenings of the extra-parliamentary party.65  Predominately, a trend has been 
established seeing caucus slowly taking control away from the extra-parliamentary 
organisation.  
 
Electorate Candidate Selection 
One area in which the extra-parliamentary organisation formally held a veto over the 
caucus was candidate selection for elections.  Candidate selection was heavily 
decentralised to the electorate level, thus allowing rural conservative electorates to 
select conservative candidates and urban liberal electorates to select liberal candidates, 
maximising the chances of winning each seat and keeping electorates unified behind 
their candidate. 
 
Candidate selection was in the hands of the electorate itself, rather than the nationwide 
or divisional level.66  A selection meeting was held with one delegate for every 15 
members of a branch.  If the selection meeting did not have 60 delegates, or a branch 
                                                 
65 Geoffrey Thompson, "Preparing the Party for MMP" (paper presented at the Bolger Years: The 
Seventh Parliamentary Conference, Wellington, 27-28 April 2007). 
66 Much of the academic work on electorate candidate selection has been done in the MMP era.  However 
there were no changes to electorate candidate selection methods until 2003. 
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did not select its full quota of delegates, then more delegates were selected by the 
Divisional Chair.  The selectoral system was progressive elimination of the lowest 
polling candidate until one candidate had a majority.  There was no representation of 
the Executive, and “there is no guarantee that the regional [divisional] chairperson will 
act according to the wishes of the party’s headquarters when nominating top-up 
delegates.”67  However, the Executive retained a veto right over all candidates selected 
and had weighting on a pre-selection meeting (since its introduction in 1973) which 
determined who the delegates may select between, with two of the nine members being 
selected by the President.  Hence even though there was formal decentralisation 
towards the electorates, the central organisation played an important role in the process 
(see Appendix One). 
 
The National Party candidate selection rules significantly benefited the incumbent MP.  
Up until 1986, only five successful public challenges to a sitting MP had been made, all 
in the Auckland Division.68  The 1993 election saw two MPs lose their seat due to de-
selection – Winston Peters, who fought, and failed, in court to prevent the National 
Executive vetoing his nomination for candidature in Tauranga;69 and Cam Campion, 
who was deselected by party members in Wanganui.  Due to the large selectorate 
nominees needed to be well known and recognised – something an incumbent was 
more likely to be than a challenger.  Furthermore, the “[i]ncumbent MPs are generally 
                                                 
67 Rob Salmond, "Choosing Candidates: Labour and National in 2002," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen 
Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), New Zealand Votes: The 
General Election of 2002,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), 196-197. 
68 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 234. 
69 Peters vs Collinge, 2 NZLR 554 (1993); Hames, Winston First, 182-185. 
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well placed to influence, if not control, the process of choosing delegates, with the 
result that their re-selection is all but guaranteed.”70
 
Table 3.3 Women Candidates in National and Labour, 1946 to 199371
Party Year (19xx) 
 46 49 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93
Labour candidates 2 3 2 5 3 5 5 6 4 6 6 13 11 13 23 28 33
National candidates 2 3 4 3 4 5 2 3 5 4 5 6 10 11 10 17 19
 
The candidate selection rules also had an impact on the ethnic and gender identity of 
National candidates.  As Table 3.3 shows, few women have been selected as candidates 
for National.  A similar pattern can be told for Māori (outside of the Māori seats) within 
National with only three successful Māori candidates up to 1986.72  The majority of 
National candidates and MPs have been Pākehā males and “National fares very poorly 
in regards to representation of women and Māori MPs.”73
 
Preparations for MMP 
With the public firmly supporting MMP, the National Party had to look at what changes 
would be needed for the new electoral system.  Most obviously, National would have to 
develop a new list selection process.  However, further preparations and changes were 
hampered by President Geoff Thompson, who firmly believed that MMP should not be 
implemented.  Thompson later noted: 
                                                 
70 Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 114. 
71 Helena Catt, "Frail Success?: The New Zealand Experience Of Electing Women" (paper presented at 
the European Consortium for Political Research, Edinburgh, 2003). 
72 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 242. 
73 David Boyd, "Party Candidate Selection Procedures and Objectives under MMP" (MA, University of 
Auckland, 1996), 82. 
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I don’t think anything was being done in caucus and it 
wasn’t until about 1992 that a group of Party people 
initiated some brain storming about electoral change.  
Some of the talented 1990 Caucus intake, like Bill 
English and Roger Sowry, joined this group and the main 
effort went into figuring out how a party list of candidates 
would be developed.  There was little thinking about how 
to capture the party vote in electioneering terms, or to 
reflect on the enormous changes in parliamentary 
strategizing that would be required to deal with the MMP 
system.74
 
The list selection process implemented by National resulted from a working paper 
distributed and discussed throughout the Party.  Three possible processes were analysed 
– the ‘Regional Model’, the ‘Electoral College Model’, and the ‘Hybrid Model’.  The 
‘Regional Model’ would have been highly decentralised, with no central over-riding 
control of the list – the nationwide ordering would be done by a mechanical merging of 
the lists.  The ‘Hybrid Model’ allowed each division to rank a regional list which would 
then have been merged into a national list by an electoral college made of both central 
and divisional representatives.  Finally, the ‘Electoral College Model’ was more 
centralised with nominations being filtered by each division (for numerical purposes) 
but all ranking would be done by an electoral college similar to the membership of the 
National Executive.75
 
National decided upon the ‘Hybrid Model’ for list selection allowing the divisions 
significant, but not complete, control.  Electorate candidate selection was to remain the 
                                                 
74 Thompson, "Preparing the Party for MMP". 
75 National Party Electoral Reform Working Party, "The Emerging Picture: Party List and Constituency 
Selection: Discussion Paper - Mark II,"  (Wellington: New Zealand National Party, 1994). 
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same and be independent of the list selection process.  Each electorate would nominate 
two potential list candidates, and the Divisional Council would nominate one per 
electorate.  The Divisional List Selection Meeting (with the same delegate rules as the 
Divisional Conference) would then rank its region’s preferences using a preferential 
voting system.  Each division was limited to a certain number of nominees, pre-
determined by the Executive on the basis of population.  The divisional lists would then 
go to the List Standing Committee who would rank the entire list and the Committee 
“shall have regard to the ranking of Divisional nominations and the need for balance”,76 
but need not be bound by it.  The List Standing Committee comprised the Leader, 
Deputy Leader, President, seven vice presidents, a youth representative, and twenty 
divisional representatives (see Appendix One). 
 
Apart from the introduction of a decentralised list selection process, National did little 
to prepare the Party for MMP.  Partly, the lack of pre-MMP preparation was planned – 
National was to review its organisation after the 1996 election.  Partly, it was due to an 
anti-MMP President who wished to continue operating in a two-party system 
environment.  Furthermore, it was unclear what changes MMP would bring to the 
National Party or even if it would need to change at all. 
 
The New Zealand National Party under FPP 
The New Zealand National Party has been highly successful in terms of membership 
figures and, more importantly, winning elections.  However, the cost of successfully 
winning office and votes has been failing to implement policy in line with the 
                                                 
76 New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules of the New Zealand National Party,"  
(Wellington: 1997), 67. 
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ideological stance of the Party.  Indeed, when National did favour policy over votes – 
1990-1993 – the Party had internal division and public distrust.  National’s vote and 
office seeking behaviour meant that the organisation was geared more towards 
campaigning than policy creation. 
 
The electoral success of National hides its organisational failures well.  From the 1950s, 
membership and vote share declined, the factional split remained unresolved with the 
regional divisions still fighting each other, the central executive needed to be reformed, 
the caucus began to dominate the organisation, and the candidate selection process 
limited the number of new MPs entering caucus.  These problems did not manifest 
themselves in periods of victory and success, but when the organisation faltered they 
often resulted in open clashes.  Only one open leadership challenge under FPP occurred 
while National was in office – the failed Colonel’s Coup against Muldoon.  After the 
formation period organisational reviews occurred in 1941, 1961, 1973 and 1984/5 – not 
surprisingly all but one of the reviews (1961) took place in a period of electoral defeat.  
While the National Party managed to successfully build an organisation to work in an 
FPP environment, it was an environment-specific solution to certain problems. 
 
The National Party exhibited an organisation designed primarily around preventing an 
oligarchical national body from developing.  Instead it promoted oligarchical regional 
divisions.  National was a classic federalised party, and indeed was identified as being a 
stratarchical franchise organisation.77  While decentralisation places the decision-
making procedures closer to the populous, it does not necessary make the process more 
                                                 
77 R. Kenneth Carty, "Parties as Franchise Systems: The Stratarchical Organizational Imperative," Party 
Politics 10, no. 1 (2004). 
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democratic.  Many of the rules ensured democratic procedures where they were helpful 
to the party elites (such as candidate selection), but retained oligarchical control where 
the elites desired (for instance policy creation was largely in the hands of caucus).  
Although elites did have significant sway over some areas Gustafson labels National as 
“one of the most democratic, mass-based political party organisations the world has 
ever seen.”78
 
The highly decentralised organisation was set up to combat Labour in a two-party 
single-member simply-plurality system.  Decentralisation allowed for the divergent 
ideological strands to come together in one political party in order to win elections.  
The Party decentralised its activities so that it could compete throughout the country in 
the FPP environment, not in a MMP environment. 
                                                 
78 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, x. 
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Chapter Four: Defeat and Decline Under MMP 
The New Zealand National Party clearly had significant problems under MMP.  The 
National Party recorded its worst results ever for four elections in a row, three of those 
being under the new electoral system.  Several potential explanations are available for 
why National could not live up to its historical FPP record under MMP.  While both 
National and Labour expected some degree of vote share decline, National was hit 
particularly hard when compared to Labour. 
 
National measured success in terms of office and votes.1  However, the successful 
operation of any political party relies on many different factors.  One of the key factors 
is how the party organises itself internally.  Yet it is not just how it organises, but also 
the appropriateness of the organisational form for its environment.  If National’s 
decline was due to organisational inability to adjust to a new electoral environment then 
a re-organisation should be the appropriate response by National.  But if the decline is 
for other reasons, then a re-organisation may fail to successfully deal with the causes of 
the decline in the long-term.  National chose to respond to the decline with an 
organisational review in 2003. 
 
Decline, 1996-2002 
Even though most of the National Party opposed MMP, the Party’s success under FPP 
meant that the Party had high expectations that they would continue to do well under 
                                                 
1 There are other ways of defining success and the objectives of parties.  See: Kaare Strøm, "A 
Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties," American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 2 
(1990). 
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MMP.2  While 1993 had been an electoral blow as National barely remained in 
government, there was little to hint that National’s vote could slide further.  The Party 
still had a base of support that it could rely on – the number of voters identifying as 
National for the 1996 election was up on 1993.3  The campaign organisation was still 
geared up and the Party believed that people would give their two votes to the same 
party and that voters would treat the electorate vote as their primary vote.4   Hence the 
Party allowed National candidates to freely campaign for their electorate as that would 
maximise the party vote overall.  
 
Leading up to the 1996 election, the National government was forced to form a variety 
of differing coalition arrangements as MPs left National in order to form their own 
political parties.  In total, six of the 50 National MPs left to form new conservative 
political parties – none left to form liberal parties.  While National was struggling 
internally, Labour was suffering externally, spending much of 1994 polling below the 
Alliance and a few months in 1996 polling below New Zealand First.5
 
The 1996 election saw National receive its lowest vote share in an election again, but 
Labour’s vote share was its lowest post-war election result.  National received just over 
one-third of all votes, and 44 of the 120 seats.  After protracted negotiations National 
formed a coalition government with New Zealand First – a conservative, populist, 
                                                 
2 For instance, see: Roger Sowry, "The National Campaign: Tactics and Strategies," in Jonathan Boston, 
Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), From Campaign to Coalition: The 1996 
MMP Election,  (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), 31. 
3 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, "Surveying the Snark: Voting Behaviour in the 1996 New 
Zealand General Election," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts 
(eds.), From Campaign to Coalition: The 1996 MMP Election,  (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 
1997), 191. 
4 Thompson, "Preparing the Party for MMP". 
5 Jack Vowles, "Countdown to MMP," in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, and Jeffrey Karp 
(eds.), Voters' Victory? New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation,  (Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 1998), 16. 
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protectionist party.6  The coalition agreement was ratified by the new National Party 
caucus with no formal consultation with, or agreement by, the extra-parliamentary 
party, although President Geoff Thompson was a member of the coalition negotiation 
team. 
 
Trouble with New Zealand First and its Leader, Winston Peters, soon became obvious.  
The coalition agreement substantially favoured New Zealand First, especially in the 
allocation of cabinet seats.7  Several embarrassing scandals emerged, both personal 
(such as Tuku Morgan’s (NZ First) infamous spending of government money on 
underwear) and policy (for instance, Minister of Health Bill English (National) and 
Associate Minister Neil Kirton (NZ First) clashed over health policy), which only 
served to fuel internal discontent in National.  The internal dissatisfaction with Jim 
Bolger’s handling of Peters and New Zealand First ended with Jenny Shipley taking the 
leadership from Bolger in December 1997. 
 
Under the leadership of Shipley, National lurched towards the centre, even though 
Shipley herself was from the liberal Right-wing of National.8  With the collapse of the 
coalition in August 1998,9 National began to re-embark upon neo-liberal reforms, such 
as reforming accident compensation and introducing work-for-the-dole, although social 
                                                 
6 See: Jonathan Boston and Elizabeth McLeay, "Forming the First MMP Government: Theory, Practice 
and Prospects," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), 
From Campaign to Coalition: New Zealand's First General Election Under Proportional 
Representation,  (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997); Fiona Barker, "Negotiating with New 
Zealand First: A Study of its Coalition Agreements with National and with Labour," in Jonathan Boston, 
Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), From Campaign to Coalition: New 
Zealand's First General Election Under Proportional Representation,  (Palmerston North: Dunmore 
Press, 1997). 
7 Boston and McLeay, "Forming the First MMP Government," 237. 
8 Edwards, "Political Parties in New Zealand", 189-192. 
9 Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, and Hilary Pearse, "Explaining the Demise of the National-New 
Zealand First Coalition," Australian Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 (2004). 
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spending climbed (largely as a result of an increase in unemployment).  Thompson 
publicly criticised the government for some of the neo-liberal reforms, especially their 
negative impact upon the farming community.10
 
The 1999 election was the third election in a row in which National lost vote share and 
recorded their worst result ever – a highly worrying trend.  This time National lost 
office.  National found itself facing an electorate weary of National and its policies, and 
also a Labour Party that accepted some of the major neo-liberal reforms that had taken 
place.11  The heavy loss, followed by a string of low opinion polling results, saw the 
liberal Shipley replaced by the conservative Bill English in October 2001.  The new 
leadership questioned the success of some of the neo-liberal reforms and indicated a 
belief that government spending was not necessarily an evil.12
 
Going into the 2002 campaign, National presented the most moderate platform it had 
had for several years.13  However the campaign was a disaster.  National realised that 
the battle was not for government, but for relevance.14  Colin James identified several 
major flaws: English appeared to lack the credibility to be Prime Minister; National was 
not viewed as likely to be in government at any point; the campaign was poorly 
planned; and, the most telling flaw, policy was “muddled and/or insufficiently firm on a 
                                                 
10 Thompson criticised the caucus on several occasions, see: Guyon Espiner, "Nat party chief criticises 
Govt over job losses," The Evening Post, 31 July 1998; New Zealand Press Association, "Heartland NZ 
gives National 'wake-up call' on rural policy," The Press, 11 May 1998; Peter Luke, "The trouble with 
ideology," The Press, 13 June 1998. 
11 Raymond Miller, "Labour," in Raymond Miller (ed.), New Zealand Government and Politics,  
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003), 241-242, 246. 
12 Edwards, "Political Parties in New Zealand", 208. 
13 Edwards, "Political Parties in New Zealand", 208. 
14 Tim Grafton, "National's Campaign," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth 
McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), New Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002,  (Wellington: 
Victoria University Press, 2003), 115. 
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range of issues”.15  Furthermore, the decision to ‘retire’ many long-serving MPs caused 
significant infighting within the Party.16  The party received 20.9 percent of the party 
vote, and just 27 seats within Parliament – the worst result in the history of the National 
Party for the fourth election in a row, and also a significant decrease compared to the 
last three elections. 
 
Figure 4.1 National Party Valid Vote Share 1990-200217
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Any complacency that still existed within National of it being ‘the natural party of 
government’ was destroyed.  For four elections in a row National had lost votes, each 
time recording a new low in the Party’s electoral support (see Figure 4.1).  For a party 
                                                 
15 Colin James, "Two Million Voters in Search of a Rationale," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, 
Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), New Zealand Votes: The General 
Election of 2002,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), 47. 
16 Andrew Geddis, "The General Election in New Zealand, July 2002," Electoral Studies 23, no. 1 
(2004). 
17 Electoral Commission, "General elections 1890-1993," ; Electoral Commission, "General elections 
1996-2005 - seats won by party," Elections New Zealand, 
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which prided itself upon winning office and votes, National had ‘failed’.  The 2002 
election defeat was deeply felt, with Bill English noting “[t]his is the toughest lesson in 
how you have to be out there earning support every day.”18  
 
Explaining the Decline 
There are many plausible explanations for the significant drop of National’s vote share 
since the introduction of MMP.  These can be placed into three categories.  Firstly, 
National’s decline may be seen as a direct result of the new electoral system.  Second, 
there are some explanations (such as leadership, trust, social and economic change) 
which have little to do with MMP – it is just sheer coincidence that they arose at the 
same time.  While another, third, possible explanation is that the Party machinery 
operated poorly in the new electoral environment.  There is no single stand-alone 
explanation as to why National declined so dramatically in the 1993-2002 period – 
these three categories each provide some explanation to what happened.  However, the 
organisational shortcomings were largely, and correctly, blamed in the 2003 review as 
being the major factor of decline.  The decentralised structure was not set up for 
winning votes under MMP. 
 
MMP Factors 
The introduction of MMP in 1996 was designed to break the hold the two main political 
parties had on parliamentary politics.  FPP created a mechanical dominance for major 
                                                 
18 Quoted in: Audrey Young and New Zealand Press Association, "Tears flow as 16 MPs say goodbye," 
New Zealand Herald, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=774&objectid=2347052, 2002 
(accessed: 1 June 2007). 
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parties, which then created a psychological dominance in the minds of voters.19  Labour 
and National both benefited from these factors under FPP. 
 
With the removal of the mechanical dominance, both Labour and National should have 
experienced at least a seat share decline under MMP.  FPP made “it difficult for small 
parties to gain representation…. all majoritarian systems tend to systematically favour 
the larger parties”.20  Under MMP once a party is over the legal five percent or one seat 
threshold, the Sainte-Laguë formula (used to turn votes into seats) “treats all parties in 
an even-handed manner.”21  If moving to MMP did not affect the preference of voters 
then Labour and National could expect a long-run seat share average of around 44 
percent each.22
 
Furthering the mechanical dominance, the psychological dominance of National and 
Labour was broken with the introduction of MMP.  Not only did the main two parties 
benefit from the mechanical workings of the FPP electoral system, but that mechanical 
working had provided a psychological disincentive for electors.  Voters did not wish to 
‘waste’ their vote and voted for a major party, even if they simply saw it as voting for 
the ‘lesser of two evils’.23  Hence with changing to MMP there was a reasonable 
expectation that both National and Labour should lose some votes to minor parties.  
The combined third party vote share ranged between 30 and 40 percent in the first three 
MMP elections.  If all else remained equal, Labour and National could expect to each 
                                                 
19 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. 
Barbara North and Robert North (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967 [1951]), 224, 226. 
20 Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-seven Democracies, 1945-
1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 20. 
21 Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 157. 
22 National’s post-war FPP vote-share average is 44.5 percent, while Labour’s is 43.4 percent.  
23 Duverger, Political Parties, 226. 
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receive around 30-35 percent of the vote.  Yet National suffered considerable losses 
under MMP, with an average of 28 percent in the first three MMP elections, while 
Labour had an average of 36 percent in the same three elections.  As Figure 4.2 shows, 
Labour did not suffer any considerable vote-share decline under MMP compared to 
what National experienced. 
 
Figure 4.2 Labour Party Valid Vote Share 1935-200524
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The multi-party system allowed voters to seek ideologically narrower parties, more 
aligned with their view point.  Both Labour and National had to react to a system 
which, instead of promoting an ideologically homogenous party system as FPP had 
done, promoted an ideologically diverse party system.  National, with liberal and 
conservative strands, had to cope with liberal ACT and conservative New Zealand First 
and United Future seeking to provide representation of liberal and conservative voters.  
                                                 
24 Electoral Commission, "General elections 1890-1993," ; Electoral Commission, "General elections 
1996-2005,"  
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While Labour also had challengers (the Alliance, the Greens, the Māori Party, New 
Zealand First), it was better able to cope with the challenge.25
 
Labour’s ability to cope with a new electoral system does raise questions as to why 
National could not cope.  Indeed, Labour managed to go from a three-election decline 
to the longest period of Labour government rule (albeit in coalition) since the First 
Labour Government, beginning in 1999.  Labour benefited from clever policy 
positioning pre-MMP,26 a strong and flexible leadership, less internal division 
(ironically due to division and desertions in the 1980s), a centralised party organisation 
and an effective campaign strategy.27  Many factors worked against National during the 
reform period, and these provide non-MMP explanations as to why National declined. 
 
Concurrent Factors 
There is a wide range of possible reasons why a political party may decline.  It is not 
unknown for a major, successful party to significantly lose votes and no longer be 
considered a major party – for instance in Canada the Progressive Conservative Party 
went from holding the second largest majority in Canadian history to holding on to just 
two seats in 1993.28  Hence it is possible that the advent of MMP and the decline of the 
National Party are two unrelated events that simply occurred during the same era of 
politics.  There is an array of plausible factors that might have led National to decline 
significantly in the 1990s and early 2000s no matter what the result of the MMP 
                                                 
25 Gregory R. Stephens, "Factionalism in the New Zealand Labour and National Parties: The Challenges 
of Moving from a Two-Party System to a Multi-Party System" (paper presented at the New Zealand 
Political Studies Association Conference, Wellington, 30-31 August 2007). 
26 Fiona Barker, "Party Policy Positioning: The New Zealand Labour Party in Opposition 1990-1996" 
(MA, Victoria University of Wellington, 1998). 
27 Stephens, "Factionalism in the New Zealand Labour and National Parties". 
28 Lawrence LeDuc, "The Canadian Federal Election of 1993," Electoral Studies 13, no. 2 (1994). 
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referendums.  During the decline period National had weak leadership, faced a public 
weary of reform and distrustful of National, social change from both post-
modernisation and urbanisation, and the ‘third term blues’. 
 
The leadership of the National Party between 1996 and 2002 was unstable and, at 
times, ineffective.  The instability was caused by the factional rotation of leaders – 
itself a product of the organisation.  Furthermore, National had a tradition of removing 
unsuccessful leaders.29  Jim Bolger led National to victory in 1996, but was replaced in 
1997 by Jenny Shipley.  While Shipley presented a new face for National, “she lacked 
the intellect and breadth to be a successful modern Prime Minister and failed to pull the 
party together and reconnect it [National] with its core vote.”30  Shipley’s failure to win 
the 1999 election caused the caucus to replace her with Bill English in October 2001.  
English “was judged inferior to [Labour Leader Helen] Clark on every measure of 
leadership”,31 and failed to shine throughout the campaign with only 11 percent of 
voters rating him as their most preferred prime minister in one survey.32  However, 
leadership has not been a strong influential factor in New Zealand elections; with an 
effect of 1 to 3 percent in the pre-MMP era and of 4 percent in the 2002 election.33  
While leadership problems may have contributed to National’s decline, the 2005 
                                                 
29 Therese Arseneau, "The Defining Features of the 2005 Election: A 'Glass Ceiling' and 'Constitutional 
Innovation'," in Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand 
General Election of 2005,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007), 431. 
30 Colin James, "Comment: Ten Prime Ministers," Political Science 56, no. 2 (2004). 
31 Jon Johansson, "Leadership and the Campaign," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen Levine, 
Nigel S. Roberts, and Elizabeth McLeay (eds.), New Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002,  
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), 65. 
32 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, "Consistent Patterns and Clear Trends: Electoral Behaviour in 
2002," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts 
(eds.), New Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), 
320. 
33 Clive Bean, "Party Leaders and Local Candidates," in Martin Holland (ed.), Electoral Behaviour in 
New Zealand,  (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 150; Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer, "Political 
Leadership, Representation and Trust," in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp, and 
Raymond Miller (eds.), Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of 
Minority Government,  (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2004), 181. 
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election result under another ‘weak’ leadership, former Reserve Bank Governor Don 
Brash,34 indicates that poor leadership was not a significant cause of National’s decline. 
 
Figure 4.3 Public Trust in the New Zealand National Party35 
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In the 1990-1993 period voters experienced a National government which failed to 
implement many key manifesto policies, and implemented some contrary policy 
                                                 
34 See: Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, "Mixed Messages: Voting Behaviour in New Zealand in 
2005," in Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General 
Election of 2005,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007), 366-370. 
35 There are minor variations in the question asked between different elections.  All survey data is from 
the New Zealand Election Study.  See:  Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer, Voters' Vengeance: the 1990 
Election in New Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour Government (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 1993), 148; New Zealand Election Study, "Democracy, Parties, and the Political 
System, 2002," New Zealand Election Study, http://www.nzes.org/exec/show/freq_2002b, 2002 
(accessed: 5 September 2007); New Zealand Election Study, "Democracy, Parties, and the Electoral 
System, 1999," New Zealand Election Study, http://www.nzes.org/exec/show/freq_1999b, 1999 
(accessed: 5 September 2007); New Zealand Election Study, "Party Preferences and Voting, 1996," New 
Zealand Election Study, http://www.nzes.org/exec/show/freq_1996e, 1996 (accessed: 5 September 
2007); New Zealand Election Study, "Campaign and Issues, 1993," New Zealand Election Study, 
http://www.nzes.org/exec/show/freq_1993a, 1993 (accessed: 5 September 2007).  For the 2005 results, 
showing a further increase in trust, but also an increase in untrustworthy, see: New Zealand Election 
Study, "2005 NZES: Section B Frequencies," New Zealand Election Study, 
http://www.nzes.org/exec/show/freq_2005b, 2005 (accessed: 5 September 2007). 
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instead.36  For instance, National increased the superannuation surtax rather than 
removing it altogether.  The further liberalisation of the economy, including the sale of 
state assets and significant welfare reforms, led many voters to distrust the National 
Party.37  Distrust in a political party is likely to lead to decline, although trust can be 
rebuilt.  Yet National became more trusted as its vote share fell (see Figure 4.3).  If lack 
of trust were the primary cause for National to lose votes in 1993, then the re-
emergence of trust in National should have reversed the decline, but it did not.  As a 
result distrust can largely be discounted as a long-term factor in National’s decline. 
 
Another theory is that voters became increasingly weary of the neo-liberal reforms and 
voted for other parties to stop reforms.  During this period National favoured policy 
over votes and office and suffered the repercussions of doing so.  Significant changes to 
economic structures created upheaval.  The neo-liberalisation period saw many reforms 
which impacted upon New Zealanders.  Substantial reforms had begun in the 1980s and 
had continued through to 1999.  The New Zealand public was left feeling that it was 
‘time for a change’ (or more precisely ‘time to stop change’).38  Yet reform stopped 
with the election of the Labour-led government in 1999, while National’s worst defeat 
was 2002.  While it could be fair to argue that the 2002 result was so low because 
voters did not want to re-start the reform process, if that was the case then the 2002 
result should not have been substantially below the 1999 result. 
 
                                                 
36 Colin James, "Rogernomics-Plus with Ruth," in Colin James and Alan McRobie (eds.), Turning Point: 
The 1993 Election and Beyond,  (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1993), 32-63. 
37 Bale and Roberts, "Plus ça change...?."; Colin James, "Assessing the Issues," in Jonathan Boston, 
Stephen Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), Left Turn: The New 
Zealand General Election of 1999,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000), 70. 
38 James, "Assessing the Issues," 69. 
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Ronald Inglehart notes that in advanced industrial societies “emphasis on economic 
security and economic growth is giving way to an increasing emphasis on the quality of 
life.”39  The values that society elects politicians on changed – social/moral issues 
became more important to voters.  The National Party’s two strands – liberal and 
conservative – were on differing sides of the ‘post-modern’ political spectrum.  A 
political party attempting to appeal to both sides of the political spectrum can expect 
little serious voter attention and would expect to decline.  However, ‘modern’ issues 
such as the economy, education and health still dominated election surveys of the most 
important issues facing New Zealand.40  Furthermore, the social liberal-conservative 
divide in New Zealand correlated with the economic Left-Right divide due to a ‘deep 
structure’ in New Zealand politics.41  As ‘post-modern’ issues were second-tier and 
largely correlated with the pre-existing political spectrum they only had a slight impact 
upon voting behaviour, and cannot be responsible for National’s decline. 
 
Urbanisation has been steadily occurring since 1886, and since the 1960s urban areas 
have comprised more than 80 percent of the population.42  One of National’s core 
support groups was in decline and National responded by placing more weight on urban 
                                                 
39 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 
43 Societies (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 325. 
40 Jack Vowles, "Estimating Change During The Campaign," in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan 
Banducci, Jeffrey Karp, and Raymond Miller (eds.), Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and 
the Consolidation of Minority Government,  (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2004), 43; Jack 
Vowles, "Did the Campaign Matter?," in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Raymond Miller, 
and Ann Sullivan (eds.), Proportional Representation on Trial: The 1999 New Zealand General Election 
and the Fate of MMP,  (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2002), 23; Richard Johnston, "Issues, 
Leaders, and the Campaign," in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, and Jeffrey Karp (eds.), 
Voters' Victory? New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation,  (Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 1998), 73. 
41 Jack Vowles, "Patterns of Public Opinion," in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey 
Karp, and Raymond Miller (eds.), Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the 
Consolidation of Minority Government,  (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2004), 125, 127-128. 
42 Statistics New Zealand, "New Zealand: An Urban/Rural Profile,"  
http://www.stats.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/A2FDF8E9-32AD-487D-AEE7-
040F513EE777/0/NZUrbanRuralProfile2.pdf, 2004 (accessed: 20 August 2007). 
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issues and policy.  National faced a wave of discontent from rural voters put off by 
National’s deregulation policies, especially of the producer boards.43  The percentage 
of all MPs from a farming background markedly dropped from 17 percent in 1990 to 
just eight percent after the 2002 election.44  National lost support in rural areas – in 
2002 Labour won the plurality of the party vote in 65 of the 69 electorates.  Yet, three 
of the four seats where National won the plurality in 2002 were rural seats and 
“National continued to command broad support across most of the rural seats.”45  
National was still the only party significantly active in seeking rural conservative voters 
and National’s decline also came from urban voters moving to new political parties. 
 
National suffered from the ‘third term blues’.  Governments have tended to lose votes 
over the term in office (Figure 4.4).  Governments may find that they are unable to 
implement key policies as they are unworkable, or the policies which are implemented 
may have a negative impact on some voters.  Furthermore, the longer a party is in 
government the rarer fresh ideas and faces are and the harder it becomes to blame 
problems on the previous government.  However, the Fourth National Government had 
a larger decline than any other government, with the defeat election 17.3 percent lower 
than the office-winning election.  Further, in five out of eight governments since 
1935,46 that particular party revived its fortunes at the next election – the exceptions 
being the First Labour Government (drop of 1.4 percent), the Fourth Labour 
Government (drop of 0.4 percent) and the Fourth National Government with a 
                                                 
43 James, "Assessing the Issues," 74; Megan K.L McKenna, "Can Rural Voices Effect Rural Choices? 
Contesting Deregulation in New Zealand's Apple Industry," Sociologia Ruralis 40, no. 3 (2000). 
44 Raymond Miller, "Who Stood for Office, and Why?," in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, 
Jeffrey Karp, and Raymond Miller (eds.), Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the 
consolidation of minority government,  (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2004), 97. 
45 Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 56. 
46 The Labour-led government (1999-200[8]) is excluded as it is still in office at the time of writing. 
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considerably larger drop of 9.6 percent.  While ‘third term blues’ contributed to the 
decline it fails to explain the unusually large drop in vote share National experienced 
both in and out of government in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
Figure 4.4 Indexed Declining Valid Vote Share of Governments47
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While these factors all contributed to a significant decline within National, most of 
them have been dealt with at some stage before.  National has had an array of leaders, 
some of whom were less capable than others.  The main value system has been slowly 
shifting and social issues were at the forefront during the 1970s.  Urbanisation has been 
a constant factor in New Zealand society, with the majority of New Zealanders living in 
cities since the early twentieth century.  The ‘third term blues’ has been faced by all 
                                                 
47 All governments since 1935.  First election result indexed to zero, showing the percentage of vote 
change since the first election.  The last election result shown (except for Labour-led coalition 
government 1999-200[8]) is the defeat election of the government.  MMP governments exclude coalition 
partners and only deal with National and Labour.  Data originally from: Electoral Commission, "General 
elections 1890-1993," ; Electoral Commission, "General elections 1996-2005,"  
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previous governments.  Distrust in National seems to be the sole challenge not 
previously faced, but it too can be discounted as a long-term factor in National’s 
decline.  The vote share decline can be largely attributed to some other factor – and 
again the introduction of the MMP electoral system rises as a variable in explaining 
National’s decline. 
 
Organisational Factors 
The National Party has operated at a decentralised level since its formation in 1936.  
The electoral reform process brought in a new form of electoral system and hence a 
new environment.  The ‘appropriateness’ of an organisational setup for a given 
environment has a significant impact upon the successfulness of that organisation.  
National’s organisation did not have the capacity to create a national list or conduct a 
nationwide campaign which would attract party votes. 
 
While National’s organisation was highly successful in FPP, under MMP the 
organisational structure was untested.  The decision to make minimal changes before 
MMP largely resulted from an inability to see the new electoral system as requiring a 
new organisation, combined with President Geoff Thompson’s dislike of MMP.  
However, the new MMP environment differed from FPP in a number of crucial ways in 
relation to the operation of political parties.  National’s candidate selection, campaign 
structure and ideological factionalism all were problematic under the new electoral 
environment and made it difficult for National to attract votes. 
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Candidate Selection48
FPP and MMP require different forms of candidates.  As FPP operates in single-
member constituencies, it largely requires candidates which can appeal to the plurality 
in each seat.  Hence a decentralised selectorate is likely to be able to appoint 
‘appropriate’ candidates.  MMP though requires a nationwide candidate pool which 
appeals to different sectors of society through ethnic, gender and identity 
representation.  Thus MMP requires a centralised selectorate and nomination process to 
ensure that the list is balanced enough to appeal to different groups. 
 
National grafted its list selection process to the already existing electorate candidate 
selection method.  The two candidate selection processes were parallel – to be a 
candidate on one did not indicate being a candidate on the other.  Nominations for the 
list were decentralised and in the hands of electorates and divisions.  There was no 
incentive for electorate candidates to present a ‘two ticks’ campaign and some were 
able to present just solely an electorate vote campaign in their electorate. 
 
National did not enforce dual candidacy, in order to potentially allow the two candidate 
pools to reflect the ‘appropriate’ form of candidate for each tier.  Yet National also 
decentralised the nomination process for the list thus leading to a lack of social identity 
candidates on the list.  Only fourteen percent of National candidates were of Māori, 
Asian or Pacific Island descent; only 21 percent were female.  While there were some 
exceptions, the social characteristics of the list largely failed to represent the social 
profile of New Zealand-as-a-whole.  Instead the list was predominately comprised of 
Pākehā males.  The list and electorate process resulted in the possibility that voters may 
                                                 
48 See Chapter Five for further in-depth discussion and supporting evidence. 
 72
not be attracted by the list candidate pool, but felt that the electorate candidate was 
attractive.  Furthermore, the decentralisation of nominations effectively ensured that 
factional candidates were selected rather than compromise, or non-factional, 
candidates. 
 
The factional nomination was reinforced by the strong divisional representation on the 
selectorate.  Combined, they created an informal regional quota system.  As the 
divisions were strongly linked to the factions there was a need for balance between the 
liberal and conservative factions.  The divisions fought for each position between 
themselves, largely ignoring other important elements.  While there were 
representatives of Māori, women and youth on the List Standing Committee, they were 
much weaker than the divisions and did not necessarily have candidates to support due 
to the decentralised nomination process.  The lists were largely based upon regional 
quantity rather than candidate quality.   
 
Each electorate largely looked after the vote campaign which would maximise their 
own candidate’s chances of getting elected.  There was no over-riding consideration for 
the state of the Party-as-a-whole.  The belief that electorate MPs were more legitimate 
than list MPs largely meant that the preferred option in entering Parliament was under 
the electorate method.  The incentives created by the nomination process and the two-
tiered nature of MMP meant that National had trouble controlling electorate campaigns.  
It is no surprise that in the 1996, 1999 and 2002 elections National recorded a higher 
overall electorate vote share than party vote share (see Figure 6.8). 
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National did have significant candidate selection problems in the 1996, 1999 and 2002 
elections.  As theorised earlier, introducing candidate selection methods for the list 
posed a problem for National.  For a political party which had operated at a 
decentralised level, the decision to allow electorates and divisions to control 
nominations and the decision to have strong divisional representation on the selectorate 
were easy to make.  However, the decisions made were not the best for appealing 
throughout the country.  National suffered in the party vote due to the inappropriateness 
of list candidates for the nation and the incentives of electorate candidates to present an 
electorate vote-centric campaign.  Decentralised candidate selection meant National did 
not have the capacity to put forward a list which would attract party votes throughout 
the country. 
 
Campaign Structure49
The change to MMP necessitated a different form of campaigning than that which 
existed previously.  As previously noted, MMP requires a nationwide campaign, 
whereas FPP requires a decentralised campaign focused on marginal seats as the 
fulcrum of the campaign.  However, National’s organisational structure limited the 
ability of Party elites to run a nationwide campaign, instead electorates continued to 
determine how campaigning would occur in their small geographic unit. 
 
Electorate committees were still the dominant force in making decisions about 
campaigning in elecorates.  There was no over-riding campaign.  Each electorate was 
able to run what it viewed as the ‘best’ campaign for the electorate.  MMP though 
                                                 
49 See Chapter Six for further in-depth discussion and supporting evidence. 
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requires a nationally consistent campaign.  Each elector’s party vote is of equal value to 
all others. 
 
The decentralised control prevented National from hiring professional staff.  As 
divisions have traditionally hired most campaign staff, the central authority could not 
hire a professional campaign adviser, and when they did (2002) they were ineffective in 
communicating to the electorates and divisions – who wished to control the campaign 
themselves.  Furthermore, financially the divisions and electorates were strong, and as 
they provided money to the central campaign team, they were able to have some control 
over the use of that money. 
 
National’s decentralised organisation further limited any nationwide strategy being 
implemented.  MMP requires parties to focus resources more evenly throughout the 
country than FPP.  However, electorates predominately focused upon marginal 
swinging voters rather than building the coalition of voters needed.  Where there was a 
nationwide strategy, it was an FPP two-party system strategy rather than an MMP 
multi-party system strategy. 
 
Electorates were able to control advertising in their own district.  There was no central 
control or approval needed.  In the 1996, 1999 and 2002 elections numerous problems 
were found.  Billboards did not ask for the party vote, and some even failed to mention 
National.  Pamphlets were produced in a wide variety of colours and forms, again some 
failing to push the party vote aspect.  Radio was used by candidates, outside of the 
ninety day regulation period, to push the candidate not the party.  The only nationwide 
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medium, television, was used by the centre, but failed to be effective as it could not, 
and did not, link in with the other campaigns occurring throughout the country. 
 
The electorate-level campaign was highly personalistic and candidates maintained 
separate campaign organisations which undermined the party/issue oriented campaign 
that the central campaign team attempted to push in all three elections.  National did not 
run an MMP-specific campaign in any of the three elections.  There was no focus on 
the Party-as-a-whole or the party vote.  Instead, the campaign structure allowed too 
much control for electorates and the central campaign team did not have the ability to 
over-ride them and run a nationwide campaign.  The decentralised campaign structure 
meant National did not have the ability to run a campaign which would attract party 
votes throughout the country. 
 
Ideological Factionalism 
The decentralised nature of National allowed the factional nature of the Party to solidify 
and institutionalise itself.  Under FPP this was a sensible decision – the liberal and 
conservative wings appealed to different sectors of society.  Under MMP the array of 
different political parties for whom it is possible, and viable, to vote for makes 
ideological heterogeneity a burden and a challenge for a party rather than a potential 
vote-winning facet.50
 
Under FPP National did not have difficulty in providing a link between the liberal and 
conservative factions and could largely allow each free rein in the extra-parliamentary 
party.  With the introduction of MMP National could no longer advertise itself as 
                                                 
50 Stephens, "Factionalism in the New Zealand Labour and National Parties". 
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simply being the ‘anti-Labour’ party, given the existence of other actual and potential 
anti-Labour political parties.  Under FPP National’s core beliefs were outlined in a 
negative statement (anti-Labour), but under MMP such statements had to shift in order 
to become positive.  Hence National had to actively define itself and what the Party 
stood for under MMP – yet in doing so National risked alienating one faction or the 
other. 
 
Figure 4.5 New Zealand Political Spectrum (post-2002 election)51
 
 
Minor political parties were able to present themselves as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ and 
not as a hybrid, broad-church party.  ACT targeted liberal voters in the main urban 
centres.  New Zealand First and United Future both targeted conservative voters, 
                                                 
51 The Progressive Coalition and all non-parliamentary parties are excluded.  Party size indicates 
ideological range, not vote share. 
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although through different means.  National, as a hybrid party, had to react to these new 
parties without turning other voters away.  As Figure 4.5 shows, National has little 
room to move as other parties crowded around it.  If National had reacted to a challenge 
by ACT with liberal policy, then they might have caused conservative voters to move to 
New Zealand First or United Future.  Likewise, a reaction to New Zealand First or 
United Future policy may have caused liberal voters to move towards ACT. 
 
The decentralised organisation prevented National from putting forward a cohesive 
statement under MMP of its policies and core beliefs.  National produced ‘muddled’ 
policy which was largely a result of being unable to successfully find common policy 
between two different factions.  A more centralised organisation would have been able 
to limit the factional tension within the extra-parliamentary party and perhaps would 
have provided more popular and populist policy stances. 
 
Reviews of Organisation 
Party organisations can serve as an easy scapegoat for electoral failure.  However, it 
appears that in the case of National during the transition to MMP that the organisational 
structure was one of the main reasons for electoral decline and not other factors which 
arose during the same period.  The decentralised candidate selection process made the 
list candidate pools unappealing nationwide.  The campaign structure gave too much 
control to electorates who, given the incentive to secure one’s own election, did not 
push the party vote message.  The ideological factionalism, which was reinforced by 
the decentralised organisation, made it hard for National to create consistent messages 
and policies.   Therefore an effective response to such a decline would be to re-organise 
the Party in order to deal with the candidate selection, campaigning and factional 
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issues.  Two reviews were undertaken in the first ten years of MMP.  The first review in 
1997 attempted to centralise the organisational structure, but failed due to resistance.  
The second review, completed in 2003, again attempted to centralise the organisational 
structure, and succeeded in doing so. 
 
1997 Review and Minor Re-Organisation 
While the Party undertook some candidate selection rule changes in 1995, it was 
decided to put off any significant review of the organisation until after the 1996 
election.  The 1997 review proposed many significant changes, yet these proposals 
were diluted and little actual change was achieved.  This was because in 1997 “the 
Party was not licking the wounds of defeat”,52 and did not feel the need for substantial 
internal reform.  The conservative nature of organisation prevented significant change.  
National undertook the 1997 review so as to ask itself: 
Proportional representation tends to reward smaller 
parties at the expense of larger ones.  The electoral 
market-place will be more crowded from now.  The main 
reason for a review flows directly from the move to 
MMP: Are we in a position to continue attracting 
membership, and support, in a more crowded field?  
For 50 years we were the only centre-right party in New 
Zealand and there was no real alternative.  MMP has 
delivered more choices to voters.53
The review was chaired by former Leader Jim McLay and included President Geoff 
Thompson as well as representatives of both the caucus and organisation. 
                                                 
52 Clark, "The Impact of MMP on Political Party Electorate Organisations", 110. 
53 Emphasis in original.  New Zealand National Party Review Committee quoted in Clark, "The Impact 
of MMP on Political Party Electorate Organisations", 111. 
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 The first discussion paper provided several potential options for re-forming the Party.  
The most radical suggestion was that National adopt a ‘flat model’ organisation.  The 
divisions were to be removed and replaced with regional directors.  This was quickly 
revised.  Instead the reviewers looked at changing the number of divisions – with three 
or six divisions being favoured.  Divisional flexibility was also discussed, with a 
proposal to reverse the decision of the 1984/5 review in standardising divisional 
structure. 
 
Furthermore, the review committee looked at the role of the National Executive and the 
Finance Committee.  While formal power had been invested with the National 
Executive, the Finance Committee had been making most decisions on administration 
matters.  The proposals put forward included replacing the Finance Committee with a 
National Management Committee, which would be a sub-committee of the National 
Executive.  However, the final proposal recommended concentrating power by 
replacing the National Executive with the National Management Board and having the 
Finance Committee as a sub-committee.  The proposed National Management Board 
would be smaller than the National Executive.  There would be fewer divisional council 
representatives and the Treasurer would no longer be a member. 
 
Consideration was given to establishing a new vice president who would be in charge 
of campaign strategy for the party vote.  One of the failures of the 1996 campaign had 
been that National had assumed that the electorate vote would be considered as the 
primary vote by electors and that ticket-splitting would be minimal.  However, both of 
these turned out to be false.  By establishing a new executive position solely dedicated 
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to the party vote, National would have at least one vice president who looked at the 
wider picture and who would be personally accountable if there was a decline in the 
party vote.  However, the final review only recommended that “future consideration be 
given to the establishment of an additional vice presidential position to oversee Party 
Vote activity and the Campaign Planning Committee.”54
 
Attention was also given to the role special interest groups played within the Party.  
There was some objection to the continuation of the Māori, women and youth special 
sections, although these objections were largely ignored.  The procedure for nomination 
of the Māori Vice President was reviewed and a decision was made to hold a 
nationwide Hui instead of rotating the nomination between the divisions.  Furthermore, 
the review recommended the establishment of a Youth Vice President, which would 
give the three nationwide social groups the same internal constitutional position as all 
three would have vice presidencies. 
 
Some of the aforementioned proposals were adopted by the constitutional conference, 
while others were not.  The resistance predominately came from divisional elites.55  
The divisions were restored their organisational flexibility and the flat model was not 
adopted, nor was the number of divisions changed.  In large, the party structure was 
unchanged and National remained a significantly decentralised political party.  There 
were some minor changes at the top – yet these did little to re-organise the Party more 
appropriately for MMP. 
 
                                                 
54 New Zealand National Party Review Committee quoted in: Clark, "The Impact of MMP on Political 
Party Electorate Organisations", 121. 
55 Clark, "The Impact of MMP on Political Party Electorate Organisations", 113-114. 
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The National Executive was renamed the National Management Board denoting the 
business-model language of the Party and in some ways replicating the movement of 
managerial theories into the state sector.  The new National Management Board was 
largely similar to the National Executive.  Divisional representation was cut by five 
(one from each division), caucus lost a representative and the National Treasurer 
disappeared.  The Māori Vice President’s selection was changed so that the person was 
now selected at a Hui.  The Young Nationals received a Youth Vice President, who was 
to be selected in a similar fashion to the Women’s Vice President.56  However, overall 
the basic structure stayed largely unchanged and ten of the seventeen members were 
still directly elected by the divisions (see Appendix One). 
 
The 1997 review proposed much, but achieved little.  While the central elites sought 
greater control, the divisional elites were not willing to give up their power and could 
effectively resist change.  The National Party was still in government at the time, and 
the full impact of MMP was yet to be felt or understood.  Furthermore, National had 
only declined 1.3 percent since the previous election in 1993.  The motivation to 
change a still successful organisational structure was lacking within the Party.  Some 
minor changes were implemented, but these did little to address the dynamic new 
electoral environment in which National was now operating under. 
 
2003 Review and Centralisation 
The 2002 election represented the nadir of National’s support, and indeed post-war 
support for either of the two main political parties.  The defeat left National deflated 
                                                 
56 Consequently, Young National representation on the List Standing Committee went to the Youth Vice 
President. 
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and showing signs of being in serious trouble.  Blame was quickly placed on Party 
President Michelle Boag, who soon resigned her position.  Two reviews were 
undertaken to evaluate the reasons for the electoral defeat. 
 
The first review conducted by National sought to establish where blame lay for the 
electoral defeat.  Many aspects of National’s campaign went wrong.  The funding was a 
shambles – in order to remain solvent National had to spend 30 percent of its 
fundraising money on repaying debts.  Leader Bill English was inexperienced in his 
new role. Furthermore, the Party lacked a cohesive strategy and ‘forgot’ to explicitly 
campaign for the party vote.  The 2002 election review committee recommended that a 
substantial review of the organisational structure be carried out.57
 
The organisation review was formally carried out by Steven Joyce (Radioworks CEO), 
Denese Henare (former Law Commissioner and wife of National MP Wayne Mapp) 
and Jeff Grant (MP 1987-1993, campaign director in 1999, businessman and farmer).  
Leader Bill English was heavily consulted throughout the process and was considered 
to be part of the team.58  The team consulted widely throughout the membership – the 
review team went on “little road shows around the various electorates….  [and visited] 
a lot of meetings at regional conferences and regional meetings.”59
 
The review team looked beyond traditional political party organisation models in 
developing the potential new organisation structure.  National looked towards 
                                                 
57 The review of the 2002 election has never formally been made public.  However, a leaked executive 
summary was read in the House by a Labour Cabinet Minister, see: Lianne Dalziel, "General Debate 
Speech, 11 September 2002," in Hansard (New Zealand House of Representatives, 2002). 
58 Subject B, Interview. 
59 Subject A, Interview with Gregory R. Stephens, 15 June 2007. 
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commercial operations, producer boards, voluntary associations such as Federated 
Farmers, non-commercial organisations such as the New Zealand Rugby Union, 
charities and local government.60  The corporation board model was strongly 
considered with Steven Joyce arguing that he wanted “the National Management Board 
to become a more traditional [i.e. corporate] Board of Directors.”61
 
A substantial re-organisation of the Party was recommended by the review team to 
make the Party organisation work effectively in the MMP environment.  The divisions 
were to lose much of their power and become known as ‘regions’.  The National 
Management Board was to be significantly downsized, with just seven extra-
parliamentary members all elected by the Annual Conference and two from caucus 
(including the leader).  The President was to be elected by, and from within, the Board 
rather than by the Annual Conference.  Three elected Board members would resign 
each year.  The Māori and women sectors would be completely removed while the 
youth sector was still to get special recognition at the regional level; however, internal 
policy advisory groups could be established, but would not play a role in governing the 
Party.  In candidate selection there was to be a candidate training college to 
professionalise candidate selection, and the electorate and list candidate nominations 
were to become largely carbon copies of each other through enforcing dual candidacy.  
Campaign decisions and strategy were to be brought into the centre.  A minimum 
membership fee was to be introduced.  The review team also recommended restoring 
loyalty to the monarchy as a guiding principle of the Party as part of the review. 
 
                                                 
60 Subject B, Interview; Subject A, Interview. 
61 Quoted in: New Zealand National Party, "Nats to consider critical changes,"  (Scoop Press Release 
Archive, 2003). 
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The 2003 review went to a special Constitutional Conference held on 12 April 2003 in 
Wellington.  The conference had the same delegation rules as a normal annual 
conference.62  A number of National elites gave speeches urging delegates to support 
the proposed changes.  For instance, Leader Bill English stated: 
We the National Party need to change our constitution 
and today is the day to do it.  And there’s a simple reason 
why we need to change our constitution. So that we can 
win.  You all remember, I hope, as powerfully as I do the 
aftermath of the last election.  And when I spoke with 
members of the National Party, then with supporters, 
when we sent the caucus out to talk to you about that 
defeat, there was a strong will to change.  Now the pain 
might have receded, but the need to change has not.  We 
have a simple requirement for the next election, that is to 
run a tightly focussed disciplined National Party 
campaign for the party vote.  Because we’ve discovered 
without one of those, without that sort of campaign, 
MMP is absolutely unforgiving.63
President Judy Kirk noted: 
We want to put in place an organisation that will allow 
the National Party to win the next election and we want to 
take our membership along with us.64
Review co-ordinator Steven Joyce argued that: 
The structural revamp will give National room to grow 
and flourish in an MMP environment.  It puts a definite 
focus on winning the Party vote and sends a message to 
                                                 
62 For the delegate rules, see: New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules of the New Zealand 
National Party,"  (Wellington: 1998), 14-15. 
63 Quoted in: New Zealand National Party, "English Speech: Give MPs the tools to do their job,"  (Scoop 
Press Release Archive, 2003). 
64 Quoted in: New Zealand National Party, "National Party overwhelmingly backs change,"  (Scoop Press 
Release Archive, 2003). 
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the membership that it’s serious about the business of 
being elected.65
Respected former Party President Sir George Chapman spoke behind closed doors and 
also urged delegates to vote for the constitutional amendments.66  The Party hierarchy 
was strongly pushing for change and clearly linked that they believe that MMP was the 
reason they needed to reform the organisational structure. 
 
The vast majority of the amendments proposed in 2003 were adopted, including all 
those listed above, and the organisation was significantly altered (see Appendix One).  
Indeed what was seen prior to the conference as the most controversial change, the 
appointment of the President by the Board, was passed with near unanimity.67  The 
National Party undertook its largest re-organisation since 1936 with little opposition, 
little fanfare, but with significant impact both within the Party and ultimately outside 
the Party.  The institutional inertia and conservative nature of organisation was broken 
with the 2002 election result. 
 
Decline and Re-Organisation 
National’s decline under MMP took the Party by surprise.  As with any waning of 
support there are many plausible explanations and indeed many of these do play some 
role in National’s decline.  However the change of electoral system meant that an 
organisation, which could have handled many of the problems National had faced in the 
1990s, could not address the new challenges presented by MMP.  The organisation was 
                                                 
65 Quoted in: New Zealand National Party, "National Party overwhelmingly backs change." 
66 Subject B, Interview. 
67 Subject A, Interview. 
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set up to campaign in a single-member simple-plurality electoral system environment – 
not in a two-tiered proportional electoral system. 
 
Other than implementing a list candidate selection method, National made minimal 
changes to prepare for MMP.  The 1997 review did little to make the organisation more 
appropriate for MMP even though some change was made.  It was not until the 
considerable defeat at the 2002 election that National realised that something needed to 
be done.  The 2003 re-organisation substantially centralised the Party. 
 
To test whether the centralisation did have impact on party behaviour, by influencing 
the power relations within National, two case studies will be analysed.  The key areas 
of a political party’s operation within a democracy are of candidate selection and 
campaigning.  If the centralisation process worked, then these two aspects should show 
significant changes to how they previously operated and hence have different external 
outcomes.  The power relations between central and regional elites will thus have 
shifted.  If there is little sign of change both externally and internally, then the 
centralisation may have purely had an administrative effect and not truly impacted upon 
the balance of power within National. 
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 Chapter Five: Candidate Selection 
Candidate selection is one of the key operations that political parties undertake in a 
democratic system.  The decision on who is, and is not, a candidate determines the 
public face of the party.  Changing candidate selection rules affects the nature of the 
candidates selected and therefore the image of whom the public see as the party.  
Furthermore: 
The quality of candidates selected determines the quality 
of deputies [MPs] elected, of the resultant parliament, 
often of the members of the government and, to some 
extent, of a country’s politics.  A change in parties’ 
selection procedures in any given country might thus 
have direct consequences for the way politics operate 
there.1
Hence candidate selection not only plays an important role within a party, but also 
within a polity. 
 
Within parties candidate selection provides an insight into intra-party conflict and 
power bases.  Successfully selected candidates have won an internal battle whereas 
those who are not selected or are in un-winnable positions (low on the list or standing 
in an opposition stronghold) have seemingly lost the battle.  The outcomes of candidate 
selection battles provide external evidence as to what happened within the ‘secret 
garden’ of politics. 
 
                                                 
1 Michael Gallagher, "Introduction," in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds.), Candidate 
Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics,  (London: Sage, 1988), 1. 
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 National’s candidate selection method has traditionally been highly decentralised.  The 
central authority (in its various guises) has had little say over who is the candidate as 
“the local electorates jealously protect their right to have the final say and heavy-
handed pressure from the centre may backfire”.2  With the introduction of MMP there 
was clearly a need to create a nationwide list selection process, yet the traditional power 
within National lay in discrete geographical units. 
 
MMP, as a two-tiered electoral system, requires two different candidate pools.  The 
electorate tier, using plurality rules, requires candidates which can appeal to the 
plurality of voters in a discrete area; while the list pool requires candidates which can 
appeal across the country.  Given that it is the party vote which determines the overall 
composition of Parliament, nominations and selections should be aimed at providing 
list candidates which appeal across the nation.  Hence candidate nomination and 
selection should be centralised. 
 
1996, 1999 and 2002 Candidate Selection Outcomes 
The 1996, 1999 and 2002 elections all used the same candidate selection methods, 
although there was a minor change in 1997 with the youth representative on the 
selectorate being replaced by the new Youth Vice President.  The list process was run 
parallel to the electorate candidate selection process.  It was possible that the two 
candidate pools would not have any candidate overlap. 
 
                                                 
2 Richard Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, second ed. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), 
255-256. 
 89
 The electorate selection was not changed with the introduction of the list, and still 
remained in the hands of the electorate.  Nomination was by ten party members.  The 
electorate candidate selectorate was in the hands of each electorate’s Selection 
Committee, with one delegate for every 15 members of a branch.  Each electorate used 
progressive elimination voting until one candidate had a majority. 
 
The introduced list process decentralised nominations and, while it was a nationwide 
process, there was significant divisional representation on the List Standing Committee.  
The list selection process required nominations from electorates and divisional 
councils, and each division ranked its candidates in a Divisional List Selection Meeting.  
The nationwide list was then ranked by the List Standing Committee.  The two 
processes and selectorates did not overlap (see Appendix One). 
 
All three elections produced similar outcomes in terms of what profile of candidate was 
selected.  There were a substantial number of candidates standing for the list or for the 
electorate only.  The National Party can be characterised during this period as having 
few ethnic minority or female candidates.  There were also consistent geographical 
traits in the placement of list candidates. 
 
National had five divisions.  These divisions each had their own characteristics, as 
previously noted.  Auckland (renamed Northern before the 1999 election) and 
Wellington (renamed Lower North Island before the 2002 election) were the liberal 
divisions.  While Canterbury-Westland, Waikato (renamed Central North Island before 
the 1999 election) and Otago-Southland (renamed Southern before the 1999 election) 
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 were the conservative divisions.  With the factions and divisions overlapping, the 
geographic traits also led into factional traits within the candidate pools. 
 
Table 5.1 1996 National Candidate Pool3
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1-10 4 4 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 4 
11-20 4 1 3 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 
21-30 4 2 2 1 1 3 0 0 1 2 
31-40 4 2 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 
41-50 3 3 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 
51-60 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 
61-65 1 0 2 2 0 2 1 0 1 0 
Electorate-only 3 5 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 - 
 
In 1996 National stood 76 candidates overall.  Of the top ten positions on the list, 
Auckland and Waikato were heavily represented, while Wellington was not represented 
at all.  The strong bias towards Auckland continued throughout the list due to its 
population and electorate seat dominance within New Zealand.  Seven women were in 
the top 30 (less than one quarter) and no woman further down the list was able to win 
an electorate.  Māori were generally poorly represented, although there were two Māori 
candidates in the top ten.  Overall the list was biased towards incumbent MPs – only 
one non-MP was in the top ten (Georgina Te Heuheu) and the next two new candidates 
were numbers 18 (Belinda Vernon) and 19 (Arthur Anae).  No candidate was stood on 
Ohariu-Belmont due to a deal made with United Leader Peter Dunne. Eight of the top 
30 on the list did not contest an electorate, although only one (Annabel Young at 
number 28) did not win a list seat on election night.  Eleven candidates stood for an 
                                                 
3 No divisional origin was released with the candidate list.  Consequently the division each candidate is 
from has been calculated by electorate stood in, or for list-only candidates from previous or future 
electorates. 
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 electorate but not on the list with five being from the Waikato Division – only two were 
successful (Max Bradford in Rotorua and Murray McLean in Coromandel) (see Table 
5.1 and Appendix Two). 
 
Table 5.2 1999 National Candidate Pool4
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1-10 3 2 2 2 1 3 1 0 0 3 
11-20 2 3 2 2 1 3 0 0 1 5 
21-30 3 2 2 2 1 4 0 1 0 3 
31-40 4 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
41-50 3 2 3 2 0 0 2 1 0 1 
51-60 3 2 3 1 1 2 1 0 1 4 
61-65 3 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 2 
Electorate-only 6 6 2 3 1 3 2 0 0 - 
 
The 1999 candidate pool followed a similar trend to that of the 1996 election.  The 
geographical spread of the top ten positions on the list was greater – Northern 
(Auckland) had three, while Central North Island (Waikato), Wellington and 
Canterbury-Westland each had two, Southern (Otago-Southland) had only one 
candidate.  Women were better represented with ten being in the top 30.  However 
Māori were worse off on National’s list in 1999.  Again no candidate was stood in 
Ohariu-Belmont to accommodate Peter Dunne and the Party decided to support ACT 
Leader Richard Prebble in Wellington Central by not standing a candidate against him.  
The number of list-only candidates in the top 30 increased to eleven.  Furthermore, 
sixteen candidates stood in an electorate but not on the list; again Central North Island 
                                                 
4 The division each list candidate was from was released in: New Zealand National Party, "National 
Announces Party List,"  (Scoop Press Release Archive, 1999). 
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 was significantly over-represented.  The total candidate pool was 83 strong (see Table 
5.2 and Appendix Two).5
 
Table 5.3 2002 National Candidate Pool6
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1-10 3 2 1 3 1 2 1 0 1 2 
11-20 2 1 3 2 2 4 1 0 0 2 
21-30 5 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 
31-40 4 2 2 1 1 4 1 0 1 2 
41-50 4 1 4 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 
51-60 5 2 0 2 1 2 2 1 0 1 
61-65 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Electorate-only 3 6 2 3 0 0 2 0 0 - 
 
The 2002 election again repeated the dominance of Northern in the list, with one-third 
of the top 30 positions on the list being Northern candidates.  While the Lower North 
Island (Wellington) Division succeeded in securing some high places for their 
candidates, they were told by other divisions that they could not have any significant 
representation until further down the list even though they had a high number of quality 
candidates.7  Māori were more strongly represented throughout the list with one 
candidate per block of ten.  Pansy Wong’s promotion on the list saw an Asian in the top 
ten for the first time.  Female representation fell to just eight in the top 30.  The number 
of list-only candidates fell, while there were fourteen electorate-only candidates and 
again Central North Island was over-represented.  There was an attempt at significant 
                                                 
5 Initially the 1999 list had 65 candidates, however the Electoral Commission received a list of 64 
candidates indicating that Rea Wikaira had withdrawn at some stage – the analysis made here is with 
Wikaira as that more accurately reflects the internal dynamics within the List Standing Committee. 
6 These figures differ from those used by Salmond, "Choosing Candidates," 200.  Instead the divisional 
origin relies on: New Zealand National Party, "General Election 2002- National Party List Ranking," 
Scoop, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0206/S00251.htm, 2002 (accessed: 7 November 2007). 
7 Salmond, "Choosing Candidates," 201. 
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 renewal with four new candidates in the 11-20 block – although none entered 
Parliament due to the poor election result.  Further attempts at renewal were found in a 
number of electorates.  Party President Michelle Boag was able to use her considerable 
influence to ensure Hekia Parata and John Key were selected, but Boag failed in her 
attempt to unseat Clem Simich.8  For the first time under MMP a candidate was put up 
in each electorate – the Party decided to challenge Peter Dunne in Ohariu-Belmont and 
Richard Prebble had failed to hold Wellington Central in 1999 (see Table 5.3 and 
Appendix Two). 
 
The 1996, 1999 and 2002 candidate pools had striking similarities, differences and 
trends.  Northern/Auckland’s dominance of the higher list placements fell.  Central 
North Island/Waikato electorate candidates were the least likely to stand on the list 
indicating that they realised that the regional list quota was not influenced by the 
number of electorate-only candidates and that they could thus have a higher number of 
candidates than proportionality would allow.  Identity candidates were under-
represented as fourteen percent of candidates were Māori, Asian or Pacific Islanders 
and 21 percent were female.  There were no openly homosexual candidates.  Māori 
fared best in 2002 and women in 1999.  The number of list-only candidates peaked in 
1999 at over one quarter of the entire list.  Only in 2002 did National stand a candidate 
in each electorate, indicating that the Executive (in 1996) or the Board (in 1999) was 
able to prevent electorates from undertaking candidate selection procedures for 
strategic reasons.   
 
                                                 
8 Salmond, "Choosing Candidates," 198-199. 
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 2003 Changes 
The 2003 review created a significant change in National’s candidate selection process, 
even though formally it looked as though little change was put through.  The National 
Management Board gained power and control in determining who will be, and who will 
not be, a candidate even though formally more power went to the electorates.  The 
major changes were the introduction of a candidate training college, making the 
electorate candidate process effectively the nomination process for the list and thus 
enforcing dual candidacy, and changing the composition of the list selectorate 
(alongside its name). 
 
Candidate’s Club 
The objective of the Candidate’s Club (sic)9 was to ensure that the candidates selected 
for electorates were capable of winning those seats.  The Club aimed to professionalise 
and improve the quality of candidates within the National Party by training potential 
candidates.  While personal candidate voting has not been strong in New Zealand,10 
local candidates are one of the many faces of their party presented to the public.  
National was not only in decline regarding the party vote but was also losing electorate 
seats under MMP – National won 30 out of 65 seats in 1996, 22 out of 67 in 1999 and 
21 out of 69 in 2002. 
 
Enrolees for the Candidate’s Club are chosen by the National Management Board by 
whatever means the Board decides.  The Party’s Constitution and Rules states that the 
                                                 
9 The National Constitution and Rules refers to it as the “Candidate’s Club”, while it should be known as 
the “Candidates’ Club”. 
10 Bean, "Party Leaders and Local Candidates," 154. 
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 Club provides enrolees with “policy information… training arrangements and other 
opportunities to gain skill and knowledge to enhance their preparation for selection.”11  
Those under the training of the Club are able to seek selection in any electorate that 
they chose, and are to be automatically considered an ‘approved candidate’ and thus not 
needing ten local members to nominate them.  The Board can therefore effectively 
nominate candidates for electorates.  Any member of the Candidate’s Club is unlikely 
to encounter any problems at the Pre-selection Committee as the President appoints two 
of the nine members.  After the Pre-selection Committee the nominees then undertake 
an array of Meet the Candidates Meetings – where the policy information and training 
of the Club nominee is likely to come through.  Delegates to the electorate’s Selection 
Committee are more likely to vote for a Candidate’s Club nominee given their training, 
expertise and the (at least implied) backing of the Board. 
 
The Candidate’s Club, while formally ensuring a better quality of candidate, 
significantly alters the electorates’ control over candidate selection.  The Board’s 
ability to ensure that certain candidates are selected increases significantly, when 
compared to the 2002 selection wrangles,12 due to the increased likelihood of Club 
candidates being selected.  National could thus expect more ‘outsiders’ (not long-
serving party members) to become electorate candidates, as well as more women, 
ethnic minorities and other identity representatives.  Furthermore, the electorates may 
no longer select highly factional candidates with compromise candidates more likely to 
be pushed by the Board.  However, the Board’s selection control is by no means perfect 
                                                 
11 New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules of the New Zealand National Party,"  
(Wellington: 2003), 42. 
12 See: Salmond, "Choosing Candidates," 199. 
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 and National’s electorate candidate selection remains more decentralised than Labour’s 
selection process which has substantial central representation on the selectorate.13
 
Another significant advantage of the Club is that it gives the senior leadership the 
ability to interact with candidates.  Consequently, they are able to “get a pretty good 
idea [of] who the potential stars are et cetera, and who aren’t.”14  Thus when the list is 
ranked several members of the List Ranking Committee (see below) will have 
personally met the candidates and thus have assessed the quality of the candidates 
rather than simply relying upon each candidate’s curriculum vitae and reputation.  The 
list ranking of new candidates should therefore be a better reflection of skill and quality 
than of regional tallying. 
 
List Nomination Process 
Previously each electorate selected two potential list candidates and each Divisional 
Council selected one potential list candidate per electorate.15  At the electorate level a 
similar process in selecting an electorate candidate was used, with some slight 
modifications to elect two nominees.  The divisional nominee was selected through 
preferential voting by the Divisional Council.16  The Divisional List Selection Meeting 
would then rank the division’s candidates and limit the number of candidates to that 
                                                 
13 For Labour see: New Zealand Labour Party, "New Zealand Labour Party Constitution and Rules,"  
(Wellington: 2007), 19.  Also see: Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 113. 
14 Subject C, Interview with Gregory R. Stephens, 12 November 2007. 
15 If an electorate did not nominate two candidates then the Divisional Council could nominate an extra 
candidate instead. 
16 The Divisional Council is predominately made up of the electorate chairs, divisional chairs from the 
youth, Māori and women’s sections, and divisional conference elected representatives (including the 
chairperson) (see Appendix One). 
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 pre-determined by the Board on the basis of population.  The 2003 changes 
considerably altered that process.   
 
The 2003 changes mean that all electorate candidates are able to nominate themselves 
for the list, without being filtered by electorates or divisions, and all electorate 
candidates “will be strongly encouraged by the Board to be also nominated for the 
Party list”.17  These dual candidates are then ranked by the Regional List Ranking 
Forum (equivalent to the Regional Conference) for the region their electorate falls 
within.  The National Management Board may, at its discretion, nominate up to five 
candidates for the list who are not electorate candidates, giving the Board more control.  
Regional elites have no role in nominating list candidates.  All list nominees are then 
ranked by the nationwide List Ranking Committee. 
 
Effectively, this single pool of dual candidates provides a better guarantee that all 
candidates will seek both the party and electorate votes during an election campaign.  In 
previous MMP campaigns a number of electorate candidates did not fight for the party 
vote.  Furthermore, list candidates with no set electorate could have struggled to 
campaign meaningfully for National and, in effect, entered Parliament on the hard 
campaign work of other candidates.  By making the electorate candidate pool 
subservient to the list candidate pool, National could expect a better electorate 
campaign that focused on both votes.  
 
Within National many of the ethnic and women MPs have come into Parliament 
through the list.  Due to the electorate seeking ‘someone like them’ and not considering 
                                                 
17 New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules (2003)," 64. 
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 nationwide gender balance “historically women have found it difficult to gain 
nomination for National constituency candidature”.18 Given the low number of Māori, 
Pacific Island or Asian candidates selected in electorates,19 a similar argument can be 
made that electorates did not consider nationwide ethnicity balance either.  Hence there 
is a significant possibility that while electorate campaigning is improved; nationwide 
National has fewer women, Māori and other identity group representatives than in 
previous elections where they were already sparse. 
 
List Selectorate 
The 2003 re-organisation affected the body which ranked the candidates.  Previously 
the List Standing Committee was made up of the Leader, Deputy Leader, President, 
five divisional vice presidents, the youth, Māori and women’s vice presidents and four 
representatives from each of the five divisions (see Appendix One).  Due to the changes 
to the National Management Board composition some of these positions no longer 
existed after the 2003 review. 
 
Instead, the List Ranking Committee was to be made up of the Leader, Deputy Leader, 
President, non-parliamentary Board members, and each of the five regions will be 
represented by the Regional Chairperson and three other representatives (see Appendix 
One).  Notably there are no ex officio representatives for youth, Māori or women on the 
Committee.  Furthermore, the regions each have fewer representatives, although they 
are still strongly represented.  Previously divisional representatives held 25 (five each) 
                                                 
18 McLeay, "Representation, Selection, Election," 299. 
19 Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 and Appendix Two.  Also see: Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 203, 204-
205.   
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 of the 31 List Standing Committee seats, whereas regions only hold 20 (four each) of 
the 29 seats on the List Ranking Committee. 
 
The changes to the List Ranking Committee increase the power of the National 
Management Board, and in particular the Leader, to determine the list rankings – not 
only do they have more representation, but they also have had greater interaction with 
all candidates due to the Candidate’s Club.  Instead of divisions fighting for list 
placements it becomes likely that no informal regional quota system will develop and 
that list ranking will be more determined by the quality of the candidate rather than 
where they are from.  The removal of the Māori, women and youth representatives may 
cause the list to no longer have high-placed identity candidates – indeed this is 
furthered by the electorate selection being the list nomination, limiting the ability of the 
list to bring in identity candidates. 
 
Together, these rule changes – the introduction of the Candidate’s Club and the changes 
to the list nomination process and the list selectorate – created a substantially different 
candidate selection approach within National.  Formally the candidate selection process 
became more decentralised – electorates controlled both their own candidate selection 
and nomination for the vast majority of the list.  Yet potentially, the Board gained 
control over the candidate selection process through the Candidate’s Club, the removal 
of divisionally nominated list candidates, and a greater voting presence on the List 
Ranking Committee. 
 
The theoretical impact that the new candidate selection process has on the candidate 
outcomes is not necessarily clear.  The Candidate’s Club may produce more identity 
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 candidates within electorates.  However, if this does not happen, then the requirement 
that all but five list candidates are electorate candidates means that there is little chance 
of the list being able to provide a balancing mechanism to ensure identity 
representation.  The informal regional quota system operating within the List Ranking 
Committee should subside, meaning that there would be little semblance of regional 
order on National’s list.  The 2005 candidate selection process was the first to operate 
under the new rules. 
 
2005 Candidate Selection 
National undertook candidate selection for the 2005 election in late-2004 and early-
2005.  However, the Candidate’s Club had been operating since early-2004.  The new 
candidate selection process resulted in a different outcome from previous elections 
indicating a significant change in the power relations between the National 
Management Board, regions and electorates.  While there was a change, the 2005 
selection still gave regions considerable power – indicating that there may be a further 
attempt at centralisation in candidate selection by the central elites. 
 
Candidates’ College 
The 2005 election was the first to run the Candidate’s Club – although elites referred to 
it by the more professional and educational title of the ‘Candidates’ College’.  While 
little information about the College was made publicly available, President Judy Kirk 
noted in early 2004 that: 
Sixty four potential candidates have attended the 
College….  At the moment, I cannot think of one major 
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 selection which will not be contested by a number of 
people, any one of whom would be a good candidate….  
Strong and well prepared candidates are important in our 
plan….  I am very grateful to Don [Brash], the Caucus, 
previous leaders and MPs for their support and help with 
the college.20
The Candidates’ College was up and running at least one year and four months before 
the election.  With 64 club participants it would have been obvious from the outset that 
not all would be able to secure nomination, especially if none challenged a sitting MP.  
Steven Joyce, the 2005 campaign manager, noted that the College “directly led to the 
very strong set of well-prepared and disciplined candidates National was able to field in 
the 2005 election.”21  The College obviously provided significant mentoring to make 
sure each candidate understood their roles, obligations and followed the decisions of the 
Board and Leader. 
 
National, as a rule, does not release the names of those in the College.22  It is known 
that there were a number of high profile individuals whom National attempted to woo 
to stand as a candidate.  Leader Don Brash sought out “people who on the face are very 
good all-rounders, and some people who have real expertise in particular areas.”23  
There was speculation that high profile lawyer Judith Ablett-Kerr QC would stand,24 
                                                 
20 Judy Kirk, "Address to National Party Lower North Island Regional Conference " New Zealand 
National Party, http://www.national.org.nz/Article.aspx?articleId=1966, 2004 (accessed: 6 November 
2007). 
21 Emphasis added.  Steven Joyce, "National - The Road to Recovery," in Stephen Levine and Nigel S. 
Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 2005,  (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 2007), 107. 
22 New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules (2003)," 42. 
23 Quoted in: Helen Tunnah, "Wanted: new Brash-pack MPs," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=3577376, 2004 (accessed: 30 October 
2007). 
24 Sarah Catherall, "National politics on the cards for QC Judith Ablett-Kerr," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/organisation/story.cfm?o_id=500483&objectid=10122111, 2005 (accessed: 9 
November 2007). 
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 although she decided not to.  Another potential candidate who did not stand was 
Business Roundtable chairman Rob McLeod.25  Speculation also existed around 
Wellington lawyer Chris Finlayson and Auckland principal Allan Peachey,26 both of 
whom ended up standing for National.  It is likely that some of these candidates were 
involved within the Candidates’ College thus creating such conjecture in the media. 
 
A notable sign in the ability of the Candidates’ College is evident in the number of 
electorates National managed to win in 2005.  While National won a number of 
marginal seats from Labour, National also won some seats that it had not held in many 
years and were becoming seen as safe, or relatively safe, seats for other parties.  Napier 
was held from 1981 to 1999 by Labour’s Geoff Braybrooke – in 1999 he secured over 
60 percent of the electorate vote – and it was taken over by Labour’s Russell 
Fairbrother in 2002 with 45 percent of the electorate vote.  In 2005 National presented a 
new candidate in Napier, Chris Tremain, who won just over half of the electorate votes.  
Bob Clarkson, another new candidate, was able to take Tauranga from New Zealand 
First Leader Winston Peters, who had held the seat since 1984.  Craig Foss, in his 
second attempt, won Tukituki from Rick Barker, which had been a Labour stronghold 
under various guises.  Chester Borrows, in his third attempt, won the Whanganui 
electorate from Jill Pettis who had won the seat in 1993 and had held it since then.  
These candidates were able to do in 2005 what various candidates had been unable to 
do for many years – win new electorate seats for National.  Again, it is not possible to 
tell whether these candidates were College participants, but it is likely that a number of 
them were. 
                                                 
25 Tunnah, "Wanted: new Brash-pack MPs,"  
26 Tunnah, "Wanted: new Brash-pack MPs,"  
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In 2005 the College did not act as an effective filter as was expected.  The Board 
allowed 64 nominees in.  One interview subject noted that “[i]t’s very easy to get into 
the Candidates’ College.  I don’t know many who’ve been refused, but nutters have 
been [refused]”.27  The College was not exclusive enough to ensure that candidates 
were guided to nomination in electorates.  Furthermore, a number of electorates 
selected candidates that were not trained by the College.28  While the Board did gain 
some extra control, it was not what they necessarily expected.  However, the Party 
expected a large crop of new MPs, due to the significant poll increase in 2004, and may 
have wanted to keep the potential candidate pool as wide as possible.  The success of 
the College in training new candidates to win seats and votes means that it is likely to 
play a more prominent role in future elections. 
 
No Māori Seat Candidates 
National decided to not stand any candidates in the seven Māori seats as part of 
National’s commitment to abolish the Māori seats in order to achieve its ‘one law for 
all’ policy stance.  However, the decision could also have been made because National 
was unlikely to find suitable Māori candidates or have any real chance in picking up 
many votes in the Māori seats.  National never won a Māori seat in the post-war era due 
to the Labour-Ratana alliance, and National was unlikely to do so in 2005.  The Press 
political reporter Peter Luke speculated that National’s decision was “a classic political 
                                                 
27 Subject C, Interview. 
28 Subject C, Interview. 
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 instance of making a virtue out of a necessity” as “National’s prospects in the Maori 
[sic] seats were remarkably dim.”29
 
A decision not to contest an electorate has significant consequences for any party.  The 
spending limit falls by $20,000 for each electorate that is not contested.  At some public 
meetings there may be no party representative present, depending on the organiser’s 
rules.  There will be less publicity locally within the electorate.  Voters may feel as 
though they are being ignored and hence become less likely to cast a party vote in 
favour of the party.  National’s decision not to stand a candidate in the seven Māori 
seats inevitably meant that their spending cap was $140,000 less than that of other 
parties (including Labour) and that they were likely to lose party votes from those on 
the Māori roll.  Furthermore, with the dual candidacy requirements, National was not 
going to have significant Māori representation on the list. 
 
The choice to not stand any candidates in the Māori seats was made by the Board and 
caucus.  Leader Don Brash stated that the “caucus agrees with a decision by the Party 
board that National will campaign only for the party vote in the Maori [sic] 
electorates.”30   However, under the Constitution and Rules there is no role for the 
caucus to play in determining candidate selection processes – indicating that the 
centralisation may have also increased the control of the caucus over the extra-
parliamentary party.  The Māori seats decision was made for policy reasons, yet under 
the Constitution and Rules the Board may only consider four matters when deciding not 
                                                 
29 Peter Luke, "Nats shift stance on Maori seats," The Press, 27 November 2004. 
30 Don Brash, "National opts for party vote only in Maori seats," New Zealand National Party, 
http://www.national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticleID=3217, 2004 (accessed: 13 November 2007). 
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 to allow a candidate selection process to occur – none of which deal with policy or 
strategic matters.31
 
The decision by the Board not to allow candidates to stand in the Māori seats was 
partially a result of the 2003 centralisation.  Previously such a decision could have been 
made but would have resulted in internal fighting as the Māori Vice President would 
have strongly resisted such a move.32  The liberal Auckland and Wellington divisions 
may have also provided resistance.  The new Board (see Appendix One), with no social 
or regional representation, meant that there was little resistance or veto players to the 
decision within the Board itself. 
 
List Outcome 
The National Party list in 2005 was different from that of previous MMP lists.  The 
representation of ethnic minorities and women fell dramatically.  The list position of all 
sitting MPs was determined by their caucus rankings and not by the extra-parliamentary 
party.  The regional origin of candidates also seemed to matter less.  Furthermore, no 
candidate stood solely in an electorate and only three candidates stood solely on the list. 
 
The list and electorate pools were largely carbon copies of each other.  The National 
Constitution and Rules only requires that electorate candidates be “strongly encouraged 
by the Board to be also nominated for the Party list.”33  In 2005 President Judy Kirk 
                                                 
31 See: New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules (2003)," 43-44. 
32 Parallels can be found in debates over the removal of the Māori seats, see: Gustafson, The First 50 
Years, 253. 
33 New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules (2003)," 64. 
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 noted that “the constituent candidate is also the list nomination”.34  For the first time all 
electorate candidates stood on the list, indicating that the encouragement given 
essentially made it a necessity to stand on the list.  The Board has up to five 
nominations for list-only candidates; in 2005 they used three of these nominations – 
Leader Don Brash, high-profile Māori MP Georgina Te Heuheu and new-comer Tim 
Groser.  Apart from these three candidates, the two candidate pools were identical. 
 
The number of ethnic minority and female candidates fell within National.  National 
had only two Māori candidates – Georgina Te Heuheu (19) and Tau Henare (29).  
There was one Pacific Island candidate – Fepulea’i Ulua’ipou-O-Malo Aiono (47).  
National also had three Asian candidates – Pansy Wong (20), Ravi Musuku (48) and 
Ken Yee (58).  All bar Te Heuheu stood in an electorate rather than being nominated 
for the list by the Board.  The list was also poorly representative of women – there were 
only six women in the top thirty of the list (one-fifth) and eleven in the rest of the list 
(less than one-third).  For the first time National had an openly homosexual candidate – 
Chris Finlayson (27).  Identity candidates fared very poorly in 2005 and National’s list 
was not reflective of New Zealand society. 
 
The changes to the candidate selection rules limited the ability of National to bring in 
ethnic and female candidates.  Previously, women and ethnic minority candidates could 
be brought in through the list nomination process if none (or few) were selected to 
stand in electorates.  The decision to have no candidates in the Māori electorates in 
2005 meant that National did not automatically have seven Māori candidates on its list.  
                                                 
34 Emphasis added.  Quoted in: Ruth Berry, "All National candidates to be on list," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=467&objectid=10127743, 2005 (accessed: 15 
November 2007). 
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 Further, few ethnic minority or females were selected in general electorates, and the 
Board only nominated one female Māori for the list.  While the changes to the 
candidate selection rules led to more party vote-focused electorate candidates, 
nationwide National was unrepresentative of New Zealand society and hence less likely 
to attract ethnic minority and female voters.  However, the lack of social identity 
candidates worked in with National’s overall strategy of defining itself as the anti-
‘political correctness’ party (see Chapter Six). 
 
One of the key outcomes of the 2005 list was that the top positions were a carbon copy 
of the caucus rankings of the re-standing MPs.  The caucus was last ranked unilaterally 
by Leader Don Brash in August 2004, although there were some changes between then 
and the list being announced in May 2005 (notably the demotion of Katherine Rich and 
consequent promotion of John Key to the frontbench).  The first discrepancy between 
the caucus rankings and the list rankings occurred at number 13 – with Tim Groser 
coming in to take that position.  Apart from Groser, caucus rankings continued 
throughout the list.  The next non-incumbent on National’s list was Chris Finlayson at 
number 27 – below all MPs seeking re-election.  The fact that all re-standing incumbent 
MPs were in order of caucus rankings reflected a change in who controlled the list 
selectorate.   
 
National Party insider and former-parliamentary staffer David Farrar noted on his blog 
that “it was decided to exempt MPs from regional rankings and have them in the top 30 
in their caucus order.”35  This decision is clearly an indication of centralisation and an 
                                                 
35 David Farrar, "National Candidates," Kiwiblog, 
http://www.kiwiblog.co.nz/2007/07/national_candidates.html, 2007 (accessed: 9 November 2007). 
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 increase in the power of the Leader.  As it is the Leader who decided upon caucus 
ranking, the continuation of those rankings onto the list means that the loyalty of MPs 
changed.  Previously, errant MPs could claim that their legitimacy within the National 
caucus came from the extra-parliamentary party and not from the Leader.  By allowing 
the Leader’s ranking of caucus to determine the list ranking, the Leader was able to 
assume far greater control over MPs.  Indeed it appears that the extra-parliamentary 
party will simply reinforce and agree with the decisions of the Leader, rather than serve 
as an external power base and as a court of appeal.  The Leader’s extra control came 
from his ability to influence the much-smaller Board and his significant role in 
choosing the President. 
 
Table 5.4 2005 National Candidate Pool36
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1-10 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 
11-20 7 1 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 1 2 
21-30 4 3 1 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 
31-40 1 1 3 2 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 
41-50 4 2 3 1 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 
51-60 3 2 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
61-65 0 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
 
The regional breakdown for the 2005 candidate pool is complicated by the fact that 
sitting MPs were excluded from the regional rankings and simply placed in caucus 
order.  However, if regionalism still mattered then the List Ranking Committee should 
have provided substantial balance for regions that were poorly represented within 
caucus by ensuring high-placed list rankings for those regions.  There would have been 
                                                 
36 Regional origin was calculated by the electorate in which each candidate stood in. 
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 pressure by those regions poorly represented in caucus to provide regional balance as 
had happened at previous elections.37  Yet this did not happen.  The Lower North 
Island only had one MP seeking re-election (Simon Power),38 and did receive the 
second non-incumbent spot (Chris Finlayson at 27).  In the next block, the Lower North 
Island received three candidates at 33, 36 and 39.  Canterbury-Westland had five MPs 
seeking re-election, with three being in the top ten.  The third non-incumbent position 
(28) went to Nicky Wagner who stood in Christchurch Central.  Positions 31, 38 and 42 
then went to Canterbury-Westland candidates.  The Lower North Island was not 
compensated for the lack of regional representation it had in the top positions when 
compared to Canterbury-Westland. 
 
The different treatment of Lower North Island and Canterbury-Westland candidates 
indicates that in 2005 regionalism mattered less within the List Ranking Committee.  
Both Canterbury-Westland and the Lower North Island were important electoral 
grounds for National, although for different reasons, and should have been balanced.  
Repeating caucus rankings on the list meant that regional fighting for the top list 
positions was diluted and may have stopped regions from attempting to seriously fight 
for list rankings.  Furthermore, as the senior leadership had more interaction with 
candidates, due to the Candidates’ College, the quality of each candidate is likely to 
have had more of an impact on their list placement.  The dilution of regionalism had a 
positive impact on the list as the quality of high-placed list candidates should be 
improved.  However, regionalism was still important as it ensured that the Party 
                                                 
37 For the 2002 balance experience, see: Salmond, "Choosing Candidates," 200-201. 
38 Roger Sowry was the only other Lower North Island MP in the caucus but had decided not to re-stand. 
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 adequately spread itself nationwide and maximised the attractiveness of National’s list 
throughout the country.  
 
The different nature of the candidate pool reflects both the changes made and decisions 
to use new opportunities arising from the rule changes.  The pool was less reflective of 
society as a whole (see Table 5.4 and Appendix Two).  Thus, the new rules did not 
work as well as they might have. 
 
Unfinished Business in Candidate Selection 
One of the key roles political parties play within a democracy is to select the candidates 
for whom electors vote.  After the changes to National’s candidate selection rules, 
National is arguably less democratic.  The Candidate’s Club gives the Board limited 
influence over the electorate selection and hence the list nomination process, although 
more than they have previously had.  Furthermore, the regions have a decreased role in 
ranking list candidates. 
 
Candidate selection is one of the areas to watch in future adjustments to National’s 
organisation as it is a highly contested arena within the National Party itself.  There was 
still institutional inertia in 2003 which prevented the complete centralisation of 
candidate selection.  One interview subject stated that: 
[In candidate selection there are] just some technical 
issues around making sure the representation is right and 
everything.  Just more a case of clarifying the rules, there 
is some things that probably could have been made 
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 clearer.  But I don’t think any wholesale change [needs to 
be made].39
But another interview subject thought otherwise:  
Personally, I wish it [the Candidate’s Club] would go 
more like the UK system where it would be a bit more 
elitist and get them, not quite like the Conservative A-
List, but a real sign that this person will be a good 
candidate and electorates [should be] strongly encouraged 
to take people who have been through Candidates’ 
College cause it means they’ve been able to [have] been 
sussed out.40
Candidate selection could become more centralised within National – Labour is still 
significantly more centralised.  It is likely that the role of the Candidate’s Club will 
become a more active filter in determining whether a candidate is selected or not as a 
means of increasing central control without amending the Constitution and Rules.  
Further adjustments may come in ensuring that ethnic minority and female candidates 
are able to get on to the list – especially given the diversifying ethnic makeup of New 
Zealand. 
 
Nevertheless, the changes National undertook significantly altered what type of 
candidate was selected.  The Candidate’s Club resulted in a different form of political 
aspirant, although it did not act as a significant filter as theoretically expected or as it 
may do in the future.  The decision to make all electorate candidates stand on the list 
altered the way electorate candidates acted within the campaign, but also limited the 
ability of the list to provide an ethnic and gender balance.  The List Standing 
Committee, with less regional representation, limited the fighting between regions for 
                                                 
39 Subject A, Interview. 
40 Subject C, Interview. 
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 list positions and suggests that for the National Party the quality of a candidate is now 
more important than regional quantity.   
 
Further changes are likely to occur to in the candidate selection process in order to 
provide a better pool of candidates at each election.  The National Management Board 
did gain significant control over the selection process, but not as much as some elites 
wished.  Regions still have a significant say over candidate selection in National.  
However, the partial centralisation of National did result in a candidate pool more 
suitable to an MMP environment than that which the decentralised organisation could 
provide. 
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 Chapter Six: Campaigning 
The organisational restructuring of 2003 significantly altered the way in which the 
National Party operated in the following 2005 general election.  The Party was able to 
run its best campaign in several elections.  The new organisational structure played a 
key role for National in helping attain 39.1 percent of the vote – almost double that of 
the 2002 election and beginning to get close to its FPP average of 44 percent. 
 
The re-organisation affected National’s campaigning in several different ways: party 
organisation creates and promotes some opportunities while preventing and limiting 
others.  In the case of National, financial control became managed by the National 
Management Board, removing money from an internal power play between divisions, 
thus allowing significant corporate donations.  With larger finances, as well as more 
central control of the campaign, the Party was able to hire external professionals to help 
with campaign strategy and advertising.  The professionals introduced new strategies 
and some of these strategies required a flexible leadership-member relationship which 
the centralisation allowed.  Further changes were to be found in advertising, with the 
centralised control giving National a clearer, more consistent nationwide messaging as 
well as enabling the Party to fully use the expertise of professionals.  Thus, the 
centralisation process affected the way in which National campaigned and hence had a 
significant impact on the election result. 
 
Other dynamics were at play in the 2005 election which means that the successful 
turnaround of National’s results may not solely be ascribed to the centralisation within 
National.  During the 2002-2005 parliamentary term many events occurred which may 
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 have contributed to National’s vote share increasing.1  Don Brash replaced Bill English 
as Leader – even though significant doubts were raised about Brash’s ability to lead the 
Party.2  Brash’s Orewa speech and the subsequent fallout resulted in a 17 percent poll 
rise for National and “restored a sense of contest and balance”.3  National replaced 
Party President Michelle Boag with Judy Kirk, and brought in Steven Joyce as General 
Manager.  Changes between the elections also occurred outside of National – Labour 
suffered some embarrassing scandals and promoted unpopular policy (such as school 
closures); the Exclusive Brethren decided to become involved in ‘worldly’ politics; 
ACT replaced Leader Richard Prebble with Rodney Hide; and the foreshore and seabed 
controversy created significant Māori political change, ultimately leading to the 
development of the new Māori Party.  These other internal and external factors provide 
non-organisational explanations as to why National was able to rebuild its vote share.  
However, the re-organisation provided a backbone on which these other factors could 
rebuild National’s vote share in the 2005 campaign. 
 
Decentralised Campaigning in an MMP Environment 
National’s 1996, 1999 and 2002 campaign all have similar facets to them.  During these 
three election campaigns National did not run MMP campaigns, but rather the 
decentralised organisation ran different campaigns throughout the country.   As one 
interview subject noted: 
                                                 
1 See: Brett de Malmanche, "Appendix 8: 'Events, My Dear Boy': The Political Scene, 2002-2005," in 
Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 
2005,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007). 
2 For instance, see: Dedire Mussen, "Brash challenge is 'laying groundwork for National defeat in 2008 
election'," Sunday Star Times, 26 October 2003. 
3 Jon Johansson, "Orewa and the Rhetoric of Illusion," Political Science 56, no. 2 (2004). 
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 [T]he National Party had been traditionally organised 
around fiefdoms at the electorate level and collective 
fiefdoms at the divisional level…. it was more a loose 
collection of similar thinking political organisations with 
similar outlooks than a [political party], which worked 
fine under FPP because essentially the electorate was the 
focus, but MMP requires a national consistent message to 
be delivered to voters and which the Party structure didn’t 
[do] and it was essential but it depends on the structure 
which made it difficult to get it central, centralised, 
central control.4
The lack of central control limited the ability of National to fundraise, hire 
professionals, have a nationwide strategy or have a centralised advertising system. 
 
Financing Campaigns 
Internal organisational capabilities are an important factor in fundraising.  
Traditionally, National has financed its organisation and campaigning through 
membership fees, voluntary donations from members and contributions from other 
supporters, including corporations.5  Organisational capabilities to provide internal 
financing fell, however, largely as a result of falling party membership (see Appendix 
Three).  National became more reliant on external sources of funding. 
 
However, National was unable to attract significant corporate or individual donors.  
Donations and fundraising became part of the internal power play within National 
rather than a cause that united the Party.  Divisions were to “supervise the collection of 
                                                 
4 Subject B, Interview. 
5 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 200. 
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 contributions to the Party funds”,6 while the nationwide Finance Committee (until it 
was disestablished in 1997) was only to “assist, supervise and advise on the finances of 
the Party”.7  To donate to the Party, corporations or wealthy individuals would need to 
give the money via a division rather than being able to send the money directly to the 
National Management Board.  But, given the split of the divisions by ideology/faction, 
the money would not simply move through to the Board.8  Instead, the division would 
then argue for that individual’s or corporation’s policy stance with the other divisions.  
In short, there was no guarantee that donating significant amounts of money to National 
would have any influence on the policy that National stood for at an election.  
However, smaller donations (which do not attach patronage or policy expectations) 
would still have been provided to the Party as National still had ‘attractive’ policies.  It 
is thus unsurprising that other political parties, such as ACT, were in a better position to 
attract large-scale corporate donations than National. 
 
The decline in National’s internal and external ability to raise funding caused 
significant problems for the Party.  National was financially strong in 1996 and had no 
trouble purchasing advertisements.9  However, the 1999 election placed National in a 
financially precarious position – National was only able to raise 87 percent of the 
money it spent.10  This debt continued to plague National and 30 percent of the funding 
for the 2002 campaign had to be spent on repaying debt and keeping the Party 
solvent.11    At the 2002 election National was only able to spend $1 million on its 
                                                 
6 New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules (1998)," 27. 
7 New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules (1986)," 20. 
8 Subject B, Interview. 
9 Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 100. 
10 Tracy Watkins, "Losing campaign cost Nats $1m," The Dominion Post, 26 October 2002. 
11 See: Dalziel, "General Debate Speech, 11 September 2002." 
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 campaign – half of what National had spent in 1999.12  National had attempted to 
fundraise vigorously in 2002 – a team of 16-20 fundraisers, headed by former National 
Minister of Finance Sir William Birch, sought corporate funds – but the same channels 
were being used by the ACT Party.13  ACT spent $1.6 million during the campaign and 
Labour spent $1.4 million; National was only the third largest party in terms of 
financial capability in the 2002 election. 
 
National’s internal organisation prevented donors being attracted to the Party.  While 
the Party was able to receive some external funding, National was unable to match the 
external donations that Labour or ACT were receiving.  While the relationship between 
money and votes is not direct,14 and campaigning spending regulations prevent 
significant inequities between parties,15 a party which is unable to adaquately fund a 
campaign is unlikely to succeed in winning votes.  In order for National to win office, it 
needed to find some source of external funding. 
 
Rejection of Professionalisation 
National largely resisted the movement towards professionalisation in the Party.  
Within National there was a key rule to exclude paid staff from being able to act as a 
delegate or committee member – meaning the governance of the Party was left to 
                                                 
12 Watkins, "Losing campaign cost Nats $1m." 
13 Fran O'Sullivan, "The cost of democracy," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=774&objectid=2049298, 2002 (accessed: 5 October 
2007). 
14 Bryce Edwards, "Shining a Light on Party Finance in New Zealand" (paper presented at the New 
Zealand Political Studies Association Conference, Wellington, 30-31 August 2007). 
15 See: Andrew Geddis, Electoral Law in New Zealand: Practice and Policy (Wellington: LexisNexis, 
2007), 137-139, 151-152, 161-166. 
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 amateurs.16  It was traditional for National leaders to have significant involvement in 
the management of election campaigns.17
 
Even if those amateurs who governed the Party wished to hire professional 
campaigners, each division would want to hire its own professional campaigner rather 
than give power to one central advisor.  Divisions traditionally hired their own staff 
rather than rely on head office appointments or volunteers.18  Any professional 
campaigner would be limited in their effectiveness by only dealing with one division.  
National’s organisation did not create significant opportunity for professionalisation 
and the poor financial situation did not help. 
 
In 2002 the National campaign committee included: Leader Bill English; Deputy 
Leader Roger Sowry; MPs Simon Power and Murray McCully; Parliamentary staffers 
Tim Grafton and Sue Foley; and President Michelle Boag.  English and the committee 
largely stayed out of managing the campaign.  Instead, National appointed a campaign 
director-general – Allan Johnston.  However, Johnston had a “lack of political 
experience and personal authority, as well as limited strategic ability”.19  While 2002 
was the first campaign which attempted to use a professional adviser, it may have 
contributed to the poor election result as the leadership was not seen as carrying 
messages to the electorates and divisions to push the party vote, rather Johnston was. 
 
                                                 
16 Wood, "National," 255. 
17 Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 181. 
18 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, 205-206. 
19 Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, 181. 
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 Professionalisation is a common trend within political parties, especially those 
undergoing decline.20  It allows parties to understand what the voters are looking for 
and how they are best to be targeted.  While there is a degree of cynicism around 
professionalisation, it has helped political parties win elections. 
 
Lack of Strategy 
The MMP environment requires major parties to build a coalition of voters from 
various groups.  The median swing vote, so important in FPP, becomes one of the 
groups the Party needs to target.  National’s 1996, 1999 and 2002 campaigns were not 
MMP campaigns per se.  When there was an attempt to run a nationwide strategy, it 
was undermined by the electorate candidates who saw the electorate method of entering 
Parliament as more legitimate than the list,21 and hence campaigned to best maximise 
their chances of being elected. 
 
In 1996 the “cold reality of MMP campaigning hit many MPs”.22  The electorates 
continued to be viewed by many members and elites as being the key to success, as 
President Geoff Thompson noted: 
[National] believed firmly that the constituency 
organizations would be strong enough to campaign for 
their candidate or candidates and as a spin-off, generate 
the party vote attached to the candidate by association.23
                                                 
20 Mair, Müller, and Plasser, "Conclusion," 265. 
21 See: Leigh J. Ward, "'Second-Class MPs'? New Zealand's Adaptation to Mixed-Member Parliamentary 
Representation," Political Science 49, no. 2 (1998). 
22 Sowry, "The National Campaign," 27. 
23 Thompson, "Preparing the Party for MMP". 
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 While there was some nationwide focus and targeting of specific groups, National did 
not have an overall focus on the party vote aspect.  Electorates focused on the same 
groups as they had done under FPP, rather than the multitude of groups needed to win 
under MMP. 
 
In 1999 National faced a lack of overall strategy as well, with Annabel Young noting: 
Even amongst National supporters there was confusion 
about National’s overall strategy.…  From the inside, it 
appeared that the National campaign demonstrated good 
operational control, but even party activists were unclear 
about strategy.  This made it difficult to integrate their 
actions into the strategy.  In some cases, it led to local 
paralysis.24
The communication between electorates and the central campaign control fell apart.  
Some electorates largely campaigned for the electorate vote using their own strategies 
and resources.  National did not target any set of voters consistently with the central 
and local bodies of the Party clashing. 
 
The 2002 election, the nadir of National’s support, again had no over-riding strategy.  
In a leaked copy of National’s self-review, the Party admitted it ‘forgot’ to seek the 
party vote.25  National attempted to undermine Labour’s support by getting voters to 
give the government a scare by voting National.  As Tim Grafton notes: 
This strategy failed, partly because the message was 
communicated poorly by the campaign advertising in the 
early stages of the campaign, partly because the gap 
                                                 
24 Annabel Young, "Strategy, Tactics and Operations: National's Campaign," in Jonathan Boston, 
Stephen Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), Left Turn: The New 
Zealand General Election of 1999,  (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington, 2000), 34-35. 
25 See: Dalziel, "General Debate Speech, 11 September 2002." 
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 between National and Labour created a ‘relevance’ issue, 
and partly because the party’s campaign failed to focus 
on the party vote.26
Again, National did not target specific key groups of voters.  Instead it focused on 
trying to build discontent with the Labour-led government, forgetting that being 
discontent with Labour no longer necessarily meant voting National in the multi-party 
environment. 
 
All the campaigns demonstrated a lack of central strategy in gaining the party vote.  
National further demonstrated a lack of understanding about the nature of campaigning 
in a multi-party system.  At each election the electorates felt that their campaign was 
more important and relevant than the nationwide campaign (in 1996 the central 
campaign team even accepted this) and thus undermined any cohesive strategy that the 
central campaign team tried to enact.  
 
Un-Coordinated Advertising 
The early MMP elections had seen National ineffectively advertising itself – the focus 
was not on the party vote and messages failed to come across to the voters.  Each 
electorate largely had control over the advertising within its electorate.  The only 
nationwide medium, television, was poorly used by the central campaign team. 
 
National billboard campaigns, for all three elections, were poor.  The 2002 campaign 
provides a perfect case study.  During the 2002 campaign it was not until two weeks 
before the election day that a billboard featured Leader Bill English – and when the 
                                                 
26 Grafton, "National's Campaign," 114. 
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 billboards came out they were regarded as weak and not highlighting the party vote 
strongly enough.27  Furthermore, the “National Party’s electorate hoardings were all 
over the place… totally uncoordinated….  The party simply did not have a generic 
model which its candidates could adopt and then adapt to fit their needs.”28  There was 
a wide variety of different billboards in use, and they did not necessarily even mention 
the National Party (see Figure 6.1).  The decentralised organisation made each 
electorate responsible for its own electorate billboard.  Electorates had the option of 
centrally ordering billboards, but there was no push for them to do so and few did.29
 
Figure 6.1 2002 National Electorate Billboards30
  
 
Electorates traditionally also held responsibility for campaign literature such as 
pamphlets.  Each electorate was able to produce its own pamphlets and decide which 
letterboxes to place the information in.  For the 1996 and 1999 elections these 
pamphlets were collated by Victoria University of Wellington academics.  National’s 
resources were focused on ‘fairly safe electorates’ in 1996 with less attention given to 
                                                 
27 Nigel S. Roberts, "All Over the Place: Billboards Battles in 2002," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen 
Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), New Zealand Votes: The 
General Election of 2002,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), 271-272. 
28 Roberts, "All Over the Place," 272. 
29 Subject C, Interview. 
30 Both billboards were photos taken by Nigel S. Roberts who retains copyright.  They were published in 
the photographic collection accompanying: Roberts, "All Over the Place." 
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 ‘safe electorates’ and ‘marginal electorates’.31  At the 1999 election, National 
emphasised the party vote in only 46.2 percent of pamphlets, with 53.8 percent 
emphasising the electorate candidate; Labour emphasised the party vote in 56.9 percent 
of the pamphlets.32  Some lessons were learnt – for instance in 1996 some National 
candidates produced pamphlets with orange, rather than blue, backgrounds,33 whereas 
in 1999 “most National material was produced on a blue background in the motif of a 
billowing New Zealand flag.”34  Yet this was forgotten in 2002 as there “was not even 
a central party direction that all party material be printed in the party’s colour of 
blue!”35  The electorate control prevented structured nationwide control over pamphlet 
material and resulted in a strong focus on the electorate candidate and poor targeting of 
information towards selected groups of voters. 
 
Within New Zealand television is a largely nationwide medium and hence political 
parties cannot limit their television campaigning to specific geographic areas.  
However, radio stations are still localised and offer a better opportunity for electorate 
candidates to use an electronic medium.  Hence it would be expected that a 
decentralised party would use radio for electorate campaigns and television for party 
vote campaigning.   
 
                                                 
31 Margaret Cousins and Elizabeth McLeay, "Leaflets, Letterboxes and Litter: Candidates and their 
Campaigns," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), From 
Campaign to Coalition: The 1996 MMP Election,  (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997), 87. 
32 Hilary Pearse, "'No Junk Mail': The Street-Level Campaign," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, 
Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), Left Turn: The New Zealand General 
Election of 1999,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000), 132. 
33 Cousins and McLeay, "Leaflets, Letterboxes and Litter," 93-94. 
34 Pearse, "'No Junk Mail'," 136. 
35 Chris Rudd and Janine Hayward, "Campaigning," in Raymond Miller (ed.), New Zealand Government 
and Politics,  (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 335. 
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 Unfortunately there is little data available on radio advertising within New Zealand.  
However one interview subject noted that radio has not been a significant medium for 
the National Party.  There has been little demand from the electorates to use radio as a 
campaign tool within the ninety-day election spending period.  Electorates did not ask 
for an allocation of the state funding provided for television and radio advertising.  A 
number of electorates have been able to use radio advertising outside of the ninety-day 
period in order to build awareness of the candidate, not of the National Party.36
 
Television campaigning has been a significant tool for National.  Television was the 
most centralised aspect of National’s campaign, largely due to the structure of 
opportunities within television as a nationwide medium rather than due to any decision 
within the Party itself.  In 1999 National used a combination of positive and negative 
(anti-Labour/Alliance) adverts, but the negative advertisements appeared to be acts of 
desperation rather than a legitimate campaign tactic.37  During the 2002 election, 
National’s opening broadcast failed to mention the party vote, the advertisements 
ignored Bill English’s strengths and the messages were poorly constructed.38  The 
campaign teams in 1999 and 2002 were unable to effectively use the main central tool 
at their disposal largely due to their inability to link all party advertising together in one 
unified strategy. 
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 Re-Organisation 
The 2003 review brought many elements of the Party under the control of the central 
National Management Board.  The Board gained control over finances and the 
campaign.  The re-organisation created a structure with better opportunities for 
professionalisation, a central unified party-vote strategy and uniform advertising.  The 
changes made to National were of significant benefit to the 2005 election campaign. 
 
Finance 
The centralisation process changed the internal structure so that it becomes more suited 
towards receiving corporate donations.  The review gave the Board “full responsibility 
for the finances of the Party.  It shall have the power… to deal with the business and 
property of the Party.”39  Corporations or wealthy individuals seeking to donate would 
be able to deal directly with the National Management Board rather than with a region.  
Although there is little indication that corporate funding was one of the aims of the 
restructuring, it was a significant by-product of the decision to bring control of the 
Party into the centre. 
 
Any additional funding within National may allow the Party to have a more active, 
professional and standardised campaign than it previously had.  If the Board provides 
funds to the regions and electorates then they have a greater say over the nationwide 
and electorate campaign.  However, if the electorates and regions provide income to the 
Board, as previously happened,40 then the electorates will have some leverage over the 
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 nature of their campaign.41  It is important, for the nationwide strategy MMP requires, 
that the Board has substantial income separate from levying electorates for funding. 
 
National’s, former, decentralised organisation limited the ability of the Party to have 
enough campaign funds and the ability of corporate donors to influence the Party’s 
policies.  The new centralised organisation increased the Party’s ability to secure 
substantial campaign funds.  However, the new organisation also provides a greater 
opportunity for external donors to influence policy and strategy within National which 
could potentially undermine the traditional grassroots of the Party.  Other factors – such 
as leadership, polling, experience, membership figures and party funding laws – 
influence whether these opportunities are taken up or not.   
 
Professionalisation 
The centralisation process created an opportunity for professionalisation to develop.  As 
MMP requires a more sophisticated electoral strategy throughout the country, 
professional advisors are likely to be of some benefit.  Professionalisation also includes 
the use of data analysis systems, polling techniques, and strategic advice which allows 
parties to figure out how to maximise their vote throughout the country. 
 
With governance and campaign management located within one single authority, the 
effectiveness of professionalisation increases significantly.  The Board becomes more 
likely to seek external advice as it is clear that responsibility for campaigning lies on its 
                                                 
41 Subject B, Interview. 
 127
 shoulders and not on those of the regions.  Furthermore, with a single financial centre 
the Party is more likely to be able to afford to hire external consultants.   
 
Not only was the Board more likely to be willing to appoint external professional 
campaigners; but more importantly the organisation was more conducive to attracting 
professionals, as Dennis Kavanagh notes: 
The marketing men prefer a party that is centralised, 
leader friendly, allows them direct access to the key 
decision-makers, including the leader, and grants much 
autonomy to the people they liaise with- usually the 
party’s communication directors.  Internal debate should 
be sacrificed in the interests of presenting a clear 
message. It should have what Philip Gould, [Tony] 
Blair’s polling strategist, calls ‘a unitary command 
structure’. Party activists thrive in the inner-directed 
party; marketing professionals look to an outer-directed 
party. They give different answers to the question of who 
counts. For the former it is the members who need to be 
courted, for the latter it is the voters who need to be won 
over.42
National was more likely to hire external consultants after the centralisation process 
than before, and these professionals could arguably have significant control and 
influence within the Party. 
 
                                                 
42 Dennis Kavanagh, "Party Democracy And Political Marketing: No Place For Amateurs?" (paper 
presented at the Political Communications in the Global World Conference, Mainz, 30-31 October 2003), 
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 Control Over Strategy 
Previously National left electorate strategy to each electorate with a minimal 
nationwide strategic overview.  The centralisation process substantially weakened the 
control regular party members had over the Party itself.  As party members are notably 
more radical than their elite counterparts,43 the removal of direct relations between 
members and elites allowed the elites more flexibility in controlling the party’s policy 
and strategy.  Even though elites are still sensitive to member concerns and are unlikely 
to remove policy without just cause – such as it being unpopular with core segments of 
society – the policy put forward by National is more likely to seek out set groups of 
voters. 
 
National has traditionally been able to seek out the median voter and, to some extent, 
ignore core National voters who were not in key swing seats.  An MMP environment 
though requires National to target its ‘natural’ voters as well.  Targeting traditional 
National voters became a problem for National under MMP as it has two distinct 
groups – urban liberals and rural conservatives – to appeal to.  However, there are some 
unique strategic devices to deal with this problem such as ‘dog-whistle’ and ‘wedge’ 
tactics. 
 
A dog-whistle is a deliberately ambiguous message that appeals to a certain prejudice 
of one set of voters, while those without those views do not recognise it as being 
prejudicial.  National was limited in its ability to use dog-whistle tactics before the 
centralisation process.  Previously, divisions had the ability to craft messages specific 
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 to each electorate or division and so there was, in their view, no need to ‘hide’ their 
message by using such a tactic – rather they could be explicit and clear as to what they 
meant.  The liberal areas could use liberal messages and the conservative areas could 
use conservative messages.  The leadership would then have to use compromise 
positions between the two factions.  However, with a nationwide campaign system, the 
effectiveness of dual-messaging falls apart.  The re-organisation moved control of 
campaign material to the campaign team which increased the ability of the Party to use 
dog-whistle messages.  Potentially, dog-whistle politics allows National to rebuild both 
the liberal and conservative constituencies separately without disturbing the other.   
 
A wedge tactic aims to attack another party’s policy towards an identity group (usually 
an ethnic group) in order to make the other party defend the group’s rights so as to 
highlight that the other party is more concerned with minority groups than with the 
majority.44  The centralisation created an opportunity for the Party elites to use ‘anti-
Māori’ wedge tactics as internal resistance was weakened.  Prior to the centralisation of 
National’s organisation, Māori concerns about the direction of the Party were able to be 
represented with a Māori vice presidency who acted as a veto player on such tactics.45  
Concerns may have also come from the liberal Auckland and Wellington divisions and 
their associated vice presidencies and representatives.  The development of a wedge 
tactic may have led to significant internal turmoil within the National Management 
Board.  The Board may have been unwilling to approve of wedge advertising and 
policy in an election campaign.  However the centralisation process saw the removal of 
the Māori and divisional vice presidencies and representatives from the National 
                                                 
44 Sarah Maddison, "Ideas from 'Across the Ditch'? Wedge Politics in the 2005 New Zealand Election," 
Australian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (2006); Shaun Wilson and Nick Turnbull, "Wedge 
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 Management Board.  Hence the Party gained another strategy to deal with the MMP 
environment. 
 
Control over Advertising 
The centralisation process allowed National to campaign coherently throughout the 
country.  The central control limited the ability of electorates to run their own 
campaign.  All electorate advertising needs to be approved of by the central campaign 
team located within the head office.  Indeed, one interview subject noted: 
It was much tighter control than in the previous 
campaigns.  Mainly because of the review of the 2002 
election where there wasn’t enough control…. [It was] 
just the basics of everyone using the same colour, having 
the same logo, the same brochures generally et cetera.46
The centralisation resulted in allowing the campaign team to have a more effective, 
unified nationwide campaign. 
 
The previous decentralised organisation made each electorate responsible for their own 
billboards and pamphlets.  While electorates had the option of centrally ordering 
billboards, it was optional.  The centralisation process brought control over the design 
of billboards to the National Management Board in order to produce more effective and 
standardised electorate billboards that sought both the electorate vote and the party 
vote.  For pamphlets, each electorate was still responsible for the design, but “you have 
to get permission from headquarters, so one of the headquarters campaign staff has [to] 
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 sign off the pamphlet….  They do have the ultimate [say]”.47  All advertising was either 
to be created, ordered through, or approved by the central campaign team and not done 
on an electorate-by-electorate basis. 
 
With advertising brought into the centre, the party vote element should be pushed more 
strongly.  Furthermore, the new strategies available to the Party could be expected to be 
present in all advertising.  Professionalisation should change who was targeted and 
improve the quality of advertising.  The changes did have an impact in the 2005 
election campaign as explained in the next section. 
 
2005 Election Campaign 
The 2005 election was called by Helen Clark for 17 September 2005.  Labour had a 
significant poll lead going into the election year.48  The new organisational structure 
provided National with the opportunity to campaign more consistently throughout the 
country.  While National lost the election, their campaign was their best MMP 
campaign so far and that was reflected in their vote share – the highest for National 
since the 1990 election landslide. 
 
Corporate Finance 
In the lead up to the 2005 election National successfully raised substantial amounts of 
money.  National’s true bank account for 2005 was “bulging the purse to an extent that 
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 will never be made public.”49  There are a number of estimates available.  National’s 
declared donations for 2005 totalled $1.88 million.  This figure is unreliable, as all 
donations under $10,000 need not be declared and the figure does not include money 
raised in 2003 and 2004 which also went towards National’s 2005 campaign.  National 
declared its election expenditure to be $2.1 million – but this figure also misses many 
expenses such as employing consultants and any advertising more than three months 
before the election.  However, Steven Joyce noted that for the 2005 election National 
would “need to look at raising about $2.8 million dollars [sic] from fundraising 
activities, over and above electorate levies and the President’s appeal”.50  Whatever the 
true amount of money raised and spent in 2005, it was much larger than any amount 
National had ever spent in an election before.51
 
Many of the donations National received were reciprocated in the form of providing 
access to the leadership or input into policy, or both.  It is folly to expect substantial 
donations not to have some sort of reciprocation attached.52  Many of the significant 
donations were from corporations with potentially much to gain from the election of a 
National-led government.  For instance, pharmaceutical company Pfizer purchased a 
table at a fundraising event for roughly $5000 – Pfizer stood to gain from National’s 
policy of reviewing the state pharmaceutical purchasing agency Pharmac.53  National 
had several meetings over privatising accident compensation with the Insurance 
Council and when the policy was released Insurance Council CEO Chris Ryan privately 
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 stated that the policy was “very positive for the industry”;54 the Insurance Council 
reportedly gave $1 million to National’s campaign.  There was little internal debate 
about the policies decided upon by the party elites – the structure was set up to give 
more power to the centre. 
 
However, the situation regarding corporate financing of National’s campaign may not 
be a long-term trend within the National Party.  In 2005 the Party elites were largely 
inexperienced in grass-roots fundraising and preferred to use their much greater 
corporate links – for instance General Manager Steven Joyce had not been active, 
except as the co-ordinator of the 2003 review, in the Party before but had served as 
CEO of Radioworks Ltd.  Furthermore Leader Don Brash was well recognised within 
the finance community as being business friendly – Brash had served fourteen years as 
Governor of the Reserve Bank and had links with several wealthy businesspeople.  It is 
unlikely that such a move towards corporate funding would have occurred without the 
centralisation process, yet it is equally important that the corporate donors had friendly 
faces to approach in Brash and Joyce.  The negative public reaction to the publication 
of the relationship between National and its donors saw Leader Don Brash resign in 
late-2006, and may serve as a warning to future leaders. 
 
Professional Advisers 
The 2005 campaign saw National use external professional advisers – indeed the extent 
of their use within National was unprecedented within New Zealand.  The only MP 
within the key advisor group to Leader Don Brash was Murray McCully, although 
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 Deputy Leader Gerry Brownlee was occasionally involved.  Bryan Sinclair (a right-
wing activist mentored by prominent neo-liberal Roger Kerr), Matthew Hooton (a 
public relations consultant) and Peter Kennan (a neo-liberal economist) were brought in 
by Brash through his Parliamentary Leader’s Fund.  Richard Long, formerly editor of 
The Dominion, remained from former-Leader Bill English’s staff. Outside of 
Parliament, former Radioworks CEO and 2003 review co-ordinator Steven Joyce was 
appointed General Manager of National in 2003.  Of those close to Brash during the 
campaign only Long and McCully had had significant interaction with National 
previously – the others were professional outsiders brought in for their specific 
experience in order to get National elected.55
 
For the election campaign itself, National hired Mark Textor from Crosby|Textor – an 
Australian company dedicated to strategy, market research and campaigning.  
Crosby|Textor was previously involved in the Australian Liberal Party’s 1996, 1998, 
2001 and 2004 successful campaigns; the United Kingdom Conservative Party’s 2005 
highly professional and controversial, albeit unsuccessful, campaign; and British 
American Tobacco’s constant uphill battle against regulation and anti-smoking 
campaigns.  Crosby|Textor was well known for its tactics of ‘push-polling’, dog-whistle 
politics and wedge tactics.56
 
John Ansell was brought into National to organise television, radio, billboard and 
pamphlet advertising.  Ansell’s background was in advertising, especially political 
party campaigns.  Ansell had won the Mobil Radio Award for the 1993 Labour Party 
                                                 
55 Hager, The Hollow Men, 19, 57. 
56 Hager, The Hollow Men, 152-156. 
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 campaign.  Since 1996 Ansell had been a firm ACT supporter and had organised their 
election advertising in previous MMP campaigns.  Don Brash’s leadership of National 
attracted Ansell to the Party.  Richard Long organised for Ansell to be paid out of the 
parliamentary leader’s fund – even though none of his advertisements were fundable by 
Parliamentary Services.57
 
The professional strategists rejected input from National members.  Bryan Sinclair, and 
others close to Don Brash, used the term ‘the dark side’ to refer to movements and 
people within National, not to Labour or other Left-wing movements.58  Matthew 
Hooton and Sinclair worried about Brash becoming a “prisoner of the caucus”.59  Peter 
Keenan felt that President Judy Kirk was “not that important in the scheme of things”.60  
The internal political structure was largely ignored by the professionals.  Instead the 
professionals preferred to rely on their own experience, training and market analysis. 
 
National’s campaign strategy was substantially informed by these external 
professionals.  The professionals were the closest advisors to Don Brash and often 
recommended him not to listen to other forces within National.  The dominance of the 
professionals saw National run its most professional, vote-seeking MMP campaign. 
 
Multiple Strategies for the Party Vote 
In 2005 a new centralised strategy was used to make sure National received the largest 
vote share; a further objective was to ensure that the Green Party fell below the five 
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 percent threshold to limit Labour’s coalition options.61  The strategy focused on several 
different aspects.  National accepted that to win the election they would need to build a 
coalition of voters by capturing the swinging voter through directly appealing to the 
‘middle ground’ as well using dog-whistle and wedge tactics to appeal to different 
Right-wing voters.  These strategies required a more flexible leadership that was not 
bound to the traditional National Party base, and the centralisation provided that 
flexibility. 
 
Crosby|Textor was employed to carry out focus groups of non-affiliated voters – those 
crucial to winning an election.  Their aim was not to find out what the voters were 
thinking or wanted – but rather how their perceptions could be changed and how, with 
‘prompting’, voters could see problems with the Labour-led government’s policy.  For 
instance, voters felt that tax cuts missed the point and were happy about the state of the 
economy.  However, when focus group members were prompted they felt that Labour 
lacked a plan to keep the economy growing.  National was thus able to link the long-
term economic concern with its policy of cutting taxes.62  Due to National’s tax cut 
campaign “more voters identified tax as their number one issue of personal concern 
than any other issue”.63  Crosby|Textor’s use of focus groups allowed National to find 
how their centre-Right policies could target the median voter through clever use of 
messages. 
 
Not only did Crosby|Textor work on how to package policies, but they worked on 
agenda setting and policy creation.  For instance, Crosby|Textor recommended focusing 
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 on immigration as a key issue and recommended that National’s policy focus on only 
allowing skilled migrants to enter New Zealand,64  Don Brash later stated that 
“immigrants must be likely to provide a net benefit to existing New Zealanders”.65  
Further recommendations were made to focus on Helen Clark’s personality.  One of 
Clark’s virtues at the previous election was that she was seen as having integrity, 
competence and being trustworthy;66 Brash attacked the Labour-led government as 
being “rotten to the core” and that “one will be amazed that Helen Clark’s nose is not 
three feet long”.67
 
National realised that a number of its policies would be unpopular with the median 
voter and decided that these policies needed to be ‘inoculated’.  Three Labour policies 
were seen as being well supported by the public – four-week annual leave for workers, 
rejection of privatisation and the increased superannuation rate.  If National opposed 
these policies then they were likely to lose votes.  National believed they had already 
dealt with nuclear policy and the perception that tax cuts were simply for the rich.  
Richard Long noted that: 
 We [the National Party] are constantly being seen to 
embrace Act [Party views], or employers, and being 
worker unfriendly (eg four weeks leave) which means we 
frighten off many of those blue collar male Labour voters 
that Don [Brash] dragged across the divide on Orewa.68  
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 Slowly the issues were ‘inoculated’ – either through simply accepting Labour’s policy 
(four-week annual leave, superannuation) or through vague statements which implied 
acceptance (privatisation).69   
 
Internally the inoculation measures were unpopular throughout the ranks of the Party.  
Don Brash wrote that he was “left worrying what it is that I will actually achieve by 
winning the election – maintaining a whole lot of dopey Labour policies”.70  Peter 
Keenan noted that “some core supporters [party members]… are almost barking mad 
when it comes to choosing a package of measures that enough people might vote for”.71 
Keenan justified the inoculations by stating that “the policies that National/Brash stand 
for are not widely enough shared in the community to win an election, and most core 
supporters will understand that”.72  However, the policies were never completely 
removed from the plans for when National won the election – just for what they 
campaigned on.73  National’s inoculations represent classic vote/office seeking 
behaviour of political parties. 
 
National’s plan to reclaim the centre-ground through clever messaging, selecting 
populist policies, hiding unpopular policy and attacking Labour was not their only 
strategy.  National also imported two strategies from the Australian Liberal Party, via 
Crosby|Textor, to help win the 2005 election – dog-whistle and wedge tactics.  These 
strategies were not aimed at the median voter but instead sought to bring together the 
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 divergent Right-wing voters who had, at previous MMP elections, voted for minor 
Right-wing parties rather than National. 
 
The opportunity for the use of dog-whistle politics rose and it was taken up during the 
2005 campaign.  National employed dog-whistle tactics on numerous issues – however 
the prime examples were the use of the phrases ‘political correctness’ and 
‘mainstream’.  Both phrases are deliberately vague and are used against minority 
groups perceived as having significant power. 
 
The phrase ‘politically correct’ is received differently by different audiences, Nicky 
Hager notes that: 
 To one audience the messages purport to be a common-
sense dismissal of silly excesses; to others they are an 
invitation to sneer at feminism, to feel comfortable 
talking about ‘cripples’, ‘faggots’ and ‘coconuts’ and to 
put the boot into Maori [sic].74   
National focused strongly upon Labour’s ‘politically correct’ policies during the 2005 
campaign.  Gerry Brownlee attacked Labour’s policy of ensuring teachers can 
pronounce Māori properly as being “politically correct tokenism”.75  A decision not to 
drain Mount Ruapehu’s crater lake, which may have created a dangerous lahar such as 
the 1953 lahar that killed 151 people, saw Brownlee state that “the Government 
chooses to put political correctness before lives.”76  Each of these statements linked 
Labour’s policy decisions with ‘pandering’ to Māori instead of creating policy that 
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 benefited all New Zealanders.  However at the same time, quite different meanings 
could have been taken by those who do not hear the dog-whistle, instead believing that 
National’s message was that the government had lost its way and produced poor policy. 
 
The key message throughout the election campaign for National was that while they 
represented ‘mainstream’ New Zealanders, Labour did not.  In his speech to National’s 
2005 Annual Conference Brash stated that:  
[M]iddle New Zealand - hard-working average income 
families - know that the serious issues confronting them 
in their daily lives are just not being addressed.  This 
Clark Government, you see, is not a government of 
mainstream New Zealand, for mainstream New 
Zealand.77   
At the same conference Gerry Brownlee used ‘mainstream’ fifteen times during his 
speech.78  Again, these messages were aimed at selected segments of voters – white, 
middle class, male voters – while not being immediately offensive or off-putting to 
other segments of society.  Brash did not wish to elaborate on who was, and was not, a 
member of the ‘mainstream’ New Zealand political discourse – doing so would 
undermine the entire purpose of using dog-whistle tactics.  Yet Brash had to deal with 
media analysis of what ‘mainstream’ meant and struggled to come up with an 
acceptable definition to potentially swinging voters during a TV3 election debate.79
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 Dog-whistle tactics were predominately used by National to substantially rebuild its 
conservative base without scaring away the liberal vote.  However, there were instances 
of National using it to appeal to their liberal voters.  For instance, on the issue of 
privatisation John Key stated that National was interested in “what will make the boat 
go faster”,80 and that privatisation would be off the agenda “for at least our first term in 
office”.81  The message to neo-liberal voters was that privatisation was clearly on the 
agenda, just not in the short-term, whereas conservative voters would feel that large-
scale privatisation was unlikely to occur and small-scale privatisation may occur later 
on.  The conflicting messages predominately served National well. 
 
Along with dog-whistle messages, National also introduced to New Zealand wedge 
tactics.  The tactic originated in Australia and was transferred to New Zealand.82  The 
wedge tactic aimed to exploit the ethnic tension within New Zealand by attacking 
Labour’s Māori policies, thus making Labour defend Māori rights, in an attempt to 
make Pākehā vote National.  The tactic was well used by National in 2004 and 2005. 
 
In 2004 Don Brash gave a speech entitled ‘Nationhood’ to the Orewa Rotary Club.  The 
speech focused on “the dangerous drift towards racial separatism in New Zealand, and 
the development of the now entrenched Treaty grievance industry.”83  Brash was 
largely negative about Māori, with three negative statements for every positive one.84  
The aim of the Orewa speech was to “put the shits up Labour and force them into a 
more radical ‘pro’ Maori [sic] position and [for National to] pick up red neck votes as 
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 well.”85  The speech successfully linked Labour with Māori separatism and with giving 
iwi too many rights to the foreshore and seabed.  Labour was immediately forced to 
defend Māori-specific polices and race-based funding,86 although later Labour 
announced a review of race-based programmes.87  The Orewa speech and its fallout 
resulted in a 17 percent poll increase for National.88
 
Figure 6.2 National Party ‘Iwi/Kiwi’ Billboard89
 
 
During the 2005 election campaign National continued to use wedge tactics in relation 
to Labour and Māori.  The connection was made explicitly in one particular election 
billboard.  At the top was the word ‘Beaches’, referring to the foreshore and seabed 
debate; on the left-hand side was Helen Clark on a red background with ‘Iwi’; on the 
right-hand side Don Brash was on a blue background with ‘Kiwi’ (see Figure 6.2).  The 
                                                 
85 Matthew Hooton, quoted in: Hager, The Hollow Men, 81. 
86 Tara Ross, "Clark laments divisive politics," The Press, 5 March 2004. 
87 New Zealand Press Association, "Scrutiny of Maori smoking programme welcomed," New Zealand 
Herald, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=3584112, 2004 (accessed: 30 
October 2007). 
88 Johansson, "Orewa and the Rhetoric of Illusion." 
89 Image taken from: New Zealand National Party, "Send An e-Card," New Zealand National Party, 
http://www.national.org.nz/Ecards.aspx, 2005 (accessed: 24 October 2007). 
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 message was clear – Labour would give Māori rights to the beaches whereas National 
would ensure that all New Zealanders could access the beaches.  The billboard 
separated off different groups – one side was Māori and Labour; the other side was 
non-Māori and National – the billboard aimed to make non-Māori vote National.  The 
divisive nature of the billboard was denied by National, with Steven Joyce stating “with 
the iwi being part of the word Kiwi as well…. obviously that includes iwi and that's 
part of the message of the billboard.”90  The billboard was also an attempted dog-
whistle.  Labour was clearly linked by National to being strongly in favour of Māori 
and not of the wider nation. 
 
Throughout 2005 Brash attacked Māori values generally and Labour for pandering to 
Māori.  Brash described the powhiri used to greet international visitors as a “semi-
naked male, sometimes quite pale-skinned Maori [sic], leaping around in, you know, 
mock battle”.91  National was committed to abolishing the Māori seats and reviewing 
Te Puni Kōkiri, Office of the Māori Trustee, Te Māngai Pāho, the Waitangi Tribunal 
and the Office of Treaty Settlements – with expectations that the review would remove 
a number of these agencies.92  Labour was forced into defending powhiri, the Māori 
seats and various government agencies.93  Again the aim was to make Labour defend 
Māori rights and implied that Labour was more concerned with addressing Māori issues 
than Pākehā issues. 
                                                 
90 Quoted in: Ruth Berry, "National spreads short, sharp message," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10328610, 2005 (accessed: 30 October 
2007). 
91 Quoted in: Amanda Spratt, "Too much culture, says Brash," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&ObjectID=10343937, 2005 (accessed: 30 
October 2007). 
92 Ruth Berry, "Brash's knife hovers over Maori offices," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10342927, 2005 (accessed: 30 October 
2007). 
93 Berry, "Brash's knife hovers over Maori offices," ; Spratt, "Too much culture, says Brash,"  
 144
  
Wedge tactics successfully served National in the 2005 campaign, but only up to a 
point.  The Iwi/Kiwi billboard did grab attention, but it was pointed out that most of the 
uproar around the foreshore and seabed debate had come from Māori who were upset 
that the government was taking away, not giving, Māori rights.94  The Orewa speech 
was also attacked for having significant factual errors and ‘teaching illusion’.95  Indeed 
Colin James notes that National’s stand on race issues meant that “Labour may owe as 
much as 1 to 2 percent of its final vote to adverse reaction to that position from liberal 
whites, from Maori [sic] and from Pacific Islanders.”96
 
National’s multi-pronged 2005 election strategy was primarily devised by external 
consultants brought in specifically for winning the election.  They produced a sales-
orientated campaign which focused on selling policy to traditional supporters, which 
had left National for other parties in 2002, rather than winning over new voters.97  For 
National to use these new strategies they needed a highly flexible organisation, with 
minimal or no internal resistance to the employment of such strategies.  The 2003 re-
organisation provided the degree of flexibility needed.  Furthermore, the centralisation 
provided the money to hire professional consultants, such as Crosby|Textor, to 
recommend such strategies.  While these new campaign strategies were introduced by 
the Party, more traditional methods also received a considerable boost from National’s 
centralisation. 
                                                 
94 Hager, The Hollow Men, 186. 
95 Johansson, "Orewa and the Rhetoric of Illusion." 
96 Colin James, "A Contest of Values or a Contest of Wills? Factors and Issues in the 2005 Election," in 
Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 
2005,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007), 60. 
97 Jennifer Lees-Marshment, "Political Marketing," in Raymond Miller (ed.), New Zealand Government 
and Politics,  (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 495-496. 
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Consistent Advertising 
National’s 2005 advertising was more consistent throughout the country.  Almost all 
advertising sought both the party and electorate vote.  It was made clear to delegates at 
regional conferences by Steven Joyce and Judy Kirk that there was only to be one 
standardised campaign.98  The Party had standardised billboards and pamphlets.  
Television and radio campaigns were linked.  The campaign team decided not to use 
newspaper advertising, instead allowing electorates to use that medium as their own. 
 
National “made a clear decision not to have a newspaper advertising campaign.”99  The 
advertising that National did undertake in newspapers was based on the initiative of 
individual electorates rather than that of the National Management Board.  Given the 
institutional view held by many volunteers within National that it was the electorate 
vote that mattered,100 it is not surprising that one-quarter of the newspaper adverts did 
not push for the party vote and none included a picture of Don Brash.101  The lack of 
central control over the newspaper campaign allowed electorates to present their own 
messaging in one medium which did not clash or contradict the central campaigns 
advertising in that medium. 
 
                                                 
98 Rudd and Hayward, "Campaigning," 335. 
99 Emphasis in original.  Chris Rudd, Scott Connew, Phil Harris, and Matthew Parackal, "Political 
Advertising in the Metropolitan Newspapers," in Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), The 
Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 2005,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 
2007), 202. 
100 See: Joyce, "National - The Road to Recovery," 109. 
101 Rudd, Connew, Harris, and Parackal, "Political Advertising in the Metropolitan Newspapers," 201-
203. 
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 National’s 2005 billboard range was highly professional and standardised.  The 
nationwide billboards were “breathtakingly simply…. clear and uncluttered” and were 
“probably unmatched in New Zealand electoral politics for 30 years.”102 National hired 
external consultant John Ansell to create the ideas for the billboards while Phil O’Reilly 
of 20/20 Design Group transformed them into billboards.103  
 
Figure 6.3 National Party ‘Tax/Cut’ Billboard104
 
 
All of the nationwide billboards were split into two halves – the left half had a red 
background and a picture of a sour-looking Helen Clark; the right half had a blue 
background, a photo-shopped picture of smiling Don Brash and the National logo.  
Each half then had white words conveying policy differences.105  For instance, on one 
billboard (Figure 6.3) the Labour-side had the word ‘Tax’; the National-side then had 
‘Cut’ – the message being that Labour overtaxes voters whereas National will cut taxes.  
                                                 
102 Nigel S. Roberts, "Changing Spots: Political Party Billboard Battles in New Zealand in 2005," in 
Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 
2005,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007), 270, 274. 
103 Hager, The Hollow Men, 183. 
104 Image from: New Zealand National Party, "Send An e-Card,"  
105 Roberts, "Changing Spots," 269-272. 
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 The billboards were so successful that the ACT Party copied the design by adding a 
yellow panel with a picture of Rodney Hide to the right-hand side.106  National used 
about 20 different billboards, although some were for specific events in order to appeal 
to a congregation of like-minded individuals (such as horse racing enthusiasts).107
 
The 2005 electorate billboards all followed a set pattern.  On the left was a picture of 
the electorate candidate; on the right a picture of Don Brash – the same picture as on 
the nationwide billboards (although cropped slightly lower) to link the campaigns 
together.  Between them (in descending order) were: the candidate’s surname, the 
electorate name, ‘PARTY VOTE’ and finally ‘National’.  The billboards were clearly 
set out on the same blue background as the right-side of the nationwide billboards and 
successfully asked for both votes to go to National.  Figure 6.4 shows Auckland Central 
candidate Pansy Wong’s billboard and Wayne Mapp’s North Shore billboard with a 
last-minute attachment, both of which followed the generic model.   
 
Figure 6.4 National 2005 Electorates Billboards108
 
 
                                                 
106 Roberts, "Changing Spots," 277. 
107 Joyce, "National - The Road to Recovery," 110.   
108 Both photos taken by Nigel S. Roberts who retains copyright.  The photos were published in: Claire 
Robinson, "DVD," in Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New 
Zealand General Election of 2005,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007). 
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 While the nationwide billboards were controversial (especially the ‘Iwi/Kiwi’ billboard 
seen in Figure 6.2), they pushed National’s party vote message successfully.  The 
central control achieved by the National Management Board meant that electorate 
candidates were not solely seeking a personal vote but instead seeking ‘two-ticks’ for 
National.  In previous election campaigns there had been an option of ordering 
billboards centrally, but in 2005 it “pretty much became a requirement to order 
centrally.”109  Interestingly, the authorisation for the billboards still lay with the 
electorate – for instance Pansy Wong’s billboard was authorised by John Collinge 
while Wayne Mapp’s North Shore billboard received authorisation from Richard Gates 
(see Figure 6.4).  In contrast, all Labour electorate billboards were authorised by 
General Secretary Mike Smith.110  However, although legal responsibility with the 
billboard still lay with the electorate, the design and messages were clearly controlled 
by the National Management Board. 
 
In 2005 National had a more systematic central control over the material delivered to 
households. A nationwide pamphlet was designed by John Ansell and was distributed 
under the authorisation of Steven Joyce.  The aim was to link the print material in with 
the nationwide television and radio campaign (see below).  The nationwide ‘Taxathon’ 
pamphlets (see Figure 6.5) featured a picture of Helen Clark (‘The Prime Moneywater’) 
and Michael Cullen (‘The Wastemaster-General’) and then proceeded to list extra taxes 
Labour raised alongside a list of what National determined was embarrassing extra 
spending by the government.111  The ‘Taxathon’ pamphlets were distributed to almost 
                                                 
109 Subject C, Interview. 
110 To view the billboards, see: Robinson, "DVD." 
111 Taylor, "New take on old jingle to push tax message,"  
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 one million households throughout the country.112  Another six pamphlets, as well as 
several postcard versions of the nationwide billboards, were distributed on a nationwide 
basis.113
 
Figure 6.5 National ‘Taxathon’ Pamphlet114
 
 
Electorates put out their own pamphlets as well – these were not coordinated nationally 
but did highlight the party vote.  Officially the advertising on the pamphlet was split 
fifty-fifty between the party vote and electorate vote in order to share the spending 
under the Electoral Act 1993.  The pamphlets were still aimed at raising candidate 
                                                 
112 Steven Joyce, "National to send out a million 'Taxathon' pamphlets," Scoop, 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0508/S00061.htm, 2005 (accessed: 31 October 2007). 
113 Joyce, "National - The Road to Recovery," 110. 
114 Image from: Kevin Taylor, "New take on old jingle to push tax message," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10339261, 2005 (accessed: 31 October 
2007). 
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 awareness, although the Party headquarters ensured they used consistent branding (such 
as the National logo) and sought both votes.115
 
Figure 6.6 Screenshots of National ‘Taxathon’ Television Advertisement116
    
National’s 2005 television and radio advertisements were strongly thematically linked 
together – as too was the main election pamphlet (see above).  The main television 
advert National used was the ‘Taxathon’ (see Figure 6.6).  The television campaign 
used the ‘Telethon’ jingle but with some new words; Helen Clark and Michael Cullen 
sung ‘Thank you very much for you high taxation’.  The advert went on to attack 
Labour on numerous grounds – education, personal scandals, new/higher taxes, and 
policing.  Finally at almost the end of the advert the voiceover stated ‘We have a new 
                                                 
115 Subject C, Interview. 
116 Images are screenshots from: New Zealand National Party, "The Great NZ Taxathon,"  
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 total.  Time we had a new government’ with Don Brash responding ‘Thank you very 
much’ in front of a blue background with ‘PartyVote National’ on it.117
 
Radio has not been a significant medium for the National Party.  In 2005 electorates 
continued to use radio outside the ninety-day period in order to highlight the candidate 
– there was no central control over these advertisements.118  However, Steven Joyce’s 
radio background led National to use radio advertising to work alongside its nationwide 
television and pamphlet campaign.  The 2005 radio ‘Taxathon’ advertisments were 
primarily the music and lyrics from the television adverts.   
 
Television and radio advertising were both more professionalised in the 2005 
campaign.  John Ansell designed the television, radio and pamphlet campaigns.  
Indeed, advertising initiatives had significantly improved in regard to all mediums used 
in the campaign, bar newspapers.  Almost all of the nationwide advertising focused 
either on areas on which liberals and conservatives agreed – lower tax, ending 
government waste and so forth – or were dog-whistles and wedges. 
 
While there was some resistance to the centralised control, electorates did follow the 
directives of the National Management Board.  With the vastly superior advertising of 
the 2005 election campaign, alongside new strategies and more money to spend, 
National was able to secure 39.1 percent of the party vote. 
 
                                                 
117 New Zealand National Party, "The Great NZ Taxathon," New Zealand National Party, 
http://www.national.org.nz/files/Taxathon_small.asf, 2005 (accessed: 24 October 2007). 
118 Subject C, Interview. 
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 The 2005 Election 
The 2005 election produced significantly different results from previous MMP 
elections.  National grew its vote share.  The campaign itself was seen as being highly 
successful compared to previous MMP elections: 
It was probably the first campaign I’ve been involved in 
since ’87 where no one bitched about the campaign 
afterwards – this is incredibly rare, as I said you have a 
party of 20,000 experts and I’ve not heard any serious 
criticism.119
Labour still had the advantage going into the campaign – a booming economy, a 
significantly larger caucus to send out on the campaign trail, Helen Clark was well 
ahead in preferred Prime Minister polling – and won two percent more of the party 
vote.  The 2002 election result still hurt National in the 2005 campaign:   
 [T]he election result was a case of ‘If I was trying to go 
there, I wouldn’t start from here’.  It is hard to impress as 
an alternative government with only 27 MPs out of a 
Parliament of 120, and the support resources to match.  
As a result of the 2002 election, the National political 
team was woefully small compared to the resources the 
Labour government could bring to bear, and that led to 
too many cracks.120
While the centralisation had many positive impacts for National, it also meant that in 
2005 the Party suffered from a lack of institutional knowledge on the ground: 
That institutional knowledge was pretty good at the 
regional level, we’ve lost that, and that was one of the 
prices we paid, and we’re yet to find a formula, we’re yet 
to replace it at the national level.  I think we’re getting 
                                                 
119 Subject C, Interview. 
120 Joyce, "National - The Road to Recovery," 113. 
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 there, we’re getting underway for the long-term good of 
the Party.121   
The campaign strategy that National ran ensured that it almost doubled its previous 
election result and was within two percent of Labour’s result.  National actually won 
802 more electorate votes than Labour throughout the country, although both parties 
secured 31 electorate seats. 
 
Figure 6.7 Straight-Ticket Voting for the National Party, 1996-2005122
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Split-ticket voting significantly fell in 2005.  In the 1996, 1999 and 2002 elections, 
National was unable to convert all electorate-vote voters into party-vote voters (see 
                                                 
121 Subject B, Interview. 
122 The 1996 data is from survey data: Levine and Roberts, "Surveying the Snark," 185-186. The 1999 
data is calculated from: Jack Vowles, "What Happened at the 1999 Election?," in Jack Vowles, Peter 
Aimer, Jeffrey Karp, Susan Banducci, Raymond Miller, and Ann Sullivan (eds.), Proportional 
Representation on Trial: The 1999 New Zealand General Election and the Fate of MMP,  (Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 2002), 88.  The 2002 and 2005 data has been calculated from official results 
from: Chief Electoral Office, "2002 General Election Split Voting Statistics," Elections New Zealand, 
http://2002.electionresults.govt.nz/splitvotes/excel/SplitVotingAllElectorates.xls, 2002 (accessed: 10 
December 2007); Chief Electoral Office, "2005 General Election Split Voting Statistics - All 
Electorates," Elections New Zealand, http://2005.electionresults.govt.nz/elect-splitvote-Overall.html, 
2005 (accessed: 10 December 2007). 
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 Figure 6.7).  In 2002 only 57.1 percent of those giving National their electorate vote 
went on to give National a party vote.  In contrast, 82.9 percent of those giving their 
electorate vote to National also gave their party vote to National in 2005.  The 
substantial increase in terms of electorate voters giving National their party vote 
indicates that in 2005 National was able to convert electorate support into party votes 
more effectively through a party vote focused campaign.  As Figure 6.8 shows, 
National decline had largely been in the party vote; the electorate vote in 2002 was not 
significantly below that of the previous election. 
 
Figure 6.8 National Valid Vote Share 1990-2005123
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National’s recovery was not evenly distributed throughout the country.  As a result of 
promises by National to reduce the number of civil servants, the Wellington Central 
seat swung towards Labour.  Northland swung slightly towards Labour largely, it 
seems, as a result of Shane Jones being selected as Labour’s candidate.  While National 
                                                 
123 Electoral Commission, "General elections 1890-1993," ; Electoral Commission, "General elections 
1996-2005,"  
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 won the plurality in the general seats, the Māori seats swung to National by just 0.06 
percent of the party vote, and meant National did not receive the overall plurality.  
National won the North Island general electorates by 42.1 percent to Labour’s 39.5 
percent.  Yet Labour won the South Island by 42.4 percent to National’s 39.2 percent.  
Women comprised only 46 percent of National’s voters.  The campaigning, and the 
candidates selected, did not have enough nationwide appeal.124
 
National’s new campaign strategies also had significant impacts on other political 
parties.  ACT was largely decimated and only remained in Parliament due to National 
voters splitting their ticket in Epsom, against the wishes of the National Party, by 
giving their electorate vote to Rodney Hide.125  ACT also lost the significant financial 
donations from large corporations and wealthy individuals, as well as political 
advertiser John Ansell.  United Future was reduced to just three MPs.  New Zealand 
First lost a significant number of voters and the Tauranga electorate, placing New 
Zealand First in a precarious position for following elections. 
 
Steven Joyce noted that the centralisation “became the first building blocks of the 
party’s 2005 election campaign.”126  The re-organisation created new opportunities for 
the Party.  It became easier for National to collect corporate donations, to seek the 
advice of professional campaigners, to use new and controversial tactics and to run a 
nationwide campaign.  These new strategies and opportunities were all taken up in the 
                                                 
124 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, "The Baubles of Office: Winning and Losing Under MMP," in 
Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 
2005,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007), 31-48. 
125 Rodney Hide, "ACT - Survival in Epsom," in Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), The 
Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 2005,  (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 
2007), 141-142. 
126 Joyce, "National - The Road to Recovery," 105. 
 156
 2005 election campaign and all had significant impact on the way in which National 
campaigned throughout the country.  National was able to convert supporters into 
voters more effectively due to its new organisation.  The centralised organisation was 
better to suited to the MMP environment than the previous decentralised organisation. 
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 Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
The New Zealand National Party underwent dramatic events in the 1990s and 2000s.  
The period started well for National – under Jim Bolger National won a landslide FPP 
election after six years in opposition at the 1990 election.  Soon, however, the Party 
faced serious difficulty.  National barely won the 1993 election and only because 
Labour and the Alliance divided the Left vote.  The 1996 election, the first under the 
new MMP electoral system, again saw National scrape back in to government – this 
time in a coalition with New Zealand First.  After a leadership change to Jenny Shipley 
and the collapse of the coalition, National lost office at the 1999 election.  The party 
changed its leader again, this time to Bill English, only to fall dramatically at the 2002 
election to just 20.9 percent of the party vote. 
 
This catalogue of defeats prompted changes which resulted in National winning 39.1 
percent in the 2005 election – not enough to get National into government, but almost 
double the 2002 result.  After the 2002 election result, the Party accepted that 
something was seriously wrong and embarked upon a number of changes.  First, Judy 
Kirk replaced Michelle Boag as Party President.  Then, National reviewed its structures 
and, after finding them wanting, re-organised itself into a leaner, more centralised 
party.  Leader Don Brash replaced Bill English, promising corporate donations and 
expertise.  However, the most significant change, which affected the power balances, 
was the internal restructuring.  This new centralised structure was the main reason 
National was finally able to produce an MMP campaign in 2005. 
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 Electoral Systems and Party Organisation 
National’s decline and climb is, at least partially, an organisational story.  The 
decentralised organisation served National well under FPP and allowed it to win the 
majority of elections in which the Party competed.  The new MMP electoral system 
raised challenges which the decentralised organisation could not cope with.  Instead 
National entered into a decline.  The Party re-organised itself into a centralised party 
that was better able to operate in the MMP environment. 
 
Internationally there has been a common trend for parties to centralise their activities 
due to decline, infighting or cartelisation.1  The alternative explanations for 
centralisation need to be ruled out for National.  Parties have tended to respond to vote 
share decline through centralisation.  However National’s decline was primarily not due 
to weak leadership, a lack of voter trust, social change or economic change – thereby 
ruling out that it was a response to a ‘normal’ decline.  Further, parties have been 
reformed as part of infighting within the party.  Yet there is little evidence to suggest 
that the re-organisation was an attempt by one group of elites to takeover the entire 
party, indeed one rule change ensured Board turnover rather than entrench their 
positions.2  Another potential explanation for a centralisation is that it is the 
cartelisation of National.  Yet other cartel model reforms were not attempted, and 
National rejected state funding after it was proposed by Labour.3
 
                                                 
1 See Chapter Two. 
2 See: New Zealand National Party, "Constitution and Rules (2003)," 21. 
3 Judy Kirk, "National Party President Perspective" (paper presented at the Funding of Political Parties 
and Election Campaigns Symposium, Wellington, 15 June 2007). 
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 National’s centralisation was a response to changes in the electoral system under which 
the Party operated.  While postulating general rules and laws from one case is folly, the 
experience of the National Party does provide clues for further comparative analysis.  
The hypotheses proposed earlier were: 
Hypothesis 1: In competitive environments, political 
parties require an organisation which is suited to the 
environment in which they operate in. 
Hypothesis 2: MMP requires a more centralised 
organisation than FPP. 
 Hypothesis 2.1: A Shift from FPP to MMP is 
likely to produce a centralisation of candidate selection 
and campaigning. 
The National Party provides a single-case analysis which supports these hypotheses.  
Under FPP, National did have an organisation which was suited to its environment, and 
National won office more times than any other party.  The environment changed with 
the introduction of MMP and National’s organisation was no longer suited to its 
environment.  National did change its organisation to make it better suited to MMP, and 
did so by centralising its governance, candidate selection and campaign management.  
The experience of National, at least, confirms the hypothesis that mixed member 
proportional favours a more centralised organisation than first-past-the-post is correct.  
National was more successful when it brought campaign control and candidate 
selection more under the control of the National Management Board. 
 
The changes to National arguably meant that the New Zealand National Party was less 
democratic internally.  Party members lost control over the Board and the presidency, 
over candidate selection, and over the campaign strategy.  However, National cannot be 
blamed for its decision to re-organise itself along arguably less democratic lines.  One 
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 of the key goals of National is to win office – they wished to reclaim the title of ‘the 
natural party of government’.  If that means that the elites have greater control, then for 
many members that is more than a worthwhile exchange.  In terms of democracy within 
New Zealand, the question is was the exchange of internal party democracy for greater 
inter-party democracy worth while? 
 
Future Challenges for National 
National formed in an environment in which there was significant pressure for a two-
party system.  However under MMP, the smaller, ideologically purer parties are better 
able to compete for specific voters than one broad-church hybrid party.  National is 
surrounded by other parties and changing policy simply opens up room for other parties 
to gain voters.  While in 2005 National was able to build a coalition of liberal and 
conservative voters, it is a long-term challenge for each and every election for National. 
 
National could split itself into two political parties.  The liberal faction, with some ACT 
members, would form one distinct political party.  The conservative faction, with some 
New Zealand First and United Future members, would form the other centre-Right 
party within New Zealand.  As Figure 7.1 shows, the parties would meet in the centre-
ground and then each seek out their own distinctive set of voters.  The liberal party 
would range from social to economic liberals and predominately target urban areas; 
while the conservative party would focus upon conservative issues and be linked with 
the farming community. 
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 Figure 7.1 New Zealand Political Spectrum with National Split into Separate 
Liberal and Conservative Parties4
 
 
With the Duvergerian pressure on National gone, National will need to address this 
challenge of whether it is better to have a liberal-conservative coalition within one party 
or between two parties.  Each system has advantages and disadvantages.  The 2003 re-
organisation did not address the ideological divide found within National.  The divide 
may cause potential problems in the future for National.  The lack of need for a liberal-
conservative alliance in one political party is a potential future challenge that National 
may need to address. 
 
                                                 
4 The Progressive Coalition and all non-parliamentary parties are excluded.  Party size indicates 
ideological range, not vote share.  Compare with Figure 4.5 for the post-2002 political spectrum (which 
excludes the Māori Party). 
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 Conclusion 
The 2003 changes substantially altered National and made it more suited to the new 
electoral system.  While the National Management Board gained control in 
campaigning, candidate selection was only partially centralised.  National’s structure 
will continue to be reviewed to ensure that it is suited to its environment.  There is 
likely to be an attempt to further centralise the candidate selection process, and it may 
be the final change to respond to electoral reform.  Any other changes brought forward 
are unlikely to be a response to electoral reform, but to other changes in the internal or 
external environment. 
 
Ultimately the New Zealand National Party was a response to the organisational 
demands of first-past-the-post.  Its organisation was established in that environment to 
compete in elections.  The Party began to decline under mixed member proportional 
electoral rules and only a significant centralisation helped it to recover in the 2005 
election.  The change to mixed member proportional led National to centralise its 
organisational structure.  The pressure for parties to centralise is indeed stronger under 
mixed member proportional than under first-past-the-post.   
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 Appendix One: Organisation and Candidate Selection Charts 
The following charts are designed as visual aids of organisation.  They do invariably 
result in simplifying the relationships and do not indicate how each stage is determined.  
However, they do provide a useful guide to be read alongside the various editions of the 
Constitution and Rules of the New Zealand National Party. 
 
Notes: 
• The 1995-2003 candidate selection chart is based upon the post-1997 reform 
rules.  There were three minor changes impacting on the process. 
o In 1996 the Young Nationals were represented on the List Standing 
Committee by the Young Nationals Chairperson.  From 1997 onwards 
the Young Nationals were represented by the Youth Vice President. 
o In 1996 the National Treasurer was involved in candidate selection 
through his/her position on the National Executive. 
o In 1996 the central body is known as the ‘National Executive’.  From 
1997 onwards it is known as the ‘National Management Board’. 
• No account is made for how each stage progresses. 
• No account is made for the different powers each body or person has. 
• Selection by a collection of different persons/groups is indicated by a bordered 
box around those people with an arrow from the box itself. 
• Lines are coloured with the colour of the box that the line flows to.  However, 
parliamentary candidates are found in brown throughout.   
• Colours are kept constant through the graphs for the same, or similar, body. 
• Nominations are in dotted-lines.   
• The choice of colour does not represent any judgement value whatsoever.
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 2003- Organisation 
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 1973-1995 Candidate Selection 
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 1995-2003 Candidate Selection 
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 2003- Candidate Selection 
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 Appendix Two: National Party Candidates 1996-2005 
Losing candidates (on election night) are in italics.  If the electorate is italicised, but not 
the candidate, then it indicates the candidate came in on the list and lost the electorate.  
No ranking indicates that the candidate was not on the list. 
 
1996 Election 
The National Party candidate pool for 1996 was: 
List Ranking Candidate Electorate 
1  Jim Bolger Taranaki-King Country 
2  Don McKinnon  
3  Bill Birch Port Waikato 
4  Jenny Shipley Rakaia 
5  Paul East  
6  Doug Graham  
7  Georgina te Heuheu  
8  Lockwood Smith Rodney 
9  Bill English Clutha-Southland 
10  Katherine O’Regan Tauranga 
11  Simon Upton  
12  Wyatt Creech Wairarapa 
13  Joy McLauchlan Hutt South 
14  Doug Kidd Kaikoura 
15  Roger Sowry Otaki 
16  John Banks Whangarei 
17  Jim Gerard Waimakariri 
18  Belinda Vernon Maungakiekie 
19  Arthur Anae  
20  Maurice Williamson Pakuranga 
21  Murray McCully Albany 
22  Christine Fletcher Epsom 
23  Eric Roy Invercargill 
24  Peter Gresham Whanganui 
25  Roger Maxwell New Plymouth 
26  Pansy Wong  
27  Marie Hasler Waitakere 
28  Annabel Young  
29  Tony Ryall Bay of Plenty 
30  Nick Smith Nelson 
31  Alec Neill  
32  Denis Marshall Rangitikei 
33  John Luxton Karapiro 
34  John Carter Northland 
35  Brian Neeson Waipareira 
36  Ian Revell Northcote 
37  Wayne Taitoko  
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 38  David Major Rongotai 
39  Margie Stevens Dunedin North 
40  Warren Kyd Hunua 
41  David Carter Banks Peninsula 
42  Clem Simich Tamaki 
43  Lindsay Tisch  
44  Tony Steel Hamilton East 
45  Bob Simcock Hamilton West 
46  Phil Raffils Owairaka 
47  Gerry Brownlee Ilam 
48  Karyn Bisdee Rimutaka 
49  Mark Thomas Wellington Central 
50  Shane Frith Auckland Central 
51  Margaret Moir West Coast - Tasman 
52  Paul Hutchinson  
53  Angus McKay Wigram 
54  Stuart Boag Aoraki 
55  Dick Dargaville Te Tai Tokerau 
56  Peta Butt Te Tai Rawhiti 
57  Gavan Herlihy Otago 
58  Wayne Mapp North Shore 
59  Wayne Kimber Mahia 
60  Graeme Reeves Tukituki 
61  Sue McKenzie Christchurch East 
62  George Matthew Palmerston North 
63  Cliff Bedwell Te Tai Tonga 
64  Ken Yee Manukau East 
65  Kathryn Ward Napier 
Max Bradford Rotorua 
Murray McLean Coromandel 
David Broome Mangere 
Richard Gardner New Lynn 
Malcolm MacPherson Dunedin South 
Les Marinkovich Manurewa 
John McCarthy Taupo 
Tahuna Minhinnick Te Tai Hauauru 
Kerry Sutherland Christchurch Central 
Timoti te Heuheu Te Puku O Te Whenua 
Allan Wells Mana 
 
No National candidate was stood in Ohariu-Belmont. 
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 1999 Election 
The National Party candidate pool for 1999 was: 
List Ranking Candidate Electorate 
1  Jenny Shipley Rakaia 
2  Wyatt Creech  
3  Don McKinnon  
4  Bill English Clutha-Southland 
5  Lockwood Smith Rodney 
6  Georgina te Heuheu  
7  Roger Sowry Otaki 
8  Nick Smith Nelson 
9  Tony Ryall Bay of Plenty 
10  Belinda Vernon Maungakiekie 
11  Pansy Wong  
12  Simon Upton  
13  Maurice Williamson Pakuranga 
14  John Luxton  
15  Max Bradford Rotorua 
16  John Carter Northland 
17  Doug Kidd  
18  Annabel Young  
19  Eric Roy Invercargill 
20  Anne Tolley Napier 
21  David Carter Banks Peninsula 
22  Bob Simcock Hamilton West 
23  Katherine Rich Dunedin North 
24  Marie Hasler Titirangi 
25  Arthur Anae  
26  Alec Neill  
27  Katherine O'Regan Tauranga 
28  Mark Thomas Mana 
29  Phil Raffills Mt Roskill 
30  Kerry Prendergast  
31  Martin Poulsen Auckland Central 
32  Gavan Herlihy Otago 
33  Wayne Mapp North Shore 
34  Brian Neeson Waitakere 
35  Shane Ardern  Taranaki-King Country 
36  Gerry Brownlee Ilam 
37  Simon Power Rangitikei 
38  Paul Hutchison Port Waikato 
39  David Steele Taupo 
40  Dale Stephens Ikaroa-Rawhiti 
41  Angus McKay Wigram 
42  Phil Heatley Whangerei 
43  Paul Henry Wairarapa 
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 44  Richard Worth Epsom 
45  Chester Borrows Whanganui 
46  George Ngatai Waiariki 
47  Enosa Auva'a Manurewa 
48  Rea Wikaira  
49  Bret Bestic  
50  Rod O'Beirne West Coast - Tasman 
51  Wayne Marriott Aoraki 
52  Stephen Rainbow  
53  Tim MacIndoe  
54  George Kahi Hauraki 
55  Larry White Tukituki 
56  Ken Yee Manakau East 
57  Lynda Scott Kaikoura 
58  Matthew Parkinson East Coast 
59  Dawn Honeybun  
60  George Halligan Palmerston North 
61  Grant McCallum  
62  Peggy Burrows  
63  Toni Millar  
64  Noelene Buckland Mt Albert 
65  Stuart Boag Rongotai 
 Warren Kyd Hunua 
 Murray McCully Albany 
 Clem Simich Tamaki 
 Tony Steel Hamilton East 
 Lindsay Tisch Karapiro 
 Gideon Couper Waimakariri 
 Len Jury New Plymouth 
 Russell Keast Dunedin South 
 John Knox Christchurch East 
 Murray McLean Coromandel 
 Vanessa Neeson Te Atatu 
 Clare Radomkse Hutt South 
 Ian Revell Northcote 
 Stuart Roddick Rimutaka 
 John Stringer Christchurch Central 
 Sylvia Taylor Mangere 
 Dennis Patuwairua Te Tai Hauauru 
 Tom Murray Te Tai Tokerau 
 Cliff Bedwell Te Tai Tonga 
 
Rea Wikaira (48) was not on the list given to the Electoral Commission. 
No National candidates were stood in Ohariu-Belmont or Wellington Central 
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 2002 Election 
The National Party candidate pool for 2002 was: 
List Ranking Candidate Electorate 
1  Bill English  Clutha-Southland 
2  Roger Sowry Otaki 
3  Nick Smith Nelson 
4  David Carter Banks Peninsula 
5  Don Brash  
6  Georgina Te Heuheu  
7  Wayne Mapp North Shore 
8  Tony Ryall Bay of Plenty 
9  Gerry Brownlee Ilam 
10  Pansy Wong Auckland Central 
11  Lockwood Smith Rodney 
12  Lynda Scott Kaikoura 
13  Simon Power Rangitikei 
14  Katherine Rich Dunedin North 
15  Hekia Parata Wellington Central 
16  Gavan Herlihy Otago 
17  Bob Simcock Hamilton West 
18  Allan Peachey  
19  Sue Wood Mana 
20  Guy Salmon  
21  John Carter Northland 
22  Alec Neill Wigram 
23  Belinda Vernon Maungakiekie 
24  Anne Tolley Napier 
25  Richard Worth Epsom 
26  Eric Roy Invercargill 
27  Paul Hutchison Port Waikato 
28  Arthur Anae Manukau East 
29  Ian Buchanan Wairarapa 
30  Greg White Te Tai Hauauru 
31  Phil Heatley Whangarei 
32  Marie Hasler Waitakere 
33  Annabel Young  
34  Eric Liu  
35  Tau Henare Te Atatu 
36  Chester Borrows Whanganui 
37  Nicky Wagner Christchurch Central 
38  Leanne Jensen-Daines East Coast 
39  Tim MacIndoe Tauranga 
40  Wayne Marriott Aoraki 
41  Dan Gordon Waimakariri 
42  Sandra Goudie Coromandel 
43  John Key Helensville 
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 44  Jeremy Sole Northcote 
45  George Ngatai Tamaki Makaurua 
46  Dale Stephens Ohariu-Belmont 
47  Craig Foss Tukituki 
48  Judith Collins Clevedon 
49  Glenda Hughes Rongotai 
50  Dave Scott Palmerston North 
51  Weston Kirton Taupo 
52  Hamuera Mitchell Waiariki 
53  Enosa Auva'a Manurewa 
54  Sylvia Taylor Mangere 
55  Barry Nicolle West Coast - Tasman 
56  Paul Foster Dunedin South 
57  Mita Harris Te Tai Tokerau 
58  Brent Trewheela Mt Roskill 
59  Raewyn Bhana Mt Albert 
60  Bill Karaitiana Te Tai Tonga 
61  Geoff Horton New Plymouth 
62  Rodney Williams  
63  Alan Delamere Ikaroa-Rawhiti 
64  Peter O'Brien  
65  Rod O'Beirne  
 Shane Ardern Taranaki-King Country 
 Brian Connell Rakaia 
 Murray McCully East Coast Bays 
 Clem Simich Tamaki 
 Lindsay Tisch Piako 
 Maurice Williamson Pakuranga 
 Brendan Beach New Lynn 
 Cliff Bedwell Te Tai Tonga 
 Kevin Davies Tainui 
 Stephen Johnston Christchurch East 
 Mike Leddy Rimutaka 
 Tony Steel Hamilton East 
 Malcolm Short Rotorua 
 Richard Townley Hutt South 
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 2005 Election 
The National Party candidate pool for 2005 was: 
List Ranking Candidate Electorate 
1  Don Brash  
2  Gerry Brownlee  Ilam 
3  Simon Power Rangitikei 
4  Bill English Clutha-Southland 
5  Nick Smith Nelson 
6  Tony Ryall Bay of Plenty 
7  John Key Helensville 
8  David Carter Banks Peninsula 
9  Lockwood Smith Rodney 
10  Katherine Rich Dunedin North 
11  Murray McCully East Coast Bays 
12  Judith Collins Clevedon 
13  Tim Groser  
14  Wayne Mapp North Shore 
15  John Carter Northland 
16  Richard Worth  Epsom 
17  Maurice Williamson Pakuranga 
18  Clem Simich Mangere 
19  Georgina te Heuheu  
20  Pansy Wong Auckland Central 
21  Shane Ardern  Taranaki-King Country
22  Phil Heatley Whangarei 
23  Paul Hutchison Port Waikato 
24  Lindsay Tisch  Paiko 
25  Brian Connell Rakaia 
26  Sandra Goudie Coromandel 
27  Chris Finlayson Mana 
28  Nicky Wagner  Christchurch Central 
29  Tau Henare Te Atatu 
30  Allan Peachey Tamaki 
31  Jo Goodhew Aoraki 
32  David Bennett Hamilton East 
33  Chester Borrows  Whanganui 
34  Chris Auchinvole West Coast – Tasman 
35  Jonathan Coleman Northcote 
36  Mark Blumsky Wellington Central 
37  Eric Roy Invercargill 
38  Kate Wilkinson Waimakariri 
39  Nathan Guy Otaki 
40  Jacqui Dean Otago 
41  Jackie Blue  Mt Roskill 
42  Colin King Kaikoura 
43  Anne Tolley East Coast 
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 44  Craig Foss Tukituki 
45  Paula Bennett Waitakere 
46  Katrina Shanks Ohariu-Belmont 
47  Fepulea'i Ulua'ipou-OMa Aiono Manurewa 
48  Ravi Musuku  Mt Albert 
49  Bob Clarkson Tauranga 
50  John Hayes Wairarapa 
51  Moira Irving  New Plymouth 
52  Chris Tremain Napier 
53  Mita Harris New Lynn 
54  Mike Leddy Rimutaka 
55  Conway Powell Dunedin South 
56  David Round Christchurch East 
57  Gilbert Stehbens Rotorua 
58  Ken Yee Manukau East 
59  Paul Goldsmith Maungakeikei 
60  Malcolm Plimmer Palmerston North 
61  Nicola Young Rongotai 
62  Tim MacIndoe  Hamilton West 
63  Allison Lomax Wigram 
64  Weston Kirton Taupo 
65  Rosemarie Thomas Hutt South 
 
 
No National candidates were stood in the following seats: 
Ikaroa-Rawhiti 
Tainui 
Tamaki Makaurau 
Te Tai Hauauru 
Te Tai Tokerau 
Te Tai Tonga 
Waiariki 
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 Appendix Three: Estimated Number of Party Members 
No formal membership figures are released, but there are a number of estimates made 
on the size of National’s membership. 
Long-term trend, 1936-2007 
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 Sources 
Most of the data is collated in:  
Edwards, Bryce, "Political Parties in New Zealand: A Study of Ideological and 
Organisational Transformation" (PhD, University of Canterbury, 2003). 397, 689-691 
 
However, this has been supplemented by some more recent estimates, from:  
Year Estimate Source 
1940s 
and 
1950s 
300,000 Miller, Raymond, Party Politics in New Zealand (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 73 
Early 
1970s 
200,000 James, Colin, "National," in Raymond Miller (ed.), New 
Zealand Government and Politics. (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 368 
2001 20,000 James, Colin, "National," in Raymond Miller (ed.), New 
Zealand Government and Politics. (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). n375 
2001 22,000 Young, Audrey, "Brash plotting to extend magic run." New 
Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&
objectid=3561003, 2004 (accessed: 7 June 2007) 
2002 26,000 New Zealand Press Association, "National supporters urged to 
overturn the polls," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=774&
objectid=2050667, 2002 (accessed: 7 June 2007) 
2002 7,000 Salmond, Rob, "Choosing Candidates: Labour and National in 
2002," in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen 
Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), 
New Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002,  
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003). 196 
2004 44,000 Young, Audrey, "Brash plotting to extend magic run." New 
Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&
objectid=3561003, 2004 (accessed: 7 June 2007) 
2005 40,000 Berry, Ruth, "National members bid to soften race policy," New 
Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=58&obj
ectid=10347251, 2005 (accessed: 7 June 2007) 
2005 30,000 Milne, Jonathan, "Nervous Labour faces tough battle to return to 
power," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&
objectid=10117265, 2005 (accessed: 7 June 2007) 
2005 Between 
10,000 
and 
17,000 
O'Connor, Teresa, "Maori Party 'biggest in the country'," New 
Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&
objectid=10128011, 2005 (accessed: 7 June 2007) 
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 2005 20,000 Subject C, Interview with Gregory R. Stephens, 12 November 
2007 
2005 30,000 Young, Audrey, "Remarkable rise of Don Brash," New Zealand 
Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&
objectid=10337228, 2005 (accessed: 7 June 2007) 
2006 20,000 Edwards, Bryce, "Backdoor funding affects democracy," New 
Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=221&o
bjectid=10401160&pnum=0, 2006 (accessed: 7 June 
2007) 
2007 20,000 Collins, Simon, "Private donations make up small percentage of 
funding," New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/story.cfm?c_id=280&
objectid=10481111&ref=rss, 2007 (accessed: 8 
December 2007) 
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